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After enduring centuries of colonialism, followed recently by the exogenous forces of 
globalization and isomorphism, Romania and other countries in Eastern Europe have had 
unique opportunities amidst formidable challenges since they began their transitions 
toward democracy. In this case study, I explore these forces and resulting challenges that 
influenced the Romanian education system between 1989 and 2007. With this approach, I 
try to elucidate the difficulties endured by the Romanian political and education elite 
when transitioning the country from totalitarianism toward democracy. I conducted an 
extensive literature review and document analysis, coupled with in-depth interviews with 
the Romanian bureaucratic education elite who influenced the country’s education 
reforms. My research investigated the complicated manner in which education plays a 
role in supporting a country in transition.  
Two central questions drove my research: 
(1)    What factors impacted Romania’s transition from a totalitarian regime 
toward democracy? 
(2)    What role did education play in Romania’s transition from a totalitarian 
regime toward democracy? 
My findings suggest that too many poorly constructed short-term focused reforms, 
developed by an elite deeply entrenched in its communist past, slowed significantly the 
development of a democratic education system in Romania. Exogenous forces such as 
colonialism, globalization and isomorphism further compounded the challenges of 
Romania’s political transition. The elements of these findings, in addition to domestic 
factors such as Romania’s history and culture, coupled with its nascent political system 
and colonized mentality, partially explain the reasons for the core of the education system 
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CHAPTER I: OVERVIEW  
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this introductory section is to provide the overview, focus, 
purpose, research questions, framework of analysis and potential significance of my case 
study. This study investigates the major trends, forces and phenomena that affected 
education and culture in transitional Romania between 1989 and 2007. This study 
explores also the nature of education as an institution with the potential to play a role in 
nation-building, social reproduction, cultivation of character, teaching of democracy and 
instilling of culture. However, in post- coup d’état Romania, the role of education was 
minimal as a component of transition due to competing forces that undermined 
education’s potential role, which may have contributed to disjointed, ineffective and ill-
timed policies and laws. For comprehension and clarity, this study will elucidate these 
forces and highlight why and how they influenced education with a discussion of the 
potential consequences based on evaluated literature and original interviews conducted 
with elite bureaucrats in Romania. 
In this chapter, I lay the groundwork upon which I construct my analysis of 
Romania’s transition within the context of many historical and contemporary challenges. 
Whereas many studies about democratic transition focus on the quality of the democracy 
or the process itself from a political perspective, I spotlight education when considering 
the transition, which provides a unique lens to view democratization and a country’s 
transition from one system toward another. Through this lens, and by providing a new 
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perspective, I try to then uncover a number of possible directions to consider for Romania 
as well as other future transitional democracies. Moreover, even non-transitional 
democracies can benefit from revisiting their respective developments. 
 
Relationship to Topic 
My relationship to this topic was initially based on my Eastern European ancestry. 
This relationship was later strengthened by my interest in democratization, development 
and the integral role of education in both constructs. I hope my study elucidates for 
leaders in nascent, future and established democracies the importance of thinking and 
acting with a long-term perspective with regards to education as a component of national 
political development and democratic transition. Therefore, my relationship to the study 
is both personal and ideological, the combination of which irrevocably connects me to the 
outcome of this work.  
 
Focus 
The focus of my study was guided by the following questions:  
(1) What factors impacted Romania’s transition from a totalitarian regime 
toward democracy? 
(2) What role did education play in Romania’s transition from a totalitarian 
regime toward democracy? 
These questions remain unanswered in the literature in terms of exploring the causes 
behind Romania’s transition in relation to changes in public and private education, and 
how the transition may have differed from other countries in Eastern Europe. For 
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example, the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, along with Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovenia all liberalized their economies and moved quickly toward a 
democratic government and democratic society. Meanwhile, countries like Romania and 
Bulgaria were slower to transition: their Perestroika approach to reform involved a very 
slow, calculated shift from a closed and controlled government toward an open and 
democratic government, despite the passage of many reforms and policies. Moreover, the 
role of education is not adequately explored in the literature and possibly insignificant in 
supporting the transition. The question of whether education was a critical factor in a 
country’s transition toward democracy was not clearly delineated, nor was the issue of 
whether transitions were slowed by the failure to use education as an agent of rapid 
change. 
Unlike some other countries in Eastern Europe, which capitalized on the 
opportunity to fundamentally remove the obstacles standing in the way of democratic 
reform and stability, such as instituting democratic education and capitalist theory in the 
classroom, Romanian elite did not take advantage of this opportunity. These elite or 
bureaucrats, defined in this study as those in the field of education who held or now hold 
a position of influence during and possibly before the transition, had the authority and 
power to shape the outcomes of the reform. For example, Romania did not furnish its 
Constitution of 1991 with regulations for government, business and education that were 
necessary to navigate through the transition away from totalitarianism. Although this 
Constitution allowed for the provision of private or non-secular education for the first 
time in almost fifty years, the government did not supplement the Constitution with a 
long-term plan for these schools with regard to accreditation, funding, curriculum, 
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democratic education or pedagogy. Four years later, when Education Act 84 was passed 
in 1995, also known as the Education Law of 1995, it provided guidance for the 
Romanian education system and addressed the vague nature of the Constitution as it 
relates to education—which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Concurrent with Education Act 84 in 1995, the Romanian government applied to 
gain entry into the European Union (EU), a decision that promised to link Romania to 
more established democracies in Western Europe which would possibly support its 
transition. The EU application also indicated the Romanian government’s alleged 
willingness to adhere to non-domestic decision-making, as in the case of the education 
assimilation law for the EU known as the Bologna Accords or Bologna Process.  
For an elite like Romania’s who were ill-trained and unprepared for their 
newfound democracy, the Accords unfortunately did not clarify how the government 
would specifically direct and administer its major domestic systems (such as education). 
While other Eastern European countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic also 
sought EU accession early in their transitions, the key difference lies with the elite who 
were charged with, or took charge of, the duty to lead their respective countries toward a 
long-term goal: a stable democracy with a free-market economy buttressed by a 
democratic education system. As a result, unlike the elite in Poland and the Czech 
Republic who ascended to power after regime change, the Romanian elite from the 
communist regime remained in charge of the government, and through an approach 
approximating authoritarianism, led the country’s democratic transition. In my research, I 
try to better understand how the lack of alternative elite, defined as those to which a new 
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government can turn to for experienced or competent leadership for the new type of 
government,1 may have had an effect on the pace and substance of Romania’s transition. 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this case study was to explore the impact of political transition on 
state-sponsored and private education, as well as to study education’s role within a state’s 
transition, by focusing on Romania as a case study within the context of Eastern Europe. 
Particular attention was given to the role of the educational elite—or bureaucrats, those 
with an ability to impact Romanian education on a national scale through positions such 
as within the Ministry of Education—on the transition from totalitarianism toward 
democracy, a period extending from the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent coup in 
December 1989 to EU accession on January 1, 2007. To explore factors affecting 
Romania’s transition, as well as the role of actors who had opportunities to change the 
course of their countries, my literature review focused on colonialism, globalization and 
isomorphism as emerging concepts that help explain the forces that have influenced and 
are still influencing Romanian education.  
Before conducting my literature review and original research, I was uncertain 
which specific factors have impacted the transition, and whether or to what extent 
education played a role in this transition. Therefore, I sought to discover details about 
Romanian education during the transition from a totalitarian regime toward democracy 
                                                            
1 An example of alternative elite in the Czech Republic, for example, is Václav Havel or 
in Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki as both were non-communists who possessed the ability 




while considering the significant impact of exogenous forces and the role of elite 
education leadership. To conduct this research, I examined both foreign and domestic 
forces in analyzing Romania’s education system during its transitional period between 
1989 and 2007. By focusing on Romania, I am highlighting a country not often studied to 
explore the perspective of its elite education officials and role of education in its 
transition. Through this research, I hoped to better understand the challenges related to 
transitioning a country toward a democracy and a free-market economy, particularly in a 
country that lacked an alternative elite. To address this phenomenon, the research had to 
uncover how democratization is often considered sequential and one-size-fits-all in the 
literature, i.e., the old regime gives way to a series of pre-conceived, methodical steps 
possibly without regard for adequately considering the impact of culture, history or 
geopolitical issues. In addition, a key observation I sought to illuminate is how education 
is not always utilized as a major component when considering policy prescriptions to 
assist transitional democracies. Instead, security and economic needs take priority when 
transitioning; therefore, it seems to me that by not addressing the education system, 
countries may experience long-term challenges related to the creation of a stable 
democratic government that may eventually supersede security and commerce.  
To better understand the power of the three main exogenous forces that impacted 
the Romanian elite and how they affected education, without discounting other 
endogenous factors that will be discussed subsequently, I reviewed literature and 
conducted interviews with education bureaucrats. I also provided a broader understanding 
of Romania’s education history as well as the more recent status of its school systems 
from primary through tertiary education through the perspective of the interviewees. To 
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broaden the depth and breadth of this study, I referred to Romania’s Eastern European 
neighbors for some comparison, but the focus of this study is on Romania itself. In 
Chapter III, I will discuss my qualitative research methodology in great detail, followed 
by macro-level findings in Chapter IV and micro-level findings in Chapter V from my 
original interviews conducted in Romania, which were triangulated with my literature 
review where possible. Following these findings, I will provide theoretical and practical 
reflections in Chapter VI followed by my conclusion and possible directions to consider 
in Chapter VII. 
 
Framework of Analysis 
By employing a qualitative and exploratory case study methodology, I hoped to 
gather the data necessary to adequately discuss Romania as a transitional country. This 
case study methodology ensured that the parameters and focus of this study were limited 
to the events that took place between December 1989 and January 1, 2007. Within the 
context of this case study, I conducted an extensive literature review; in an effort to fill 
any gaps in the literature, I interviewed Romanian elite who were part of or are still part 
of the transitional government. The purpose of these interviews was to highlight what has 
happened, in terms of new policies and laws, and their impact on education. The 
interviews provide first hand information, or “voice” from the field, which can enhance 
our understanding on the role of education in a country’s transition from one political 
system to another. By evaluating colonialism and its effects on the region, globalization 
and its effect on culture, the EU and its isomorphic tendencies, and lastly, Romanian 
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education policies, I hope to convey a clearer understanding of the challenges and 
obstacles Romania faced while transitioning. 
As previously mentioned, the major concepts that guide this framework are 
colonialism, globalization and isomorphism in the context of democratization and 
decentralization. I will frame these concepts around the geographic locations of Romania 
and more broadly, Eastern Europe, and this contextualized understanding will provide a 
backdrop to examine the perspective of the elite in Romania who had to deal with 
exogenous forces and the legacy of history in real time. Hence, instead of focusing on 
solely domestic factors as some studies have explored, this study will incorporate the 




My study has the potential to improve the understanding of some of the 
challenges and resulting decisions faced by the Romanian elite during the transition from 
a totalitarian government toward democracy. This understanding can expose the way in 
which countries transition when they lack an alternative elite2 following a political 
revolution or coup. Moreover, this study addresses the impact of exogenous forces 
coupled with domestic challenges, and especially the role of education, which is usually 
treated as a lower priority in the triage of development, which focuses on the economy 
and political system first. By listening to the voices of the elite, this study hopes to 
                                                            
2 Leadership who were not part of the regime from which a country transitioned and who 
possess the ability and experience to lead within the framework of a new form of 
government, such as democracy. 
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examine the success or failure of education in propelling countries beyond short-term 




CHAPTER II: PART I: LITERATURE REVIEW:  
MACRO, EMERGING CONCEPTS AND PHENOMENA 
 
Introduction 
 To provide a firm foundation for this case study, the following literature review 
explores the three emerging concepts I have determined to be essential in understanding 
the challenges of education reform within transitional democracies: colonialism, 
globalization and isomorphism. These exogenous forces have had a deep and profound 
impact on the endogenous operational abilities within countries that are former colonies. 
For example, when transitioning from a Soviet-style education system that focused on 
“banking,” or a focus on rote memory and retention without analysis, toward a 
democratic education that valued creative and critical thinking, Romania went from 
modeling one external entity  (the Soviet Union) to another (the EU), while struggling to 
retain its own cultural context. Therefore, exploration of domestic issues necessitates the 
exploration of these non-domestic, exogenous forces in the context of democratic 
transition. 
The theoretical underpinning that helps explain these forces with which elite 
contended directly connects to their role in making decisions which affect Romania’s 
democratic transition, and educational reform, in particular. In the following sections, I 
will define Romania’s geographic region, followed by a review of democracy and 
democratization for the purpose of contextualizing the three emerging forces. This 
exploration will assist in better understanding Romania’s context for education reform 
11 
 
between 1989 and 2007. Before discussing these topics in great detail, however, I will 
first provide a brief historical overview to contextualize my case study. 
 
Defining Eastern Europe 
While every country experiences a unique historical and developmental trajectory, 
trends and commonalities can be discovered on the regional geographic level, as well the 
thematic and conceptual level. This section will explore an overview of the regional 
context for Romania to better understand the environment in which Romania transitioned. 
Understanding this region also begins with analyzing the symbolism of the Berlin Wall 
and its history as it physically divided this region: this wall symbolized a divided 
Germany and a separated Europe. Although the wall physically divided West Berlin from 
East Berlin, it was known as the Iron Curtain because it symbolized a separation between 
Western democracy and capitalism and Soviet-style communism, which was 
characterized as an impermeable political system. The concept of division dates back to 
Emperor Diocletus around 311 A.D., who made a decision to simplify the management of 
the Roman Empire by dividing Eastern Europe from Western Europe. Thus, the creation 
of the Berlin Wall provided a physical barrier that embodied a political arrangement 
begun by Diocletus’ decision two thousand years prior; this division was later solidified 
by Russian occupation, resulting in the further isolation of Eastern Europe.  
Modern day Eastern Europe consists of the following countries: Poland, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Moldova. With Poland, Czech Republic and Slovenia comprising the western border of 
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Eastern Europe, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia comprise the northern portion often called 
Baltic States. The Black Sea borders of Romania and Bulgaria represent the natural water 
boundary of Eastern Europe, with the remaining countries comprising the Southern 
border. Because each of these countries approximate the land mass of a medium-sized 
U.S. state, Eastern Europe makes up a significant portion of the European landmass. 
Particular characteristics of the Balkan Region within Eastern Europe will be discussed in 
a subsequent chapter. After defining the geographic area of Eastern Europe and its 
symbolic geographic isolation, I will now turn to exploring Romania, specifically. 
 
Modern Romania 
Romania serves as an example of one country within a connected but varied 
grouping of nations that share many common historical features. To contextualize 
Romania, I will also explore key characteristics of the country and its people in order 
to better understand contemporary, post-coup Romanian education. According to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Romania  
covers 237, 500 sq. km and has a population of 22.7 million people. 
In 1992, 45.5% of the population was under 30 years of age. More than half of 
all Romanians (54%) live in cities. Nearly 90% of the population speaks 
Romanian, the national language and the language of instruction in 96% of 
schools. Several linguistic minorities also exist in Romania, including 
Hungarian, German, and Roma (1.8%) (http://www.oecd.org). 
As one of the largest countries in Europe (approximating the size of Oregon), 
Romania was also one of the most centralized in all aspects of public life during its 
13 
 
communist period, which began after World War II and continued through December 
1989. Following on from an approximate 50-year monarchy before WWII and brief 
fascist government after WWII, the Romanian government became totalitarian under 
Ceauşescu very early in Romania’s communist era; therefore, the words communism 
and totalitarianism (in research literature and Romanian parlance today) are often 
used interchangeably—a concept I will explore thoroughly in subsequent sections. 
The totalitarian regime was particularly inefficient and negative when addressing the 
needs of the Roma population, an ethnic minority who lacked political clout during 
communism. A second group of ethnic minorities, Hungarians, inhabited the 
northwest of Romania following a border change in 1945. Although one-dimensional 
with respect to ethnicity, Romania had to contend with two key minority populations 
within its borders as it addressed political and education reforms during the transition. 
To better understand transition, I will now provide an overview of democracy, 
democratization and transition itself. 
 
Government: Democratization 
For the purposes of this study, democracy is defined as a political system whereby 
the populace controls government through representatives who are elected and who work 
within varying degrees of centralized or decentralized governments, depending on the 
country and its needs (Carothers, 1999). The population may also participate in non-
governmental organizations through publicly beneficial activities such as volunteering. 
Therefore, the population of a democracy has a stake in the outcomes of decisions made 
by their government.   
14 
 
Although multiple versions of democratic governments currently exist throughout 
the world ranging from pluralist to strong, most forms exhibit the following components: 
an electoral process with national political parties and free elections, state institutions 
with a constitution, effective and transparent judiciary, representatives and a pro-
democratic military; and, finally, a civil society with active, non-governmental 
organizations, politically educated citizenry, a strong and independent media and strong 
independent unions (Carothers, 1999). Political scientists Rose et al. (1998) consider a 
country to be a democracy if it comprises the following qualities: “it governs by the rule 
of law; institutions of civil society are active and independent of the state; there are free 
and fair elections; and governors are accountable to the electorate (p. 36). Therefore, 
commonality exists among the definitions of democracy, and potentially differs in the 
implementation of these definitions as well as the degree to which each characteristic 
manifests in the given country. 
Democratization, then, is the process by which a country changes from its status 
as a communist, authoritarian or totalitarian form of government toward a democracy, 
usually following an “abrupt change in regime due to war, internal change or the collapse 
of an external power” (Rose et al., 1998, p. 21). Moreover, “whereas a regime can 
collapse overnight, democratization is a process that requires time” (p. 45). Therefore, 
rushing to implement too many changes may cause instability, but too slow of a process 
may spark insurrection. 
During democratization, the country’s focus is on transformation. According to 
political theorist Ian Bremmer (2006), all transitional democracies follow what he calls a 
“J curve” progression with varying degrees of horizontal or vertical movement. For 
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example, as a government opens and increases transparency, it exposes itself to potential 
destabilization. The following figure demonstrates this progression:  
 
Figure 1: The J Curve 
 
With the assumption that Bremmer’s theory of transition is applicable to most or all 
democracies, one main challenge for each respective country is to determine the pace at 
which it progresses along the curve from authoritative stability toward a more open 
democracy that supports greater equality for its citizens and stability. Another challenge 
is to determine to what extent transition is needed and what type of democracy is 
desirable to follow as a model. Hence, this quantitative curve is an approximation and a 
guide to illustrate various progression levels of democratic transition, but there are a few 




Democratization: Rapid or Moderate Pace 
As the J curve shows, the pace or progression of democratization may differ 
depending on the country in question. For example, the northern and western region of 
Eastern Europe democratized quickly. The Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania all had various forms of revolution, some violent, others peaceful, 
but all removed most or all former communists from power and transitioned at a 
relatively rapid pace (Bremmer, 2006). Shortly after these countries’ revolutions, elected 
representatives ushered in swift political and economic reforms, followed by education 
reforms once the countries had stabilized. Complete changes of the political elite as well 
as political and economic systems demonstrated rapid reformation and economic growth 
without a significant loss in stability. Besides the fact that these countries possessed an 
alternative elite to the communists who had the capacity to lead in a transitional 
democracy, an additional key element for these countries’ rapid substantive transition 
was the existence of a solidarity movement (Kapstein and Mandelbaum, 1997). In 
Poland, for example, the combination of high public expectations and popular consensus 
behind the transitional leadership forged a unified leadership and citizenry. In addition, 
Poland, like Czech Republic and to an extent Hungary, maintained life-expectancy and 
infant mortality rates3 similar to western countries and invested heavily in education and 
health care following the transitions (Kapstein and Mandelbaum, 1997). 
As briefly mentioned, Hungary represents a country which experienced a 
moderate pace of transition with mixed results. Hungary’s revolution was rapid but 
                                                            
3 These two indicators are indicators used here as proxies to represent the quality of life 
in a country.  
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modest in scope, leaving many communist political elite in power while changing many 
government structures (Carothers, 1999). Not surprisingly, its location in the center of 
Eastern Europe could have played a part in its rapid reform pace and modest scope due to 
its proximity to both western and eastern influences, and representing a “political 
average” of the two regions. Moreover, as indicated above, its solidarity movements and 
quality of life indices were already on a level higher than, for example, Romania or 
Moldova. In addition, while Hungary was limited by the carryover of some leadership 
from communism to the new democratic government and was therefore slowed in its 
transition, this country maintained a legacy of economic experimentation with an ability 
to innovate and find ways of working through financial turmoil—a key component in 
transition (Kapstein and Mandelbaum, 1997).  
 
Change in Romania: Revolution or Coup d’état? 
Before discussing a slower style of transition, it is important to first explore the 
starting point for Romania’s transition, and how this origin is significant for the changes 
in government. As the 1980’s drew to a close, Romania followed the lead of countries 
located in the western portion of Eastern Europe and distanced itself from Soviet power. 
While Romanian President Nicolae Ceauşescu began distancing Romania from the 
Soviets in the 1970’s to support his nationalist tendencies, the education system 
continued to model the Soviet system in form and function. By 1989, Romania’s 
economy was weak and the citizen support for Ceauşescu’s continued leadership had 
waned, leading to an undercurrent of support for a change in government (Behr, 1991). 
On December 22, 1989, at 12:08 pm, following what was supposed to be a pro-
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government rally headed by Ceauşescu, he and his wife, Elena, were arrested and charged 
with multiple crimes. They were later tried and executed on December 25, 1989, which 
symbolized the end of their reign and that of totalitarianism in Romania.  
Although the head of state was executed and many others in power lost their 
positions, Romania did not experience a change in power due to an uprising of the 
people, and therefore did not have a revolution. To this point, the timing of the revolution 
was ill-coordinated and did not represent causality of the change in government; 
moreover, the events surrounding the coup were seemingly planned by those who later 
came into power (Siani-Davies, 2005). This question is critically important to explore 
because a revolution would symbolize “of the people” while a coup would represent 
internal regime change at the elite level. What is known is that many people died directly 
before and during the nationwide protests that arose—a clear sign that the events of 
December 22nd were to be taken seriously and, even if staged by elite with the support of 
the CIA and KGB as supported by observational remarks by émigrés, ended with fatal 
realities. What contributes to this event being a violent coup is that some of these protests 
occurred after the arrest of the Ceauşescu, indicating the suspicious nature of this event 
because a revolution would mean these events caused the subsequent arrest and deposal 
of Ceauşescu (Siani-Davies, 2005). Furthermore, high ranking Communist party officials 
later took major roles in the new government, which means a large percentage of 
alternative elite were not elected as in the revolutions of Czech Republic and Poland. 
Therefore, if the government did not change substantially in form and if many of the 
same officials remained in power afterwards, the power change in Romania more closely 
resembles a coup d’état than a true revolution. This delineation is highly significant due 
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to the difference in expectations one may have depending on whether or not a true 
revolution occurred, which characterizes the beginnings of Romanian democracy as 
being borne out of uncertainty. For clarity, I will refer to this change as a coup until 
further research clarifies the true nature of these events.  
 
Styles of Democratization: Perestroika 
With this understanding of the coup, Romania and other Balkan countries to the 
south and southwest, such as Bulgaria, underwent slower substantive reforms than their 
northern and western neighbors. Romania and Bulgaria followed Russian-style 
democratization known as perestroika and glasnost (Diamond & Plattner, 2002). These 
phenomena are defined as a type of reform whereby many, if not all, of the political elite 
remain in power and reforms are made at top-down, slow pace of reform that allows the 
elite to manage the opening of the decision-making process to the public even if many 
policies are created. In these cases, reforms can be frequent but not substantive and often 
too high-level to effectively change the core of the system or what occurs at the grass-
roots level. In reference to Bremmer’s J curve, Romania and Bulgaria followed the curve 
at a controlled pace to ensure the elite could maintain stability amidst significant change.  
These political elite held positions of authority in the regime from which the country 
transitioned as well as the new form of government toward which they transitioned. 
Hence, these political elite are not considered alternative to the former elite. As 
mentioned, since most of the government officials remained in power afterwards, these 
“reformed” Romanian leaders had the challenge of transitioning toward democracy 
despite a long and deep-rooted history of totalitarianism and communism that provided 
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no experience with democracy. Moreover, the newly formed government was not 
installed by the people and did not begin with support from the citizenry. 
 
Styles of Democratization: Static Polity 
Moldova is the final country example of democratic transition that I will explore 
briefly in this study.  A country that borders northern Romania, Moldova was, as of 2010, 
the last country in Eastern Europe to begin its democratic transition. As the poorest 
country in all of Europe, it has not substantially reformed, despite the major changes that 
have occurred since 1989 throughout the rest of the region. Presently, Russian troops 
remain in the politically volatile Transnistrian region in eastern Moldova. On this border, 
the Russian presence seems to mirror the type of occupation that would manifest in both 
Moldova and Romania in 1953, when Soviets colonized both countries using military 
force (Verona, 1992). Moldova and Russia remain in a frozen conflict with no clear signs 
of an imminent settlement. Furthermore, after the 1953 troop invasion of Moldova and 
Romania, the Soviets installed communist leadership who quickly turned authoritarian 
(and later, in Romania, totalitarian). Like Romania during that time, Moldova still 
remains directly in the Russian sphere of influence despite being ethnically, culturally 
and linguistically Romanian. As the fourth example of a democratization pace in Eastern 
Europe, following on from sample representatives such as 1) Czech Republic and Poland; 
2) Hungary; 3) Romania; Moldova represents the fourth group in its extreme right 
position in terms of transition. Based on the foundational discussions of these four styles 
of democratization, the following section will explore the underlying concept of 





 Decentralization is a complex process because it is not always linear, and differs 
from country to country. As Ginsburg et al. (2010) explained, “(de)centralization covers a 
range of meanings, including a distinction between functional and territorial 
(de)centralization” (p. 5). Functional decentralization, as borrowed from Bray (1999), 
“‘refers to a shift in the distribution of powers between various authorities that operate in 
parallel’” (p. 5). An example of this form of decentralization would be the distribution of 
authority from the Ministry of Education to universities to enable university autonomy. 
Territorial decentralization, however, “‘refers to a redistribution of control among the 
different geographic tiers of government, such as nation, states/provinces, districts and 
schools’” (Bray, 1999 as cited in Ginsburg, 2010).  An example of territorial 
decentralization would be the distribution of responsibilities to local administrations from 
the central, Ministry of Education in Romania. There are different forms of territorial 
decentralization such as deconcentration, defined by Ginsburg et al. as “the process 
through which a central authority establishes field units or branch offices, staffing them 
with its own officers” (p. 5). However, deconcentration does not equal civic 
empowerment or a guaranteed change for the citizen in terms of an increase in efficiency 
or effectiveness in receiving goods or services from government. Moreover, with 
decentralization or deconcentration comes an inherent need to educate and inform the 





Each country in Eastern Europe chose to transition toward democracy, whether the 
decision was made by the political elite or by popular demand. These transitions occurred 
at different paces, undertook different means and progressed toward somewhat different 
ends (e.g., more or less centralized government). Therefore, in this context, to transition 
meant not to follow the same path, but to seek reform that leads to a state of change 
between one form of government toward another. In each case within Eastern Europe, the 
form of government each country established (or attempted to establish) was a 
democracy. However, political reformation with the goal of becoming a stable democracy 
or implementing education reform to support democratization was not addressed 
cohesively or consistently across all of Eastern Europe; Each nation tackled the issue of 
political change in a different manner, at a different rate, and consequently, each nation 
encountered different challenges (Bassler, 2005). Therefore, transition is a political 
concept that must take into account the geopolitical context in which each country existed 
and which style of democratization each country attempted to follow, and finally, which 
form of democracy the country wished to adopt.4  
Furthermore, each country had to address long-term consequences to stabilize and 




4 It is assumed in all cases within this study, based on overwhelming support from the 
literature and political statements and actions made by leaders within these cases, that the 
form of government toward which these countries transition is: democracy. Complicit in 





















 on these em
 ensue: thos























es, I have 
an as an org
eby many o
Figure 3, be






























t must be ad










 starts its tra
rtant compo







s, a stable d
tablished; if




nsition is a 
nent of futu
tability, eco

























Figure 3: Organic Transition 
 
Unlike a transition that commenced with an organic revolution, the Figure 4 below 
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education, education has taken on an increasingly economic-focused ideology, possibly 
to the detriment of citizenship education (Levin, 1981).  
Democratic education is defined as informing and preparing students for civic life 
and life as a citizen, including skills for a career or vocation, within a democratic society 
(Gutmann, 2002). As citizenship education expert David Kerr writes,  
[c]itizenship or civics education is construed broadly to encompass the 
preparation of young people [students] for their roles and responsibilities as 
citizens, and, in particular, the role of education (through schooling, teaching and 
learning in that preparatory process (Lawton et al., 2000, p. 201).  
Democratic education has two components; first, civics education, i.e., imparting students 
the ability to participate in voting, lobbying and engaging in the functional aspects of 
government as a citizen; and second, citizenship education, i.e., imparting the ability to 
students to engage in non-governmental aspects of a democracy, such as volunteering, 
understanding responsibilities and rights as citizens, and the ability to understand and 
apply democratic values such as individual freedom balanced with community-building 
(Lawton et al., 2000).   
To support the teaching of civic and citizenship education, teachers play a 
critically important role. As citizens, teachers must embody democratic values and be 
able to impart the characteristics and skills of a democratic citizen. As explained by 
political scientist James Banks (2001), “[t]eachers must develop reflective cultural, 
national, and global identifications themselves if they are to help students become 
thoughtful, caring, and reflective citizens…” (p. 5). Teachers must embrace values such 
as human rights, equality, equity and inclusion (of ethnic diversity), to instruct effectively 
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(Banks, p. 6). Finally, teachers in democracies may contend with traditional approaches 
of democratic education, which included assimilation (toward one norm), and recently 
with multicultural perspective (acknowledging many norms); The curriculum may reflect 
varying degrees of these values, often leaving teachers with the responsibility of 
determining the outcome of which approach to take. Within this reality, the teacher has 
the power to shape student’s lives within a democracy. 
While one major component of democratic education requires a competent and 
trained teacher force, and the other major component of critical importance is: 
curriculum. Citizenship and civic education curricula comprise two approaches which 
can be combined, ideally, and are less effective when separate: standalone courses and 
integrated cross-subject instruction (Kennedy, 1997). Moreover, the curriculum must be 
understood and implemented fully to be effective, especially taking into account the 
comprehension of the philosophical and ideological aspects of the curriculum (Kennedy, 
1997). In addition to providing a framework for understanding civic duties and the 
operational functions of a democracy, a democratic curriculum is also the arena to 
possibly discuss and address issues of inequity, overcome a patriarchal past through the 
instruction of feminist theory, and overall, cultivate ways to empower all of the citizenry 
through this framework; This approach is considered to be an inclusive democratic 
curriculum (Kennedy, 1997). Also, this approach as outlined does not exist in every 
democracy or in every classroom, but the potential for its integration exists, especially in 
transitional democracies which possess an opportunity for a fresh start.  
One potential limitation of civic and citizenship education is the textbook 
availability and selection, as this component of the curriculum provides a backbone for 
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what is taught. Besides potentially exploring for supplementary materials to overcome 
limitations in textbooks, other solutions exist to the limitation of textbooks. For example, 
in addition to teaching a dedicated course on civic or citizenship education within history 
or social studies classes throughout K-12, whether through the assimilation approach, 
multicultural or inclusion approach (or some combination), citizenship education can be 
taught also in other subject areas through the applications of values and norms, such as 
team-work, critical thinking and empowerment of the student in the classroom, among 
other approaches. Whether through a specific class, applied lessons in other classes, or 
after-school activities (volunteering), curriculum provides a foundation for teachers to 
instruct citizenship education. 
 
Education and Nation Building 
Whether variance exists within the paradigm of citizenship and civic education 
regarding curriculum and instruction, commonality exits regarding education in a 
democracy as it relates to nation-building. As a political and territorial unit, the 
democratic nation-state is comprises of a political representation of the citizenry who 
share a history, cultural heritage and rule of law with some overlap of common ideology 
(Zajda et al., 2009). To sustain a democratic nation-state, the role of the citizen is a 
critical and essential component; therefore, the teaching of citizenship education in a 
democracy is significantly important. Ranging from understanding national identity as 
territory, community, citizenship and common values, education is the main institution 
charged with imparting the necessary skills for the citizenry to function effectively. 
Moreover, citizenship education plays a role in preparing the citizenry for engaging in 
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discourse and action regarding the issues pertaining to power division between local, 
state and national/federal as well as among and between various cultures and ethnic 
groups within a nation-state. Not every education system takes full advantage of the 
benefits of citizenship and civic education as it relates to nation-building, and various 
degrees of empowering citizens via citizenship education exist (Zajda et al., 2009). 
Finally, citizenship and nation-building now contend with the notion of the global citizen, 
which brings into question issues pertaining to globalization and contending with the 
balance of nationalism and cosmopolitanism.6   
In addition to nation-building and citizenship/civic education, a democratic 
education often includes an increasing value on the economy in many capitalistic 
democracies. Levin (1981) writes that now, “a main educational function is to prepare 
children for workplace roles, education's organizational forms and functions tend to 
correspond to those of the workplace” (p. 1). Within the reality that the availability of 
jobs in the workforce requires less education than what the populations receives is the 
assumption that equal opportunity and workplace hierarchy are at odds with the education 
system (Levin, 1981). Thus, if the workplace does not include broadly four main 
attributes, “emphasizing participatory decision-making, individual problem-solving, 
minimum competencies, and peer tutoring,” educating students for the economy requires 
additional alignment to be more effective in that the workforce and work place must 
adapt to the principles taught in a democratic education system (p. 1).  
                                                            
6 Cosmopolitanism is defined by Appiah as understanding the ethical implications of 
one’s role as a global citizen. While “cosmopolitan moral judgment” does not require that 
global “neighbors” have relationships as with literal neighbors, cosmopolitanism requires 
an intelligence, curiosity and engagement in understanding our global neighbors because 
we are now, more than ever, interconnected (Appiah, 2006).   
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Conceptual and Theoretical Traditions 
 Having provided a brief overview of Eastern Europe and Romania in particular, 
coupled with an exploration of democracy, democratization, decentralization, transition, 
democratic education, education and nation-building, I will now delve into the various 
forces and related exploratory concepts and theories. The first concept I will outline is 
colonialism, whose historical significance is necessary to ground other concepts such as 
globalization and, later, isomorphism. Each of these concepts will first be defined and 




Colonization represents one of the most significant exogenous forces that affected 
Romania and other countries in Eastern Europe due to the fact that it represents a long-
established historical precedent deeply integrated into the culture and politics of each 
country, as I will explore below. Critics of colonization use colonialism theory to discuss 
its negative, malevolent nature as a system of suppression, exploitation and subjugation. 
Sympathizers point out the positive impact of colonization on the colonized country, 
ranging from improved infrastructure development to strengthened cultural and religious 
identity. In both cases, the words colonialism and colonization are sometimes used 
interchangeably both for theory and phenomena in the literature. Both words represent 
the act of foreign rule, and I will use identifying language when discussing the theory of 
colonialism or the act of colonizing. I will explore both facets of this complex theory with 
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the goal of moving beyond a bimodal assessment of the phenomenon of colonialism as 
being either positive or negative; rather, I will focus on the range of effects.  
 
Defining Colonialism and Neocolonialism 
 Colonialism has varying definitions but retains the common tenet of foreign rule 
via the act of using force to control for the purpose of benefitting the aggressor militarily 
or economically, or both (Bernhard, Reenock & Nordstrom, 2004). The extent and 
significance of the rule varies depending on the colonizing force and duration of rule, but 
can comprise a range in terms of respective forms of government, i.e., authoritarian, 
communist, or democratic. In some cases, the purpose of colonizing is to exploit the 
colony’s resources. In other cases, colonization is part of a larger military strategy, often 
with the colony providing the first line of defense as an offensive military or economic 
staging point for the colonizing group. In either case, colonialism benefits the colonizer at 
the expense of the colonized. In addition to using the natural and human resources of the 
colony to enrich or protect the home country, colonization often has less tangible effects. 
As political scientist Albert Memmi argues, 
[c]olonization materially kills the colonized. It must be added that it kills him 
spiritually. Colonization distorts relationships, destroys or petrifies institutions, 
and corrupts men, both colonizers and colonized (2003, p. 151).  
These negative aspects of colonialism, here called “colonization” by Memmi, bring forth 
the need for a specific definition for clarity. Social scientist Arif Dirlik explained 
colonialism as  
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the political control by one nation of another nation or of a society striving to 
become a nation. Where a colony [has] already achieved formal political 
independence but still could not claim full autonomy due primarily to economic 
but also to ideological reasons, the preferred term [is] neo-colonialism ( 2002, p. 
430).  
Whereas colonialism involves direct and overt ruling over a country or territory, 
neocolonialism is more subtle and can appear in the form of countries or even companies 
or institutions that take advantage of their position of power and exploiting the less 
powerful. Moreover, neocolonialists may contend that there are “good” or “wicked” 
colonialists, and the failures account for the latter, as opposed to the system of 
neocolonialism itself—a system of control and exploitation, albeit officially subtle, and 
unofficially significant (Sartre, p. 36, 2001).This explanation shows the complexity of 
neocolonialism in that the supporters do not believe the negative effects to be the fault of 
the colonizer but instead that of the colonized.  
 
A History of Colonialism in Eastern Europe: The Roman Empire 
Colonialism in Eastern Europe started with the Roman Empire and progressed 
through various other powers such as the Ottoman, Hapsburg and Soviet empires. When 
the Romans first entered Dacia (modern day Romania), for example, they exploited the 
land for its geographic proximity to northern Crimea, a powerful military stronghold of 
the region. This colonization commenced under the auspices of the Roman Emperor 
Trajan between 101 and 106 AD. Romans later discovered the fruitful plains surrounding 
the Danube River and the wealth of gold deposits in the northern Transylvanian Alps. 
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Romania, or Dacia Traiana as it was called in commemoration of the Dacian ethnic 
people and Emperor Trajan, was at the frontier of the Roman Empire so it was not ruled 
with the same military intensity as locations closer to Rome (King, 2004).  
Rome’s colonial rule only endured until a brief battle with the native Dacians in 
275 AD, at which point the Empire no longer controlled lands north of the Danube—per 
the decision of Emperor Aurelian—Dacia was essentially abandoned by the Romans to 
the native Dacians. Following the exodus of the imperial Roman army, much of the 
Roman population, technology and infrastructure were left in Dacia. As a result, the 
Roman Empire is the first example of how colonial powers both exploited Romania and 
also left behind beneficial technologies and customs. Thus, the Roman Empire influenced 
Romania and contributed to shaping its approximate modern borders and language. 
 
The Ottoman Empire and Romania 
The second major colonial empire that affected the Romanians and their Eastern 
European neighbors was the Ottoman Empire, a vast and complex political entity which 
lasted from approximately 1600 AD until the close of World War I in 1918. Unlike the 
land-based Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire controlled both land and sea. Also unlike 
the Romans, the Ottomans used diplomacy and tried to create vassal states or tax-paying 
entities within their empire—a move that bridged the divide between colonialism and 
neocolonialism. This decision to establish partnerships with colonized groups—albeit 
with the threat of violent intervention—led to the immense wealth and longevity of the 
Ottoman Empire. The downfall of the Ottoman Empire was its very size and scope: 
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occupying lands from Central Europe to as far as Saudi Arabia created a territory far too 
large to control and sustain (King, 2004).  
The Ottomans were instrumental in establishing many of Romania’s modern-day 
borders, creating its large government bureaucracy and for allowing it to retain religious 
sovereignty as an Orthodox Christian country. The sense of unity created by this shared 
Orthodox faith and ethnic heritage enabled Romania’s culture to solidify. Although 
managing the Ottoman Empire required violent suppression, its lasting legacy in the 
region was the solidification of the individual ethnic cultures that it dominated while 
concurrently exploiting them to achieve wealth through taxation and trade (King, 2004).  
During Ottoman colonialism, Romania did not control its political destiny and had no 
official form of government to protect its interests. Moreover, the leadership that had any 
authority reported to the Ottomans—a point that will later be discussed with regard to the 
culture of Romanian elite in post-coup Romania.  
 
Habsburg Empire and Romania 
By the late 1800’s, the Ottoman influence over Romania and Eastern Europe had 
waned, although the Ottomans still nominally controlled a portion of Southeast Europe 
until the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and World War I. During this time, Romania was 
briefly free from involuntary colonial rule that required them to choose between existence 
as a suzerainty or war with a colonizing nation. However, the dissolution of Ottoman 
domination meant relinquishing its military protection. For self-preservation, Romanian 
political elite signed a secret but iron-clad treaty in 1883 with the Habsburg rulers of 
Austria-Hungary, who promised protection against the aggressive Russian empire to the 
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north (Jelavich, 1983). As a result, a German-born Romanian king was installed, and 
through this connection, the Habsburg Empire controlled taxation and trade. Born out of 
the need for military protection, this alliance made the Habsburg Empire the third major 
colonial force in Romania’s history, albeit one that was nominally voluntary. One benefit 
of the alliance was that Romania increasingly traded with the West, thereby establishing a 
connection to Western Europe. The Habsburg Empire therefore brought Romania into the 
fold of Europe and away from Eastern influences such as Russia or the Middle East. 
However, the Habsburg Empire continued to increase taxation on Romania until World 
War I, which marked the start of Romania’s second brief period of freedom from colonial 
rule (Jelavich, 1983). 
 
Colonialism Transforming into Neocolonialism: Romania and the Soviet Union 
From the end of World War I until the Soviet Union’s official invasion in 1953, 
Romania maintained its own semi-autonomous, constitutional but authoritarian 
monarchy. During this period, the Soviet influence was only checked by German military 
supremacy in Eastern Europe, a byproduct of the Hapsburg dominance (Verona, 1992). 
After World War II, Germany no longer acted as a military buffer, which allowed the 
Soviets to successfully invade Romania following a brief fascist regime that set the stage 
for subsequent communism (Verona, 1992). Although the ensuing Soviet-Romanian 
armistice expressed that the Soviets agreed to “respect the territorial integrity of Romania 
and its social and economic institutions,” the truth was to become the very opposite 
(Verona, 1992, p. 27). Almost overnight, the Soviet Union became both a protector and a 
colonizer. The burgeoning communist movement in Romania became distinctly 
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Stalinist—violent, authoritarian and deeply destructive of individual culture and religion, 
as well as social and educational institutions (Tismaneanu, 2003). 
This Soviet influence, which lasted until Romania’s revolution in 1989, marked 
the deepest and most influential colonial-type period in Romania’s recent history because 
it exemplified aspects of colonialism and neocolonialism. On the one hand, the Soviet 
Union during these years controlled all aspects of political and economic life in Romania. 
On the other hand, the Soviet Union was both a protector and advisor, not simply a 
colonizing force. It is this combination of Soviet colonialism and neocolonialism that 
deeply impacted Romania and created challenges for its transition away from their form 
of rule.  
Furthermore, this type of neocolonialism fostered a factory-like education system, 
whereby students were created like products to participate in the totalitarian regime. 
Without a liberal arts higher education, defined as a type of education that focuses on 
arts, sciences, and humanities in a pre-professional four-year institution, citizens had no 
choice but to fall into narrower employment opportunities in engineering or accounting, 
for example (Breneman, 1990). Wages, food, rent and education were controlled by 
government. This economic perspective shows how the passive citizen was created via 
abject oppression—a challenge that would later manifest during post-communist 
transition (Breneman, 1990).  
 
Exogenous Forces on Eastern Europe: Neocolonialism Continued 
Following World War II, neocolonialism emerged as an alternative to traditional 
colonialism, a way for powerful countries like the Soviet Union to gain wealth and 
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maintain control over less powerful countries. As mentioned, the Romanian case is 
unique: because, technically, Romania remained an autonomous state, as the Soviet 
Empire behaved simultaneously like a colonizer and a neocolonizer.7 As with other 
Eastern European countries after WWII who experienced Soviet rule via “subservience,” 
these countries, including Romania, were “subject to the dictates of the Soviet regime 
through violence and the threat of violence” (Rose et al., 1998, p. 36). However, Romania 
was not completely sovereign because it lacked supreme control over the workings of its 
country, ranging from lacking sovereign control of the economy vis-à-vis trade to 
education and its curriculum (Gallagher, 2005). In all cases, neocolonialism is therefore 
controlling as with traditional colonialism, but subtle because geographic borders and the 
perception of sovereignty are preserved. Thus, neocolonialism can be potentially as 
devastating because it has the illusion of being less lethal. For example, Romania was 
independent under Soviet rule but because the Soviets allowed for perceived sovereignty, 
the Soviets could deeply influence Romania’s culture, education and economy 
(Gallagher, 2005). As I will later discuss, the Romanian government replicated the secret 
police, government and even the educational structure of the Soviet Union. While 
neocolonialism is a challenging phenomenon to study from outside a country, the 
indicators of this force within a nation are clear enough to yield effects that can be 
evaluated in future studies. These future studies could provide decision-makers with the 
skills and knowledge to avoid future attacks on their country’s sovereignty.  
 
                                                            
7 In October of 1944, Churchill visited Stalin and the following was asked: “how would it 
do for you [Russia] to have ninety per cent dominance in Rumania…” (Glenny, 1999, p. 
522). Stalin accepted, and Romania’s fate was decided. 
38 
 
Neocolonialism and post-coup Romania 
A recent example of neocolonialism and its effect on Romania is that of a 
privately held Canadian mining company. Gold is currently being mined by a company 
named Alburnus Maior, a name borrowed from the Ancient Romans, despite the fact that 
it has been 2000 years since the Roman Empire occupied Romania 
(http://www.grist.org). This Canadian company renamed itself to seem familiar and 
innocuous to the Romanian population; it sounds indigenous, but it does not benefit 
Romanians. Although the Romanian government will receive tariff money, locals are 
being displaced due to the destructive nature of the mining techniques and are not 
provided with adequate compensation. 
 
Colonialism’s Lingering Effects  
 Based on their understanding of how colonialism is defined (powerful exploiting 
the less-powerful and the act of occupation via colonizing), Bernhard, Reenock and 
Nordstrom (2004) illustrated the division between the colonized and the colonizers (see 
Figure 5, below). Although the figure was developed to organize their data supporting a 
general study about colonialism, it clearly and compellingly delineates countries into 
their respective groups relevant to this case study: colonized and colonizer. Later, I will 
discuss concepts subsequent to colonialism, such as dependency theory and world-
systems theory, to explore how countries of power and countries with less power remain 
largely in the same position during this case study as during the times of colonialism.  
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In many of the countries in the European Internal Colony (EIC) box in this figure, 
as well as other colonies around the world, the indelible mark of their former colonial 
status remains in the form of power preservation. With regard to Eastern Europe, the 
main source of the problem is that for over two thousand years, most Eastern European 
countries have lacked full control of their government institutions, including their 
education systems. To this day, Eastern Europe remains geographically situated between 
many of the same great powers that have fought for millennia to control this region. 
Within this context, Romania must contend with transitioning toward true sovereignty.  
In sum, although Romania became an EU member state in 2007, it has a long 
history of being within the “box” of colonialism and has never been in a position of 
power outside of that box. Therefore, any consideration of reform, in education or other 
sectors, must take into consideration the legacy of colonialism and its lingering impact on 
systems, culture and leadership. Additionally, new exogenous forces have emerged from 
the literature as critically important when analyzing Romania’s transition towards 
democracy and its education system. Hence, the issue of new exogenous forces will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following sections.  
 
Globalization  
Introduction         
In addition to the exogenous force of colonialism, globalization is an emerging 
global trend that supersedes the individual nation state but still overtly benefits the same 
core countries that were once colonizers. Like colonialism, globalization brings both 
positive and negative opportunities to the countries it impacts. Also, the theory that helps 
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Although globalization has many definitions, Zuarez-Orozco and Qin-Hilliard 
(2004) combined various concepts in an attempt to define it: free markets, 
transnationalism, postnationality, imperialism, neocolonialism or Americanization (p. 9). 
What do these concepts or perspectives of globalization actually mean? Zuarez-Prozco 
and Qin-Hilliard (2004) claimed that globalization is “best characterized as a set of 
processes that tend to de-territorialize important economic, social and cultural practices 
from their traditional boundaries in nation states” (p. 14). Such a definition prompts the 
question: who has the power to influence globalization? Critics of globalization argue 
that those groups with wealth and power drive the fundamental components of 
globalization (Burbules & Torres, 2000). If this assumption is true, is globalization really 
different from neocolonialism as a subversive form of preserving power and wealth?  If 
this assumption is true, is globalization different from neocolonialism? The short answer 
is yes, but it is not without overlapping qualities. In addition, as with the conflicting 
effects of colonialism, globalization is not wholly negative and could possibly benefit 
Romania and other less powerful countries depending on the decisions elite make within 
this context.  
Within the power paradigm set in place during colonialism, new methods of 
communication and commerce link countries otherwise historically isolated 
geographically. For example, world-wide use of the telephone, computer and internet has 
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connected countries throughout the world in new ways. These inventions are unique 
because they link not only economic transactions but also the exchange of ideas. With 
contemporary technology, both products and ideas can travel at the speed of electricity. 
In addition, an increase in the frequency of communication may foster an increase in 
innovation, which contributes to the building of a world-wide web of information. The 
positive or negative impacts depend on intent—and who holds power. In an unchecked 
realm, both negative and positive influences can expand at an equal rate: an effect which 
delves deeply into systems, cultures and traditions. Globalization is therefore a powerful 
force of change that, if unchecked, has the capacity to continue the legacy of colonialism.   
 
Globalization: Modernization and Globalization Linked 
Globalization is a phenomenon that has its roots in modernization. To better 
understand globalization, modernism (terms often used interchangeably) must first be 
defined. According to theorist Alvin So, modernization is:   
the extent to which tools and inanimate sources of power are utilized. Obviously, 
there is no society totally lacking in tools and inanimate sources of power, so 
modernization is only a matter of degree (So, 1990, p. 24). 
Therefore, modernization is not simply the comparison of a culture, country or group of 
individuals from one measurable point to another. So (1990) argued that modernization 
could be reduced to the comparison of the things (possessions) one person/country has in 
comparison to others, which leads toward assimilation or homogenization. This effect can 
erode the unique traits of various cultures down to a banal existence. Within this 
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interconnectedness, however, lies the latent potential for a massive expansion of learning 
and breaking down of barriers, which will be discussed in subsequent sections.  
 Another definition of modernization is the spread of pro-Western, capitalistic 
values as a superior model of development. A supportive neoliberal perspective would 
posit that the development of capitalist economies ensures that a free-market is 
established where the economy is in control and government plays a secondary role. This 
neoliberal perspective   
has given greater and greater rein to unregulated, private decision-making. The 
policy calls for reducing the economic roles of government in providing social 
welfare, in managing economic activity at the aggregate and sectoral levels, and 
in regulating international commerce (MacEwan, 1999, p. 4). 
Although this perspective describes modernization via privatization, this same 
perspective generates numerous challenges because neoliberal policies originate from the 
core, powerful countries and the periphery, or powerless countries, are expected to fall in 
line. For example, MacEwan (1999) observes that 
[o]fficials from the international lending agencies, particularly the IMF and the 
World Bank, from the governments of the economically advanced countries, 
particularly the United States, and from private, internationally operating firms 
use their economic and political power to foist 'market-oriented’ policy on the 
peoples of the low-income countries (p. 4). 
Critics of the neoliberalism, namely some political economists, would point to the status 
quo of power since colonialism and the fact that a periphery of weaker and poorer 
countries still remain after many years of neoliberal policy. 
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Additionally, many critiques exist when challenging the benefits of modernization 
and globalization. For example, the gap between rich and poor has increased since the 
advent of modernization in the post-WWII era and subsequent decades. Accordingly, 
“[a]fter [six] UN development decades the income gap between the [powerful] North and 
the [peripheral] South remains as wide as ever" (Mehmet, 1999, p. 121). Globalization 
can therefore be conceptualized as a continuation of modernization at an increased pace 
with wider-reaching effects. Furthermore, Alvin So criticizes neoliberal modernization 
and globalization for “ignor[ing] the crucial element of foreign domination" (1990, p. 
58). Finally, proponents of modernization must contend with its strengths and 
weaknesses to slow or reverse centuries of core versus periphery domination. If not, 
globalization may simply continue the power relationships established under 
modernization, thereby minimizing the positive impact it may otherwise have on 
formerly-recognized periphery countries. 
 
Globalization and Romania 
A specific example of globalization’s impact on Romania is the case of the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) influence on the transition toward democracy. 
According to economist Joseph Stiglitz (2003), the post-coup potential of privatization in 
countries like Romania permitted the lending of capital at higher rates because new 
companies and banks could act as guarantors to IMF loans. Stiglitz purports that “this 
new strategy was first tried not on major countries like Brazil and Russia, but on 
powerless countries like Ecuador and Romania, too weak to resist the IMF” (p. 203). In 
the case of Romania, “it only wanted new money from the IMF to signal that it was 
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creditworthy, which would help to lower the interest rates it paid” (p. 203). Romania was 
short on capital to guarantee loans, but the IMF still decided it was prudent to lend 
Romania money. Unfortunately, because Romania was early in its transition toward 
democracy and was still establishing a free-market economy, the IMF was lending money 
to an inexperienced government and private sector leaders in Romania who saw loan 
money as an opportunity to gain personal wealth and power (Stiglitz, 2003). In the end, to 
receive the aid money, Romania needed to put forth a proportionate sum of cash to 
receive IMF loans. However, the IMF strayed from typical lending ratios and when 
“Romania appeared to be only $36 million of private sector loans short to receive the 
billion-dollar aid package,” the IMF simply raised the interest rates and granted the funds 
despite this disqualification, thereby jeopardizing the integrity of IMF protocol, its 
practices and the stability of the Romanian economy (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 204). This case 
illustrates how the IMF, as an agent acting on the principles of the free-market economy, 
of capitalism, and as a representative of Western powers, exploited inexperienced elite 
leadership in Romania for the benefit of increasing profits. Concurrently, however, 
Stiglitz highlights the abundance of economic resources to which the Romanian 
leadership had access and potentially misused or were misguided in their use. Regardless 
of the interpretation of this event, what started as a chance to increase the 





Critics of Globalization: Dependency Theory and World-Systems Theory 
Two major theories have emerged that criticize power relations in the world and 
support action that mitigates the negative implications of globalization. These two 
theories are known as dependency theory and world-systems theory. Although the 
theories are related, subtle differences exist. Dependency theory, defined by Alvin So, 
“represents ‘the voices from the periphery' that challenge the intellectual hegemony of the 
American Modernization school" (1990, p. 91). This perspective illustrates the 
interconnection of modernization with colonialism. Moreover, proponents of this theory 
would argue that colonialism has nearly irrecoverably altered the potential of nations that 
were marginalized to a point where they are now dependent upon modern, developed 
countries with which they are unlikely to ever equal economically or militarily. 
Therefore, dependency theory is also   
understood to be an external condition that is imposed from the outside. The most 
important obstacle to national development, therefore, is not lack of capital, 
entrepreneurial skills, or democratic institutions; rather, it is to be found outside 
the domain of the national economy (So, 1990, p. 104). 
This latter point speaks to the inequities that occur within development and 
modernization. Proponents of this theory would also argue that one way to narrow the 
equity gap between nations is if countries possessing more than a moderate share of 
resources sacrifice some of their power.  
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 What is the solution to this imbalance? One solution is through the application of 
world-systems theory as an alternative to dependency theory. When considering this 
theory, Alvin So wrote that 
world-systems perspective is not a theory but a protest—“a protest against the 
ways in which social scientific inquiry was structured for all of us at its inception 
in the middle of the nineteenth century.” Wallerstein criticizes the prevailing 
mode of scientific inquiry both for its “closing off rather than opening up” many 
important research questions and for its inability “to present rationally the real 
historical alternatives that lie before us” (So, 1990, p. 173). 
Therefore, this theory challenges existing power relations, allowing for the world to be 
viewed through various lenses rather than simply being limited to bimodal or opposite 
terms that limit the view of reality. Furthermore, he argues that "the conception of a 
bimodal system…is too complicated to be classified as [such], with cores and peripheries 
only" (So, 1990, p. 180). Therefore, to counteract a complicated force like globalization, 
it must be viewed from a different mindset than what colonialism or anti-colonialism 
(independent vs. dependent) theories purport.  
 Additionally, world-systems theory necessitates an understanding of a few key 
concepts that are clearly portrayed by Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995): 
• [h]ow different definitions of the world-system concept imply different ways 
of breaking down history into discrete periods (e.g., when did the current 
system begin, and what are the relevant criteria for separating it from other 
systems in either time or space?); 
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• [h]ow the patterned changes introduced by trends and cycles structure the 
reproduction of the modem world-system; and 
• [h]ow the global hierarchy of wealth and power reproduces itself by the 
constraints it imposes on the range of policy options for most nations (p. 388). 
These three main constructs provide an understanding that world-systems theory is as 
complicated as the theories and forces it seeks to critique. However, within its complexity 
exists the ability to clarify a unique perspective on reality. For example, the 
“reproduction” of various systems is particularly important as it relates to education. For 
example, if there are flaws in a system that is replicated within another country or 
countries, the flaws are therefore replicated on larger scale. Furthermore, if the world-
systems of powerful, less powerful and powerless are replicated, those with power will 
retain power, and those without power will remain powerless regardless of the 
opportunities that exist within phenomena such as globalization. By critically analyzing 
the relationships between countries, it is possible to understand that according to world-
systems theory, basic power relationships have not changed since the advent of 
colonialism and are therefore perpetuated through neoliberal economic policies. 
However, with the replication of power relations is the ability for knowledge and 





Modernism and Globalization: additional critiques with a long-term perspective   
 For those who wish to address the negative effects of modernization and 
globalization from a practical level, a long-term strategy may be a suitable alternative. 
One alternative way to view modernization or globalization is not only  
in terms of outcomes and gains (e.g., incomes, goods and services)… [I]t is also 
important to evaluate it in terms of what people give up or lose (and why they 
resist) in experiencing development in these terms. In addition, who gets left 
out?" (McMichael, 1996, p. 3). 
Combined, both short-term and long-term consequences may render globalization 
negative because many political elite within powerful countries may never consider the 
wide-reaching and long-term effects their actions have on other citizens around the 
world. Even worse, these elite may not exhibit consideration for the global citizenry due 
to purely focusing on domestic issues that today reverberate world-wide, potentially 
“leaving out” their own citizenry as well as the international citizenry. Furthermore, those 
who espouse neoliberal economic theory view citizens of the world as rational actors in a 
supposedly free-market global economy, actors who harbor perfect information to make 
decisions. This economic perspective is flawed because it negates the issue of power, the 
lingering effects of colonialism and the imperfect distribution and accuracy of 
information. While understanding this discussion is important for historical and political 
context, the way in which globalization impacts education is critically important, as I will 




Globalization: Impact on Education  
Many communities, states or countries must contend with balancing individual 
culture and tradition with trends and beliefs that are spread by globalization. One 
tradition that is being exported is that of “tuning” or “harmonizing” education systems, 
two synonymous concepts used to explain the process of assimilating education systems 
to adhere to one agreed upon framework. Fortunately, it is possible to find common 
development traits that pertain to any country, e.g., all countries must educate their 
children. Actions such as the United Nation’s campaign, Education for All, coupled with 
an overall renewed awareness about education’s importance as a human right, results 
from globalization’s spread of these ideas. However, globalization is not always 
accompanied by answers to the questions of what should be taught, how and toward what 
end. 
Without homogenizing school systems to exactly mirror Western Europe or the 
U.S., countries like Romania can still prepare their students to compete in the global 
market and also help contribute to a stronger nation-state while preserving some sense of 
unique education. Education, therefore, can serve both domestic and global interests as an 
institution of change (Suarez-Orozco & Qin-Hilliard, 2004). In some cases, peripheral 
countries’ curricula have not kept pace with core countries; in these cases, technology via 
the computer and internet can help mitigate such discrepancies, to a degree. The key, 
however, is to help education remain relevant without losing sight of local culture and 
values. As I will discuss in the section illustrating isomorphism, Romania has been 
directly contending with the challenges of transition while benefiting from positive 
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aspects garnered from Western Europe and the U.S. At the same time, Romania contends 
with the challenges of avoiding mimetic isomorphism, a term that explains copying to the 
point of assimilation and homogenization. For example, avoiding a consumerist economy 
and culture that have harmful ecological implications (such as the Canadian mining 
company) must be considered by the Romanian government. While a challenge for a 
nascent democracy, what better time than at the beginning to curb aspects of neoliberal 
policy that are, in retrospect, a mistake? I will explore this concept in the following 
section to demonstrate the power of truly learning from a global perspective. 
 
The Ill-effects of Globalization: Consumerism 
Although achieving equity and equality are important as ways of resolving 
historic power struggles manifested by colonialism, for example, and are supported in 
many ways by positive aspects of globalization and the spread of these ideals, negative 
impacts of globalization threaten these potential advances. Moreover, progress in terms 
of humanitarian freedom may be compromised by a solitary aspect of globalization: the 
spread of consumerism and destruction of the environment. While seemingly an issue for 
ecologists, the tangible ecological effects of globalization may soon take priority because 
of the fundamental values of needing suitable living conditions, e.g., clean water and 
clean air. However, while these effects may shift priorities for ecological purposes, the 
benefits of this shift will, by application, address issues of equity, as I will explore in this 
section. Because globalization spreads Western- and U.S.-centric economic models due 
to its links with neoliberal policy, which inherently use consumer economy to sustain 
wealth, over-consumption itself becomes a major negative byproduct of globalization 
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from the perspective of sustainability. If the pace of consumption continues without 
citizens of industrialized countries exercising more frugality, not only will consumption 
of natural resources reach a critical point, disposal sites for the resources and their 
byproducts will also become scarcer and possibly more damaging to the communities in 
the vicinity. For example, landfills are quickly meeting capacity throughout the world, 
and new locations are continuously being sought: trash from wealthy, powerful countries 
is being sent to poorer countries. Even trash has found its way into the global ecological 
system: “[o]n a beach north of Salvador, Brazil, [where a] man who runs an organization 
called Global Garbage has identified rubbish from sixty-nine countries” (Levine, 2006, p. 
5). This fact demonstrates the global effects of individual waste. Furthermore, with trash 
being shipped around the world, the global effects of consumerism precipitates the urgent 
need to evaluate the difference between want and need.  
 Consumerism, therefore, is not simply the source of widespread resource 
depletion but also the origin of resource inequity. Although strict neoliberal economic 
theories would not support resource distribution via government intervention, it is still 
possible to operate within these theories to have positive results. For example, “global 
military spending totaled $956 billion this year, while the cost of effectively combating 
poverty would be $40-$70 billion. The U.S. spent $450 billion on the military and $15 
billion for development to help poor countries, a 30-1 ratio” (Levine, 2006, p. 246). 
Therefore, on a national and international level, cutting back on military spending could 
provide immediate financial resources that could be used to promote education, combat 
poverty and illness, and create more opportunities for peace. While additional solutions 
will be discussed in later chapters, it is important in this section to consider some of the 
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alternatives that exist within a globalized world from which transitional democracies can 
chose if they are fortunate to have the latitude and foresight to select wisely. Moreover, 
countries like Romania will look to established democracies for a template (Carothers, 
1996). If that template exhibits overspending on military and overconsumption in 
general, it is likely that these negative trends may be mimicked along with the positive 
attributes of democracy and individual freedom, a balance that can be made if the 
institution of education is considered as part of the solution of democratization. Finally, 





As with colonialism and globalization, isomorphism as a phenomenon represents 
an exogenous force that impacted Romania and other Eastern European countries in their 
transition toward democracy. Another similarity is that isomorphism, like colonialism 
and globalization, can be simultaneously supported and criticized by researchers, 
depending on their perspective. In the case of Romania, isomorphism manifests itself 
primarily as EU policy and a tendency to mimic aspects of key Western education 
systems, which created positive, negative and ambiguous effects in Romania. In this 
section, I will define isomorphism and explore how it represents the third emerging 





 From colonialism to neocolonialism, and from dependency theory and world-
systems theory to globalization, many powerful forces shape the world in which we live. 
Although some solutions exist to mitigate some of the negative aspects I have outlined, a 
clear pattern has emerged whereby a few select countries continue to maintain power and 
economic supremacy. This result allows for certain dominant countries like those in 
Western Europe and the United States to have a more powerful voice in global affairs in 
comparison to poorer countries like Romania or Bulgaria. This status quo also creates a 
paradigm whereby poorer or less powerful countries model themselves after wealthier, 
powerful countries in the hopes of gaining a developmental advantage. This mindset has 
placed Eastern Europe in a position where it continues to adhere to Western European 
suggestions through the auspices of the EU. While the EU is by no means a colonizer or 
even a neocolonizer, it does represent a foreign entity founded by historically colonizer 
countries which formerly colonized countries choose to join to remain developmentally 
and economically relevant. Because of the nuanced and real difference between the 
previous exogenous forces, an emerging concept best describes this new force of change: 
isomorphism. According to social scientist Powell and DiMaggio (1983),  
[there are] three mechanisms through which institutional isomorphic change 
occurs: coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem 
of legitimacy; mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to 




However, Powell and DiMaggio (1983) highlighted “[t]his typology [as] an analytic one: 
the types are not always empirically distinct” (p. 150).  As it relates to this case study, 
isomorphism as a concept describing change or reform is not always distinctly coercive, 
mimetic or normative. For example, the type of pressures exerted by the EU may fulfill 
the definition of each type of isomorphism, depending on whether the policy is a mandate 
or hortatory or if monetary incentives are involved. Regardless of which specific type of 
isomorphism exists, it is clear that the EU exerts pressures to which new members must 
adhere. Powell and DiMaggio’s title for their pivotal work on isomorphism aptly 
characterizes it: “The Iron Cage.”  
Therefore, the impact of organizational and economic changes on a country’s 
populace is an emerging research area for organizational, institutional and educational 
researchers. In addition, the theory to explain the force of isomorphism is new and sparse, 
which is one reason this case study is attempting to fill in gap in the literature. For the 
purpose of this case study, however, isomorphism refers to exogenous pressures exerted 
by institutions such as the EU as it relates to reform in Eastern Europe and Romania in 
particular.  
 
The European Union and Isomorphism 
 The European Union (EU) was founded in 1992, directly following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and other communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Romania’s among 
them.  Based on the Treaty on European Union, or the Maastricht Treaty, the EU is an 
international system of governance for European member-states who fulfill certain 
qualifications for entry (McCormick, 2005). Although the EU is new in its present form, 
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Europe has a history of trying to create such an institution for centuries, arguably 
reaching back as far as the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (McCormick, 2005). Currently, 
the EU combines the power and authority of each of its member states to allegedly 
support their collective interests on the international stage. Therefore, the EU seeks to 
ensure that all of its member-states are aligned in various sectors such as the economy via 
the euro as a common currency, transparency and judicial reform. While education 
standards are not officially a requisite for EU entry, unlike political or economic 
standards, the EU’s Bologna Declaration of 1999, Socrates-Erasmus and the Education 
Credit Accumulation and Transfer System (ECTS) are all followed by member states as 
if they are requirements of membership.   
Although the original discourse on EU educational reform started before the final 
meeting in Bologna, it is still referred to as the Bologna Declaration, Bologna Accords or 
Bologna Process. These Accords “emphasized the creation of the European area of 
higher education as a key way to promote citizens' mobility and employability and the 
Continent's overall development (Bologna Declaration, 1999, p. 1-2). This focus on 
higher education is due to the theory that 
University students, whose studies often involve both explicit and implicit 
comparisons among political systems (including democratic ones) become more 
knowledgeable of and concerned with their own political rights and civil liberties 
(Benavot, 1996, p. 386). 
Because Education Act 84, otherwise known as the Romanian Education Law of 1995, 
which will be discussed in a following section, was created prior to the Bologna Process 
in 1995 to support reform of the country’s education, Romania was poised to begin to 
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make demonstrable reforms to their education system and successfully satisfy Bologna 
initiatives.  
Specifically, the Bologna Process calls for the following changes: 
1) Adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees; 
2) Adoption of a system essentially based on two main cycles, undergraduate 
and graduate; 
3) Establishment of a system of credits – such as in the ECTS system – as a 
proper means of promoting the most widespread student mobility  
4) Promotion of mobility by overcoming obstacles to the effective exercise of 
free movement with particular attention to…students [and] teachers, 
researchers and administrative staff; 
5) Promotion of European co-operation in quality assurance with a view to 
developing comparable criteria and methodologies; and 
6) Promotion of the necessary European dimensions in higher education, 
particularly with regards to curricular development, inter-institutional co-
operation, mobility schemes and integrated programmes of study, training 
and research” (Bologna Declaration). 
Again, because Romania already undertook many of these reforms by 1999, it is the 
latter point with regard to quality assurance with which Romania struggled. Due to its 
heavy emphasis on mathematics and engineering, Romania did not have a higher 
education system with a strong liberal arts program or primary and secondary schools 
that could prepare students for a liberal arts education, which is something Western 
European countries valued and desired from member states based on ECTS 
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requirements. As a result, Romania has had to shift away from core strengths and 
sources of cultural pride—mathematics and engineering—to accommodate liberal arts 
and liberal economics. However, because the strengths of mathematics and 
engineering (a positive attribute) came with the totalitarian regime (a destructive 
attribute), cultural values and historical perspectives have become conflated, leaving 
Romania in a conflicted position. In short, many challenges exist with which Romania 
must contend to parse apart what aspects of its history are important to renew as 
contemporary values while adhering to EU and Western reforms, which may conflict 
with some of those values and traditions. 
 Although the EU exhibits many sound policies and principles from the 
perspective that they originate from stable and strong democracies, this institution still 
has issues to resolve with regard to fundamental theories and reforms such as its 
education policy. Although positive on the surface, EU-endorsed education reform such 
as the Bologna process will alter the fabric of Romanian culture, providing the potential 
for economic gains but ensuring some cultural compromise. The process of assimilation, 
coupled with isomorphic pressures created by the EU, homogenize cultures. At the same 
time, the recent violent and oppressive past have left aspects of culture that institutions 
such as the EU can help restore or refine through advocating for democratic processes 
and values.   
 
European Union and Romania 
Romania’s ability to retain a strong identity amidst a history of great instability 
could very well be jeopardized by efforts to become more like Western Europe. 
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Historically, Romania has remained a cohesive culture for millennia due to centuries of 
effort to retain an original and strong cultural core for the purpose of stability. Because 
the EU is not a static organization that simply grants compliant countries accession, it is 
plausible but not certain that changes Romania undertook and still undertakes to become 
and stay a member may jeopardize the traditions that have kept Romania as a cohesive 
country for centuries. In addition, this organization experienced many changes that 
threaten its very existence. In the spring of 2004, French and Dutch voters rejected the 
EU constitution because of the “EU's poor economic record and its failure to maintain the 
sense of direction, homogeneity, identity, common purpose, and effectiveness that had 
carried the European project in its earlier years, however indeterminate the project may 
have been” (Cohen-Tanugi, 2005, p. 4). This rejection may signal to Romania and other 
potential members that the EU is somewhat unstable and unprepared to take on additional 
members in a way that would benefit the new members.  
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the EU would want to add more members 
due to not demonstrating that it can adequately tend to current member needs. Moreover, 
just as it was gaining momentum,  
[i]t is ironic that the EU stumbled just as the Bush administration was beginning 
to acknowledge its existence and even its virtues” (Cohen-Tanugi, 2005, p. 8). 
Despite its recent difficulties, the EU is still considered “one of the key pillars of 
Western identity and global stability—and the most progressive political 
experiment of our time (Cohen-Tanugi, 2005, p. 8). 
Cohen-Tanugi speaks to the inherent challenge of the EU in this comment, i.e., 
supporting democratic countries using centralized rule. This concept is counter-intuitive 
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and theoretically would almost guarantee failure if the countries involved were not so 
interested and financially invested in making the EU a success. For stability, however,   
Intergovernmentalists must accept that the EU is a community of citizens, not 
only of states, and supranationalists must accept that democracy can exist among 
EU members without their merging into a single polity that expresses its will 
through traditional state-like institutions (Nicolaidis, 2004, p. 3). 
These fundamental realizations are crucial to the success of the EU, especially if it is to 
benefit Romania and other newly democratized countries. Moreover, the EU must 
become something other than the “United States of Europe” (Nicolaidis, 2004, p. 1). 
Presumably, to turn sovereign countries into, essentially, tax-paying vassal states would 
bring countries like Romania back into a situation not unlike the time of Ottoman rule, 
when Romania was a vassal state because it lacked the authority to act in its own best 
interest.  
 In this struggle for the EU to define itself as a centralizing institution while 
remaining pro-democracy, a few major shifts must occur. Nicolaidis (2004) wrote that the 
Romanian government should be 
seeking the mutual recognition of all of the members' identities rather than a 
common identity; promoting a community of projects, not a community of 
identity; and sharing governance horizontally, among states, rather than only 
vertically, between states and the union (p. 4). 
These changes can solidify the EU by demonstrating that it is more than a homogenizing 
institution of Europe and avoid turning it into a “normative signpost” only if such 
theories are implemented and lead to action (Nicolaidis, 2004, p. 8). Moreover, despite 
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setbacks in constitutional refinement and fundamental political theories, its very nature as 
an “experiment” necessitates that the EU must refine itself quickly. As a result, education 
reform and the Bologna process itself may lead to unforeseen ramifications. 
 
The United States and Isomorphism: Eastern Europe 
Just as the European Union is a powerful isomorphic force in Eastern Europe, so 
too is the United States: as a democratic template, financial model and informational 
agent of democratization. The U.S. has a history of promoting democracy abroad, most 
notably with the implementation of the Marshall Plan. Before discussing American 
democratic promotion in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, a comprehensive review of 
democracy promotion precedent must be examined. As stated, starting with the Marshall 
Plan following WWII, the U.S. began promoting democracy globally. At first, democratic 
promotion became part of a foreign policy strategy to reduce the likelihood of future 
wars. By the end of the Cold War, marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
opportunities arose for the United States to promote democracy in former Soviet territory. 
This opportunity—the exposure of many Eastern European countries to the choice 
between Soviet authoritarianism and Western liberal democracy—became a “policy 
window” (Kingdon, 2003) through which U.S. political and economic interests in Eastern 
Europe could be attained via partnerships with nascent democracies.  
In this post-Soviet era, democratization became mixed with economic 
liberalization. This phenomenon led to what critic Barber (2003) considers “the spread of 
McWorld—that seductive compound of American commercialism, American 
consumerism and American brands” (p. 156). Democratic promotion lost some of its 
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benevolent nature because of this shift in foreign policy that placed U.S. interests at the 
center of international democratization within the context of globalization. Furthermore, 
flawed thinking created the notion that “exporting McWorld and globalizing markets is 
tantamount to forging free societies and a democratic world, [which] is a dangerous 
misconception likely to undermine prospective nation-building strategies” (Barber p. 
168). In the long term, American democratic promotion in this current form negatively 
affects the development of new democracies because democracy does not appear to be 
the core of the effort. Worse, the inherent governmental instability of new democracies 
seems to exacerbate their inability to work cohesively to solve international issues. 
A major institutional mechanism the U.S. government uses to promote democracy 
and other forms of “development is the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) (Carothers, 1999). A study commissioned by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID, 1999), “using the most widely used 
measures of democracy,” found that USAID Democracy and Governance obligations 
have a significant positive impact on democracy, while all other US and non-US 
assistance variables are statistically insignificant” (Finkel et al., 2006, p. 1).8  These 
omitted variables biases may have elucidated each country’s unique cultural and 
developmental characteristics. By omitting these critical variables, USAID seems to 
promote a one-size-fits-all type of democracy. Additionally, Finkel et al. (2006) report 
that “among eligible countries, democracy has been increasing steadily since 1990, but 
                                                            
8 While USAID took institutional bias into account when conducting this study, the 
finding is not surprising because the researchers “controlled for both omitted variable 
bias as well as for the potential endogeneity of AID obligations” (p. 2). 
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that the gap between the advanced democracies and the developing democracies is still 
large” (p. 1).9 
Isomorphism: A Summary 
 Overall, isomorphism as a force of institutional change is not wholly negative, if 
the purpose of the policies and the results of their implementation benefit the country in 
both the short- and long-term as opposed to creating a colony-like status. However, 
because isomorphism in Eastern Europe as framed in this study is an exogenous force, 
and one that arose when nascent democracies were making domestic policy decisions, the 
combination of these disparate phenomena may have compounded the negative effects 
due to poor coordination or incompatibility. As I will explain in a later section, Romania 
did not finish implementing its own domestic education reforms while at the same time it 
was trying to adhere to EU education reforms—the latter of which were not coordinated 
with Romania or other supporting international NGOs. Further, external institutional 
changes do not always take into account local context or culture, thereby potentially 
having a homogenizing effect on the countries in question. In the case of the EU and 
Romania, it seems that isomorphism represents a force that brought mostly positive 
changes for a country seeking to become a strong democracy and needing additional 
support because it lacked elite who were trained or experienced with democratization and 
democratic education.  
                                                            
9 Despite the shortcomings of recent democratic promotion, USAID and the U.S. 
government it represents have an opportunity to improve their effectiveness in supporting 
international democratization. According to Thomas Carothers, a noted democracy expert 
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “U.S. democracy promotion is worth 
doing because when done well, it can work, [although] much of the time, it is not done 




Exogenous Forces Conclusion 
The coercive or mimetic forces inherent in U.S. or EU international influences are 
complex challenges for sustainable democratic transition in Eastern Europe as well as 
other regions in the world because of their complex impacts. Whether the EU or U.S. 
reforms their respective domestic or international policies, Romania contended with 
powerful exogenous forces as it transitions toward democracy. Fortunately, Romania has 
a source of stability: the strong sense of identity that was forged over thousands of years. 
Moreover, if Romania can incorporate a long-term perspective, i.e., fifty or one hundred 
years from now, it has the potential to avoid the pitfalls of moving from the grasp of one 
superpower to another, especially if its education system is to support the transition.  
 
Context for Romanian Education  
To better understand how some of Romania’s education system came to be, it is 
necessary to explore the context for its education reform. Although Eastern European 
countries share many characteristics, unique geographic and cultural attributes foster 
important differences. For example, the western portion of Eastern Europe shares borders 
with historically democratic Western Europe while the eastern portion of Eastern Europe 
shares borders with Russian-influenced countries like Moldova and Ukraine—geographic 
proximity creates a somewhat political gravitational pull of assimilation. In addition, each 
country is characterized and shaped by cultural, historical, linguistic and other unique 
characteristics. Moreover, while democratic transitions in the region began in the 1980’s 
and culminated regionally in Eastern Europe in the 1989 dissolution of the USSR, the 
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trends, styles and goals of democratic transition differed from country to country. In 
addition, democracy incorporates the ideas of each home country and is not a cut-and-
paste system of rule (Carothers, 1999). Thus, national transition differed from country to 
country due to the pace of transition and desired type of democracy, which means 
education policy is shaped by these factors, as I will discuss in subsequent sections.  
 
Economic Reform and Political Economy of Romania 
To this point in the study, the exploration of emerging forces and democratization 
has provided part of a foundational context for the subsequent chapter’s foci on 
education. A final major point of consideration is economic reform and political 
economy. This section will explore the transitional component of the economy. After 
1989, Romania had an opportunity to further distance itself from Soviet influence. Over 
time, the perpetual effort of brokering peace with more powerful countries, by force or by 
choice, seemingly forged Romania’s culture and identity (Verdery, 1995). This constant 
fight for survival and legitimacy is what kept Romania from rising above the status of a 
periphery society. Therefore, Romania’s economic past and foreseeable economic future 
is largely affected by the major powers with whom it must cooperate, including Russia in 
the east and the EU and United States in the west.  
To better illustrate the political economy of Romania, it is useful to compare its 
economic transition to that of other countries in Eastern Europe. Table 1 shows two 
major groupings of post-communist countries. One group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia) have transitioned more quickly and consistently based on almost 
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every indicator in comparison to the second group (consisting of Balkan countries: 




Table 1: Comparative Measures 
Comparative Measures for Selected Postcommunist Countries 
 



















36.0 2.20 (27) 60.19 (44) 20 (F) 3 (F) 4.3 (42) 
Hungary 38.0 2.55 (42) 61.83 (42) 30 (F) 3 (F) 5.2 (32) 
Poland 36.5 2.75 (54) 61.67 (43) 19 (F) 3 (F) 4.1 (43) 
Slovenia 34.0 2.90 (63) 71.28 (32) 27 (F) 3 (F) 5.5 (28) 
Albania 25.0 3.50 (110) 28.18 (146) 56 (PF) 9 (PF) 2.3 (84)* 
Bulgaria 30.5 3.30 (95) 39.75 (84) 30 (F) 5 (F) 3.5 (52) 
Croatia 32.5 3.45 (106) 47.8 (70) 63 (NF) 8 (PF) 3.7 (51) 
Romania 29.5 3.65 (124) 33.80 (107) 44 (PF) 4 (F) 2.9 (68) 
Slovakia 33.5 2.85 (59) 48.44 (66) 30 (F) 3 (F) 3.5 (52) 
Belarus 16.0 4.25 (146) 29.11 (140) 80 (NF) 12 (NF) 4.1 (43) 
Ukraine 26.0 3.85 (133) 29.96 (134) 39 (PF) 7 (PF) 2.6 (75) 
a Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report, 2000 
(London, 2001), 14, 34, and 36 (economic transition indicators are combined with legal 
transition indicators). 
b Source: Gerald O’Driscoll Jr., Kim R. Holmes and Melanie Kirkpatrick, 2001 Index of 
Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2001). Lowest score 5.0, 
highest score 1.25. The index is composed of nine factors, including political risk, trade 
policy, taxation, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, wage and 
price control, property rights, capital flows and foreign investment, banking, regulation 
and black market. 
c Source: Euromoney (March 2000). Highest possible score 100. 
d Source: Leonard R. Sussman, ed., Press Freedom Survey, 2000 (New York: Freedom 
House, 2000). countries score 0-30 on 100-point scale are regarded as having a free press; 
countries scoreing 31-60 are partly free. 
e Source: Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Liberties, 
1999-2000 (New York: Freedom House, 2000). Highest possible score 2, lowest possible 
score 14. 
f Source: Transparency International, 2000 Corruption Perception Index, available: 
http://www.transparency.de. This index is constructed as compilation of a number of 
surveys conducted in each country and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly 
corrupt). The score for Albania is from the 1999 index. 
 
Inconsistent policy and too frequent market corrections for recessions in Bulgaria, 
Albania and Romania in particular have destabilized the economies with their short-term 
focus. Furthermore, in comparison to group one countries, “market reforms have been 
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less advanced, privatization lagged behind, and their legal and institutional infrastructure 
has been less developed and transparent…moreover, corruption has become a widespread 
phenomenon” (Ekiert, 2003, p. 96). Although Ekiert does not acknowledge the fact that 
group two countries chose to transition more slowly than their counterparts to the west, 
the following issues remain as a result of the inconsistency: “higher poverty rates, lower 
income, greater inequalities, and meager foreign capital inflows. [Furthermore], politics 
in these countries has been less predictable, reformist forces weaker, and the potential for 
a sudden crisis…much greater” (Ekiert, p. 96). Thus, given the history of the Balkan 
countries and Romania in particular, these data from Table 1 are not surprising because 
deeper challenges exist in comparison to the countries in group one based on instability 





CHAPTER II PART II: EDUCATION, HISTORY AND REFORM 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in the previous section, forces such as the lingering effects of 
colonialism, the rise of globalization and the isomorphic pressures from institutions like 
the EU continued the legacy of volatility in the region. Moreover, all of these factors 
have a profound impact in the context for education reform in Eastern Europe. In this 
chapter, I will first discuss the context of education before and after 1989 in Eastern 
Europe and Romania. I will then discuss in greater detail the three distinct education 
reforms manifested after 1989:  Article 32 of the Constitution, Education Act 84 and the 
Bologna Accords in 1999. I will focus heavily on Article 32 as it marked the literal and 
symbolic start to Romania’s transition toward democracy. Moreover, while constitutions 
may not be perceived as the starting point for education policy, this Article was the only 
piece of education legislation that Romania had or created until Act 84, and will therefore 
be explored from various perspectives as a foundational moment in post-Soviet Romania. 
 
Historical Context of Eastern Europe 
A country’s border creates a collective national identity within which many 
different groups of people must find commonalities and work towards peaceful 
coexistence. Many peaceful borders are dictated, in part, by natural geographic 
boundaries; the border between Romania and Bulgaria, for instance, is the Danube River. 
Other borders, which are frequent sources of conflict, are created solely as a result of 
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political decision-making and are often resolved by war, not diplomacy. Such constant 
change fosters regions of instability. 
 
Sub-Context of Eastern Europe: The Balkans 
Within Eastern Europe is a volatile geographic area known as the Balkan region, 
which has directly or indirectly impacted Romania for centuries. Although the Balkan 
region is encased within Eastern Europe, this region has additional unique challenges due 
to its history. The Balkan name came from a German geographer, Johann Zeune in 1808, 
who described the peninsular region of Southeast Europe as Balkan, which means 
“mountain” in Turkish (Glenny, 1999). This Turkish name is fitting because much of this 
area was under Ottoman Empire control until the latter 19th and early 20th centuries. 
However, this mountain range does not reach throughout the entire region, as Zeune 
originally believed. Instead of reaching from the Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea, the 
Balkan Mountain range begins and ends within modern-day Bulgaria. Despite this 
mistake by Zeune, the name Balkan often refers to the countries of Albania; Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Greece; Macedonia; Montenegro; Serbia; and Turkey as 
well as to Romania (Glenny, 1999,  p. xxii).10  
 Balkan countries have faced a multitude of border changes to a point where, over 
the past 100 years, maps have officially changed approximately nine times, and current 
borders are seen by some as temporary solutions to long term colonial fallout 
(http://www.bbc.com). Lingering challenges of identity trace back to past world 
superpowers such as the Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire,  the Habsburg Empire and 
                                                            
10 Kosovo is now recognized by 69 countries as a sovereign country within this region. 
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the Soviet Empire, all who colonized various areas within the region. This colonization 
and re-colonization creates both a geographic and cultural crossroads between the East 
and West. These major empires also fought for control over this area and, in the process, 
divided populations within the region. Some citizens in the Balkans converted to the 
Muslim faith (Albanians) to become outposts for the Ottoman Empire, while others 
remained Christian Orthodox or Catholic, the latter resulting from ties to Roman 
occupation.  
Although religious conversions allowed for the brokering of temporary peace 
upon becoming suzerainties in many cases, religious decisions added further 
complication to the region as it divided the people in ways not reflected in the borders of 
their respective countries. As the Ottoman Empire lost control and supremacy in the 
region, various factions began to revolt. For example, the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 was a 
major turning point in the region as Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became 
independent while Bulgaria remained a principality to the Sultan (Mowat, 1915). This 
treaty was the first step for the Balkan region’s independence from colonial influence, 
notwithstanding Soviet colonization, which stalled the progress toward independence 
until the latter part of the 20th century.   
 Over the next 100 years after the Treaty of Berlin, many changes occurred within 
the region. These changes were often sparked by exogenous influences. For example, 
when Franz Ferdinand of the Austria-Hungarian Empire visited Sarajevo in 1914 to quell 
disputes between the Bosnians and the Serbians, he was assassinated by a Serbian—an 
event that sparked World War I. If a cataclysmic event such as this pulls all contemporary 
regional superpowers into a war, clearly the Balkan region is of special interest to the 
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region and world at large. Furthermore, exogenous forces that surround the Balkans, as 
well as Eastern Europe as a whole, continue to play a major role in the development of 
culture, government and education.  
Further challenges ensued following the end of World War I. Between WWI and 
WWII, Croatian fascists allowed Germans to economically profit from this transient 
alliance. Resultantly, the region also experienced further fragmentation and border 
change due to German exploitation of regional resources (Glenny, 1999). Following 
WWII, an authoritarian system of communism took hold and, until about 1992, tens of 
thousands lost their lives due to war, forced labor and concentration camps (Glenny, 
1999). Because of such tragic factors, authoritative communism contributed to additional 
challenges which the Balkan region would have to reconcile in the 20th and 21st centuries 
in government, education and culture. 
 
Communist Education: Education as Indoctrination, 1947-1989 
As with any country, Romania’s system of education influences, to varying 
degrees, the ideological and intellectual growth of the citizenry. This influence can be 
manipulated for political ends to the detriment of student learning or vocational choice. 
For example, before 1989, “Romanian higher education was highly politicised, 
centralised, and planned. Its political character was reflected in the fact that, as a rule, 
all academics had to be members of the Communist Party” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 91). 
Specifically, governmental theories outlined in Marx’s writings, which were the 
reported backbone of the Communist movement in Romania, were never fully 
implemented because of the manifestation of a totalitarian regime. Because President 
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Nicolae Ceauşescu became a dictator, the government model outlined by Marx as one 
that exists only to protect the “rights of man” was never realized by the Romanian 
Communist Party (Tucker, 1978, p. 44). As a result of this Stalinist (or totalitarian) 
form of communism, intellectual innovation and creativity were limited from the 
start.11  
This centralized communist government took hold in the 1950’s and lasted until 
1989.  During this time, communist leaders running the countries were, according to 
Tismaneanu, “not merely nationalists. They were first and foremost Stalinists, as shown 
by their peculiarly Stalinist hostility to any form of private property and the decision to 
complete the collectivization of agriculture against all odds” (Tismaneanu, 2003, p. 35). 
Therefore, higher education was creating model communist leaders and contributors to 
the communist economy, which placed education as a critically important component of 
sustaining communism.  
 In primary and secondary education, curriculum was Soviet-inspired with the goal 
of creating “highly skilled” workers who could contribute to the maintenance of the 
communist system. Schools were divided into “primary (grades I to IV)…gymnasium 
education (grades V to VIII) and lyceum [secondary] or vocational education,” the latter 
depending on the student’s performance (Georgescu, 1997, p. 17). Later, gymnasium 
education was extended to grade ten and, as with higher education, completely controlled 
centrally by the state, with no private or religious education permitted. A nation-wide 
examination determined which students went to technical or apprenticeship schools and 
                                                            
11 While plausible that communism as a form of government also restricts innovation and 




which went to the lyceum. Schools were designed to create strong contributors to and 
participants of the communist regime, while simultaneously restricting “the role of 
intellectuals in society” (Georgescu, 1997, p. 19). Therefore, to determine the quality of 
schooling in Romania during this time is quite challenging since compulsory ten-year 
general education guaranteed passage through secondary school, so all statistics reflect a 
100% completion rate, which will be explored in the interviews. Furthermore, schools, 
universities and the Ministry of Science and Education falsified statistics to maintain the 
false impression that Romania had superior education in comparison to Western countries 
(Georgescu, 1997), when, observationally and based on my original research, the results 
seem to indicate poorer quality.     
Although education quality in Romania is unclear, students who attended 
elementary, secondary and tertiary education under Romanian Communist Party (RCP) 
received free schooling, albeit fraught with indoctrination and censored information. In 
primary and secondary school, for example, students were taught citizen education, social 
etiquette, political education, Romanian literature consisting of poems dedicated to the 
RCP, geography lessons that touted the RCP’s leadership toward Romanian economic 
independence and philosophy classes that praised the RCP’s ability to contribute to the 
Marxist movement (IEA, 1999). Based on conversations with Romanian immigrants to 
the U.S. and during informal conversations with Romanians in Bucharest, the content of 
the curriculum and school climate attempted to create a pro-government mentality of 
subservience which limited individual volition. Thus, it was not Marxist philosophy 
oppressing the student population but instead an abuse of Marxist philosophy that 
characterized the Romanian education system from 1948 under Gheorghiu-Dej and, to a 
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greater extent, Nicolae Ceauşescu from 1965 to 1989. To date, an insubstantial amount of 
information on Romania’s education system during this system exists, and as observed 
based on conversations with many Romanians, there is not a desire to spend time 
studying this period, but instead a desire to look forward. 
    
Lack of Trust 
Additional influences under Ceauşescu have affected education policy and the 
freedom of ideas by creating an aura of distrust. The impact of the Securitate (Secret 
Police), for example, warrants attention. This Securitate was a major system of 
control employed by the government to ensure order and political consensus. By 
1989, when Nicolae Ceauşescu and his wife Elena were executed for their role in the 
genocide against their own citizenry and their work against the national economic 
interests, the Securitate was both strong in number and influential (Behr, 1991). 
According to Glenny, the Securitate employed “24,000 active service officers. But its 
foot soldiers were the tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of informers who 
reported on the activities of citizens in every nook and cranny of society” (1999, p. 
604). This oppressive force did more than gather information. The Securitate also 
used "prisons psychiatric units and torture sessions…[in addition to] the certainty that 
one of your close friends or family was informing on you, contributing to the detailed 
files that the Securitate opened on every citizen" (Glenny, 1999, p. 604). These tragic 
conditions, , under which an estimated 60,000 citizens were worked to death in labor 
camps during Ceauşescu's 30-year rule, coupled with the constant terror yielded an 
environment where  lack of public trust undermined government reform.  
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Consequently, significant changes were necessary for healing and foundation-building 
for this nation of 22 million people. The Securitate and Ceauşescu’s effects on the 
country are both deep and wide-reaching. However, with the absence of these two 
terrors, potential exists within Romanian institutions such as education to build upon 
strengths while identifying and resolving challenges.  
 
Transition: Education Reform in Romania—1989 to 2007 
As discussed, education comprising all levels in a democracy is a crucial 
component of national stability, economic prosperity, rule of law, character refinement 
and civic participation; thus, the education system is crucial to the short- and long-term 
success of a democratic country (Smolar, 2002). Furthermore, democratic education can 
increase the likelihood of continued democratization by “securing direction and 
development” of the country in question (Dewey, 1921, p. 94). For example, by teaching 
students about rules, laws, participatory activities in government and volunteer life, the 
constitution and how to become empowered as a citizen, democratic education can 
maintain and develop successful democracies. The goal of democratic education is met 
when citizens can competently and responsibly participate by understanding and valuing 
democratic principles with the ability to use them in practice (Bahmueller, 1991). The 
challenge, however, is that in striving toward these ambitious goals, opportunity costs 
manifest during transitions. 
In Romania’s transition, one of the costs pertained to the role of education in its 
functional ability to support democracy. For example, democratic education do not seem 
to be fully integrated into Romania’s school system perhaps because democratic 
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education reform is a lesser priority in comparison to economic and political reform 
because of the Romanian predisposition to focus on the theoretical, not the practical 
(Freyberg-Inan, 2001). Furthermore, based on her case study, “Romanian students remain 
a reflection, rather than becoming an engine, of their country’s evolution” (Freyberg-
Inan, 2001, p. 103).  
In the short-term, stability and economic sustainability are fundamental to a 
country. However, to ensure stabilization, education can also be reformed while longer-
term plans are crafted and refined. In the Romanian case, education reform was not 
wholly addressed in law until 1995, which is why students can be characterized as a 
“reflection” of its past as Freyberg-Inan noted, instead of an engine that drives and 
supports democratic change; because little changed, systemically, norms of social 
reproduction largely continued, status quo. 
 
Romanian Education Reform: Challenges 
At first glance, transition towards democracy may seem wholly good since it 
marks movement away from oppressive forms of government. However, this transition is 
not without its challenges, and shallow attempts at progress can create setbacks that may 
cause some of the citizenry to grow weary with the democratic government. For example, 
after 1989, Romanian national scores in the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) and Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 
declined and did not start rebounding until 2001. Although test scores cannot wholly 
represent whether quality instruction takes place, nor can they accurately reflect student 
knowledge, test scores are an especially good approximation when working with a closed 
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society that lacks other indices of performance measures, and their decline was 
disheartening for the Romanian people.12 
In post-coup Romania, when comparing Romanian test results on PISA and 
TIMSS with most countries of Eastern Europe, Romania has fared among the worst 
during its time of reform.13 Quantitatively, data from the International Association for the 
Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) show that Romania underperforms 
compared to almost every country in the study, even bordering countries. The legitimacy 
and quality of the IEA Civic Education Study is crucial to this claim.14  
One possible reason may be the immense challenge of reforming after facing the severity 
of the Ceauşescu regime and exogenous pressures with which it contended. Moreover, it 
is possible that the education system was never as strong as once believed in Romania 
because so much effort was placed into ideology and the narrowing of the curriculum, 
with a heavy value of urban areas. This question will be explored within the original 
research portion of this case study. For the purpose of contextualization, however, I will 
                                                            
12 When comparing Romania to other countries, there is a historical precedent of skewing 
their domestic qualitative results and using propagandist language that severely decreases 
the legitimacy and validity of scoring. Moreover, the Ministry would also work to ensure 
that those who may not perform as well on the examinations were omitted from taking 
them in the first place, such as special needs children, thereby skewing results. 
 
13 Based on the most recent results available in 2009. 
 
14 Justifiably, the IEA is the largest and most rigorous study of civic education ever 
conducted internationally. This research tested and surveyed nationally representative 
samples consisting of 90,000 14-year-old students in 28 countries, and 50,000 17- to 19-
year-old students in 16 countries throughout 1999 and 2000. Questionnaires were also 
administered to teachers and school principals. The content domains covered in the 
instrument were identified through national case studies during 1996-1997 and included 
democracy, national identity, and social cohesion and diversity. The engagement of youth 




now discuss major challenges that have affected and continue to affect Romania as it 
transitions toward democracy and sovereignty. 
 
Romanian Education System Today: An Overview 
 The Romanian K-16 education system has undergone many legislative 
reforms, but its overall curriculum, pedagogical practices and norms have not changed 
dramatically since the Soviet era.15 In fact, the overall system that predates 1989 still 





15 During the Soviet Era, the system comprised a French and German hybrid system 
that was borrowed during Romania’s monarchial times in the early 1900’s and was 
later modified by the Soviets into a Soviet-style curricula and teaching methodology. 




Figure 6: The Education System in Romania 
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One challenge relates to the decision Romanian elites made regarding the pace of 
transition and their decision to follow perestroika. The second challenge is that 
decentralization requires locals outside of Bucharest, the capital and center of 
government, who can skillfully assume additional responsibilities. Such challenges will 
be explored in great detail in subsequent sections. Given the ideology of the leadership 
that spanned over so many decades, one can understand better the reason behind 
collectivist inertia and fear of the free market and privatization. Moreover, for Romania 
to adopt these “Western” ideologies was a radical departure from historical precedent 
with the exception of some elements incorporating aspects of French culture. 
Furthermore, Tismaneanu explains, “many of these themes and phobias predate 
communism…makes the Romanian case even more puzzling and theoretically 
challenging in its political-cultural syncretism” (Tismaneanu, 2003, p. 253). Moreover, as 
a consequence of totalitarianism, most of the population was accustomed to submissive 
roles; undertaking additional responsibilities was a foreign concept (Fryberg-Inan, 2001). 
An additional challenge exists in that over half of the population resides in urban areas, 
with small pockets of rural populations spread out over the entire country. Therefore, any 
legislative changes may impact more quickly the urban settings and slowly disseminate to 
the rural areas. Lastly, because most of the education leaders and general population 
operate under the assumption that the Romanian school system was better than most 
education systems in the West, a lingering resistance exists to implement or change too 
much due to this domestic misperception (Fryberg-Inan, 2001).   
 Finally, recent Romanian education legislation only continues the process of 
decentralization (now 80% state and 20% local) as an attempt to  implement Bologna 
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Process demands, the result of which is a theoretical trickle-down effect on primary and 
secondary education without guaranteeing the empowerment of the citizen (Fiszbein, 
2001). For a student to be prepared for a “Bologna” University, however, he or she must 
have passed through an education system that adequately educated that student with a 
broader, liberal arts background. Unfortunately, until future studies are conducted to 
assess progress of reform implementation, it is challenging to determine the current 
quality of Romanian education as of January 1, 2007. Furthermore, teacher education, 
principal training, school accreditation, along with democratic curricular reform seems to 
lack adequate policy implementation, and largely remains “ad hoc” (OECD, 2001). To 
better understand these emerging concepts, the following sections will explore various 
laws and policies to cultivate a frame of reference. 
 
History: Education Reform and the Romanian Constitution 
The first of three major components of education reform in Romania was its 
Constitution. Within the Romanian Constitution is Article 32, which is a brief but 
powerful policy that outlines briefly changes to the education system. However, it 
contains little or no detail about implementation and was not accompanied by a policy to 
guide implementation. Despite its brevity, as part of the new Constitution, Article 32 was 
the product of a “policy window,” a concept that can be defined in this case as an 
opportunity that allowed for major changes in the education system in Romania 




(1) The right to education is provided by the compulsory16 general education, 
by education in high schools and vocational schools, by higher education, as 
well as other forms of instruction and postgraduate improvement.  
(2) Education at all levels shall be carried out in Romanian. Education may 
also be carried out in a foreign language of international use, under the terms 
laid down by law.  
(3) The right of persons belonging to national minorities to learn their mother 
tongue, and their right to be educated in this language are guaranteed; the ways 
to exercise these rights shall be regulated by law.  
(4) State education shall be free, according to the law. The State shall grant 
social scholarships to children or young people coming from disadvantaged 
families and to those institutionalized, as stipulated by the law.  
(5) Education at all levels shall take place in state, private, or confessional 
institutions, according to the law.  
(6) The autonomy of the Universities is guaranteed.  
(7) The State shall ensure the freedom of religious education, in accordance 
with the specific requirements of each religious [group]. In public schools, 
religious education is organized and guaranteed by law (Romanian 
Constitution, 1991). 
All aspects of this Article are the same as what was purportedly guaranteed under 
communism with two exceptions: private provision of schooling and university 
autonomy. However, by permitting the existence of private education and university 
                                                            
16 1st through 8th grade [not kindergarten or 9th grade, onward]. 
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autonomy, the policy fundamentally alters the potential makeup of the Romanian 
education system. Prior to Article 32, religious or private education institutions in 
Romania were forbidden and universities were not autonomous. Therefore, this policy 
allows for an opportunity to reform education in Romania in a way never before 
permissible by statute.   
 While not detailed, Article 32 created an opportunity to "bring about a major, 
permanent change in the functional ability” of Romanian education to address the 
educational responsibilities in a newly formed democratic government (Fowler, 2000, p. 
253). Whereas pre-constitution policy made all aspects of K-16 education centralized and 
state run, Article 32 allowed for private secular or religious schools and higher education 
institutions. This opportunity seemingly created an alternative engine to support the 
reforms of education, especially since autonomy would be employed—the firm, Stalinist 
hand would not withhold intellectual freedoms as during the communist era. 
Furthermore, a group of citizens could, for example, create a private education institution, 
whether religious or secular in nature, that could better serve local or regional interests. 
However, the efforts necessary to implement changes permitted by Article 32 required 
individual actors in conjunction with the nascent government to take advantage of this 
new policy shift. As a result, this policy can be characterized as powerful in what it 
permits but weak in the support it provides for implementation. 
 Strategically, Article 32 handled the “public problem” of demonstrating reform as 
expected in a newly founded democracy by displaying a major value shift in how 
education could take shape (Fowler, 2000, p. 9). Although it does not comply fully with 
the definition of a mandate, Article 32 appears to govern the “action of individuals and 
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agencies” because of the profound shift in the forms of educational intuitions that could 
be created (Elmore & Sykes, 1992, p. 191). Because Article 32 expanded how 
educational institutions can be manifested due to the shift in values, this policy is 
hortatory; that is, it urges action by implying that reform is now in the hands of citizens if 
they desire to have alternatives to public education. 
 Although an inducement policy may have provided more substance through 
detailed provisions about funding and implementation, Article 32 as a hortatory policy 
also lacks specific direction. The policy does not articulate any provisions for 
accreditation, funding support, compatibility with public institutions, or even language of 
instruction. Because the type of institutions this policy permits were new to Romanian 
education, clearer guidance regarding the above mentioned issues would have provided 
better support for their relationship with the government to ensure accountability. Article 
32 is therefore an inadequate policy because although it articulates and legitimizes value 
shifts, it lacks the financial and strategic skeleton upon which a newly formed 
government should base education reform (Elmore & Sykes, 1992, p. 188). 
 
Vague Characteristics of Article 32: Missing Factors 
One important aspect of education reform is curriculum, because of its role in 
providing content for instruction. This content can reflect desired skills and values that 
the institution intends to impart to the students. Not surprisingly, due to its status as an 
article in a constitution, Article 32 does not provide any guidance with regard to 
curriculum reform, content or focus. This lack of specificity may have provided the 
flexibility in curriculum that some students and teachers desired until a clearer framework 
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was employed to carry out what the Article may have represented. Furthermore, Article 
32 did not indicate how public schooling itself should be reformed. No demonstrable 
reform is indicated in Article 32 on the topic of public schooling or anywhere else in the 
Romanian Constitution; since private or religious schools define themselves in relation to 
public schools, this lack of reform has significant ramifications for all types of Romanian 
education. Therefore, despite this freedom in instructor content, there are no boundaries 
for how the Article can be implemented or the extent to which private or religious 
institutions can differ from public institutions (Elmore & Sykes, 1992). Thus, legitimacy 
and comparability to public schooling is challenging and, as a result, possibly damaging 
to the private schools that cannot increase enrollment by differentiating themselves 
sufficiently from the public schools.  
 
Importance of Article 32 
Despite the vague nature of Article 32, it is certainly a revolutionary shift in 
policy direction with regard to Romanian education. Because of the instability of the 
political culture during its writing, perhaps only a vague and brief policy that 
demonstrated a shift in values could be created. Without further direction and follow-up 
regarding accreditation, curriculum, compatibility with public institutions and language 
of instruction, Article 32 remains a policy that is powerful in terms of the changes it 
permits but weak with regard to provisions for implementation.  
To implement changes that would avoid the potential for another dictatorship 
and influence from Russia, the Romanian educational system followed the models of 
Western Europe and the United States based on interviews I conducted in March of 
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2009. This action of adopting Western economic and political theories would garner 
the economic and political interests of these countries. Unlike some of Romania’s 
neighbors such as the Czech Republic and Poland, who did not experience violent 
revolutions, Romania had more challenging issues to tackle. The violence resulting in 
uncertain numbers of deaths, injuries and imprisonments of their coup may have 
represented the discord among citizens and political elite with regard to how the 
country would move forward. Thus, those with power would be the ones who initially 
had a larger effect on education reform since many politicians retained positions prior 
to, and following, the coup of 1989 and the creation of the new government (Birzea, 
1996). Therefore, perhaps the lack of clarity allowed for public education to continue 
without significant changes until the government gained a stronger foothold and 
legitimacy with the people. 
 
Article 32 Viewed from the Symbolic Lens 
Until the creation of Article 32, education was seen as not only a public good, but 
also a government run agency. The symbol of permissible privatized education created an 
opportunity for the entire higher education system in particular to seemingly improve by 
appearing more dynamic and modern. Here, modern is not defined as incessant 
permanent progress but rather as growth that is relevant and applicable to the free-market 
economy Romania sought to embrace. Also, the symbol of private higher education 
reflected a change the country wished to pursue. Although proud of its heritage and 
culture, the people of Romania were ready for change, as evidenced by the coup of 1989. 
The coup was an opportunity for “[c]ultural analysis—the explicit attention to the 
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meanings and symbols that guide the construction of categories and shape the use of 
language—provides a window on the otherwise concealed or unquestioned aspects of 
policy formation and implementation" (Stein, 2004, p. ix.). Thus, the symbolism of 
education policy had to reflect the cultural shift the Romanian population sought through 
political reform. Private higher education, in the U.S., is not necessarily seen as a better 
alternative to public higher education but rather a symbol of choice. Having a choice 
means having the freedom to choose a course of action despite the obstacles of user fees 
and logistics regarding the university’s proximity to a student’s home. One obstacle the 
Romanian government contended with was the perception that its work is complete with 
regard to education reform. It is possible that "[t]he danger of celebrating a symbol is that 
it can lead to a sense of self satisfaction and an unwillingness to examine practice" 
(Rosenberg, 2004, p. 207).  Thus, the symbolic perspective of this policy displays its 
powerful impact on schooling and democratization. 
 
European Union and the Hope for Stability 
Following Article 32 and various reforms commensurate with that policy and the 
Constitution as a whole, Romania, like other Eastern European countries, had an 
opportunity to apply for EU accession. To become part of the EU and thus gain the 
financial and diplomatic benefits of membership, a country must undergo various 
changes ranging from increased political transparency to economic reform. EU 
membership may also require the establishment of country-specific policies: Romania, 
for instance, has taken steps to permit ethnic Hungarians in the northwest portion of the 
country to teach in their native language without compromising their role as Romanian 
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citizens. Romania (and Bulgaria) overcame some of these obstacles and gained entry on 
January 1, 2007. Although this success may indicate that the challenging work of reform 
is complete, both countries still remain in transition due to the monumental reforms 
mandated by the EU which require, for continued membership, implementation 
(http://www.europa.eu). For these nations, entry into the EU was not the endpoint of 
transition.  
 
Anticipating the Bologna Process: Romanian Education Act 84 of 1995 
In anticipation of the EU requirements for accession, Romania passed its 
Education Act 84 of 1995, which was “the first post-communist education law in 
Romania” (Birzea, 1996, p. 105). This Act stated that Romanian education would be  
a national priority, the focusing on a democratic, open and humanistic 
educational ideal, equal chances of access to education for all the citizens of 
Romania, the tax free status of state sponsored education… and the granting of 
university autonomy and the accepting of alternative systems in the organization 
of education (Romanian National Report, 2001, p. 3). 
The Education Act of 1995 took the open-ended nature of Article 32 and made 
explicit the interests of the Romanian government and future reform. Although it 
echoes Article 32 with regard to university autonomy and private provision of 
schooling and higher education, the Act states that education will be a national 
priority that focuses on a democratic, open and educational ideal (Romania National 
Report, 2001). Previously, education policy did not focus specifically on democracy, 
but represented democratic reform by deleting communist rhetoric from the 
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curriculum. Much of what the Act did for education in Romania will be explored 
during the interviews I conducted, as literature is sparse on this subject.  
 
Challenges to Democratic Reform in Romania  
Cultural Mindset 
Despite Act 84 as a clear education policy, albeit top-down and centrally 
created, challenges remained that blocked swift implementation. For example, before 
the Romanian coup of 1989, “[i]nitiative had no place in such a system and people at 
all levels were used to following instructions and pre-set rules. The better you followed 
the rules, the better academic you were” (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 91). Therefore, one 
aspect of Romanian democratization necessitated a paradigm shift that embraced 
innovative and intellectual freedom. Because the new government adopted relatively 
unfamiliar models—democracy and the free-market economic system, respectively— 
to guide the government and economy, innovation, dedication and challenging 
decisions would be needed to support the inherent changes that would occur. 
Moreover, individual responsibility and independent thought would need to become a 
core characteristic of the new Romania.    
 
Beyond Act 84: Additional Insight into Romanian Reform Context 
Education researcher and professor Luminita Nicolescu provided a critical 
perspective on Romanian reforms in the mid to late 1990’s. Because information and 
research are sparse in terms of literature on the topic of elementary and secondary 
education, much of her work, like this study, explored higher education. In her 2002 
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article, “Reforming Higher Education in Romania,” Nicolescu spoke of the inherent 
need for education to reform before the political and economic forces can change. She 
observed that  
Central and Eastern European countries, and amongst them Romania, have an 
even greater need to have educational systems that can help their transition to 
market economies. Education systems in these countries must transform old, 
egalitarian and passive working mentalities into active, competition-based and 
responsibility-taking mentalities, which are the basis of market-driven societies 
(Nicolescu, 2002, p. 91). 
Nicolescu was not writing that education reform guarantees or is even an indicator of 
economic success in the new free market despite its progress with democratization. She 
was, however, expressing that a political change must be sustained by thoughtful, long-
term educational solutions that focus on teaching students about democracy and the 
free-market. With new concepts of competition and entrepreneurship, universities must 
also prepare students to be catalysts for change, themselves, instead of relying on 
government guidance, as was the common under the authoritarian regime.  
 According to Nicolescu, the number of students who attended tertiary 
education institutions increased by a factor of 2.5 times between 1990 and 1999 as a 
result of the new constitution and new political system (Nicolescu, 2002). 
Furthermore, the number of public higher education institutions increased from 42 in 
1970 to 111 in 1999 (Nicolescu, 2002). The demand for tertiary schooling 
overwhelmed what the public institutions could offer. This opportunity allowed for 
private higher education to fill the void and have a chance at sustaining themselves 
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due to market demand. During this time, private higher education institutions 
increased from zero in 1989 to 54 in 1999 (Nicolescu, 2002). This increase in private 
higher education is evidence that Article 32 and Act 84 allowed for desired 
educational alternatives for the citizens of Romania. 
However, in the short-term, the increase in schools alone did not necessarily 
increase civic knowledge, democratic participation or economic progress. Based on 
her qualitative research, Nicolescu writes that  
modernisation, structural and systemic reforms were also needed. [In addition,] 
modernisation reforms (changes in curricula, textbooks, teaching methods), as 
well as structural reforms (legal and managerial issues) were beginning, while 
the systemic reforms meant to change the inner logic of the system were not 
pursued at all (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 92).  
Private schools initially copied public school curricula and management practices 
because of a lack of funding or ability to create alternative curricula. However, over 
time private universities became more independent because they gained financial 
independence and experienced the autonomy from government control inherent in 
private education (Nicolescu, 2002).  
Although university autonomy does not necessarily guarantee quality 
instruction, it certainly affords demonstrable freedoms the public desired. For 
example, Nicolescu writes that,  
[u]niversity autonomy is also supposed to induce qualitative improvements in 
teaching and research and strengthen the links of universities with the 
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communities of which they are part, thus contributing to the fulfillment of the 
other objectives of the reform (Nicolescu, 2002, p. 95). 
During education reform, some private higher education institutions were able 
to be constructed in locations not inhabited by public universities. Many of these 
private universities also located themselves in urban areas. One such example is 
Hyperion University, located in Bucharest, which focused its mission on humanities, 
economics, technical skills and justice (http://www.hyperion.ro). If university 
autonomy did not exist, Hyperion University would be beholden to what the 
Romanian government mandated as core subject areas. Without this effort, Romania 
would not have other institutions with which to build this sense of community or 
instruct citizens about new democratic processes because, up until the coup of 1989, 
there were no institutions of this kind. To better understand the post-coup relationship 
between politicians and education, it is crucial to evaluate Ion Iliescu. Part of his 
course of action encompassed education as a priority for Romania. In his article “Higher 
Education in the Twenty-First Century and its Role in the Advancement of Romania,” 
Iliescu writes about the larger context of universities in Romania with regard to 
political or economic progression: “[i]n the knowledge society that is developing today, 
universities have a major responsibility. They must affirm themselves as constructive, 
knowledge-generating organizations, as well as educators of responsible and competent 
citizens” (Iliescu, 2003, p. 14).  
In this statement, Iliescu acknowledges the importance of universities and their 
effect on citizenship development. Although this same point could be said for the time 
during communist rule and that period’s desired citizen type, in the context of transition 
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toward democracy and a free-market economy, Iliescu alludes to the changing times for 
Romania. Furthermore, to better contend with the force of globalization, Iliescu saw 
education as a potential way to directly confront international changes and trends for the 
benefit of Romania. Iliescu writes that “it is in this very context that a system of 
education is needed, at the core of which are quality services and professionalization, and 
to which the unlimited access of young people is made possible” (Iliescu, 2003, p. 15). 
Private education can complement the public schooling system as an alternative and forge 
some of the changes Iliescu discussed because they would be newly created in a different 
format. The focus on the university as a guiding light of reform echoes the EU’s 
emphasis on top down reform via the Bologna Process. This perspective illuminates why 
primary and secondary education reforms were, and still are, slow in comparison to 
higher education. 
 Additional educational challenges persisted in the conflict between what the 
government wanted with regard to education reform and what Iliescu and his 
government produced. This disjuncture pertained to the speed of reform. Cesar 
Birzea, a nationally respected Romanian educator, wrote that “[t]he students and 
pupils, the main actors of the events of December 1989, wanted rapid and substantial 
reforms, especially in the field of education” (Birzea, 1996, p. 98). As principal 
figures in the events of 1989, students had a vested interest in seeing change in not 
only daily life with regard to civic freedoms, but also with regard to school reform. 
Despite student interest, the government decided rapid changes were risky in that 
sweeping changes could undermine social order and potentially, political stability. 
Specifically, Birzea argues that politicians   
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[…] quickly understood that the key factors of power in the new context are no 
longer of an ideological and military nature, but are under the direct control of 
the decision-making process. That is why the attention of the old political class 
focused upon the three important pillars of modern society: property, 
information, and education (Birzea, 1996, p. 98). 
Since the pillar of public education was already in place, Iliescu’s government did not 
need an education revolution as much as an education evolution that would reflect the 
country’s nascent democracy.  
 
Conclusion: Romanian Education Today 
Although the period covered by my case study ends on January 1, 2007, an 
extended literature review suggests that little research exists on any reforms or changes in 
Romanian education since 2001.17 Until such studies are undertaken, and until new 
reforms focus significantly on implementation, the extent to which Romanian education 
has changed or will change is unclear. However, this finding is not overly surprising 
given the characteristics of Romanian transition at its core: intentionally slow.   
In conclusion, I have provided a brief overview of the profound importance of the 
geopolitical context and historical precedent on transitional democracies like Romania. 
To understand the complex and challenging task of transitioning toward democracy 
necessitates additional exploration into the perspective of the Romanian education 
bureaucrats who impacted or now impact education reform in Romania. From the 
foundation of this literature review, and to fill the gaps that have emerged, interviews 
                                                            
17 Insufficient literature may be due to: a) few reforms since 2001 and/or b) reform 
has occurred, but there has been little research since 2001. 
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with Romanian education bureaucrats were necessary to identify and better understand 
the transition toward democracy from their perspective. Moreover, these interviews 
provided evidence for additional complexities that must be considered with regard to 
education in transitional democracies. The following section will outline the 
methodology for my interviews and will explore how the interview findings may further 





CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: OVERALL APPROACH AND 
RATIONALE 
 
Research Methods: Overall Approach and Rationale 
Accessing the elements behind education decision-making in transitional 
Romania necessitates a study into what and how, as well as why, decisions were made, 
which in turn requires understanding context without applying judgment or negative 
criticism. A purely quantitative analysis would explore only the what of the events that 
unfolded as opposed to a qualitative analysis, which discusses the how and why of events. 
Of all the qualitative methods available for my study of Romanian education, the best 
method was one that allowed me to explore a bounded period of time without 
diminishing the perspectives of the bureaucratic education elites or the documents they 
created: this method is a case study. In the next section, I will explore qualitative 
methodology and, specifically, case study methodology.  
This case study sought to answer two key questions: 
(1) What factors impacted Romania’s transition from a totalitarian regime 
toward democracy? 
(2) What role did education play in Romania’s transition from a totalitarian 
regime toward democracy? 
To support this analysis, I reviewed relevant quantitative studies from the IEA, PISA and 
TIMSS, for example, to supplement my qualitative analysis because they provided an 
overview of Romania’s transition. To provide a contextual framework for the interview 
data for the purpose of triangulation, I conducted a thorough literature review and 
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document (policy) analysis, both of which were explored in Chapter II. Finally, although 
I primarily focused on the time period after the Romanian coup d’état of 1989, I did not 
limit relevant information that may pre-date that time marker.  
 
Characteristics of This Study 
To explore education’s role and the forces impacting Romania during its 
transition from totalitarianism toward democracy, I selected the approach of qualitative 
research methodology. Such a methodology encompasses several characteristics that 
seemed valuable to what I desired to study: 1) natural setting (field focused) as source of 
data; 2) researcher as key instrument of data collection; 3) data collected as words; 4) 
outcome as process rather than product; 5) analysis of data inductively, attention to 
particulars; 6) focus on participants’ perspectives, their meaning; 6) use of expressive 
language; 7) and persuasion by reason (Creswell, 1998, p. 16). In short, this form of 
methodology was essential to answering my two research questions, especially because I 
wanted to emphasize the perspective of the interviewees. Participant perspective is a 
component that quantitative methodology could undermine because the two traditions 
differ on three main levels: the difference between explanation and understanding as the 
purpose of inquiry; the distinction between a personal and impersonal role for the 
researcher; and a distinction between knowledge discovered and knowledge constructed 
(Stake, 1995).  
Because I desired to explore Romania’s transition to discover gaps in the 
literature, the qualitative tradition naturally fit these expectations as a quantitative study 
may not have allowed for the narrative of the interviews.  Moreover, because the 
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questions and collected data comprise an exploratory study, a rigid quantitative 
framework was not plausible.  
Interviewing was a particularly important method of data collection because of 
the premise that to explore this transition, I understood that “much of what we cannot 
observe for ourselves has been or is being observed by others” (Stake, 1995, p. 64). 
Moreover, “the interview is the main road to multiple realities” (p. 64).  
After selecting qualitative methodology, I had to determine my philosophical 
assumptions to answer the research questions before selecting which tradition of 
qualitative methodology: ethnography, biography, phenomenology, grounded theory and 
case study. From Creswell’s (1998) rubric, the following Table 3 explains the 




Table 3: Philosophical Assumptions with Implications18 
Ontological I will address ontological issues by interviewing Romanian elites who 
may provide additional information about the democratic transition as 
well as costs and challenges to the transition. This information may 
help challenge the reality set forth by researchers, who have their own 
bias. 
Epistemological I have a connection to Romanian culture due to Romanian ancestry, 
religion and marriage. That connection is multiplied by having family 
relatives in Romania. I see myself as both part of the people and an 
outsider—and I am that much more connected as a result. 
Axiological I wish to understand Romanian government values to see some of the 
reasons why and how decisions were made regarding education 
policy. I am curious, but cannot study extensively, that relationship in 
comparison with the values of the populace. 
Rhetorical I will carefully choose words I write because I know my study may be 
translated and possibly used by Romanians. What I write is therefore 
doubly important. In addition, I will pay attention to words used by 
those whom I interview and will carefully translate when necessary to 
capture tone and original meaning. 
Methodological My goal is to be fluid and flexible in terms of conclusions or expected 
observations. Because my study will be emergent, I also want a strong 
enough foundation. So, I will have a strong literature review and 
introduction that will leave room for how the interviews and my 
experiences in the field can affect what I ultimately write as a 
conclusion. 
 
Based on the philosophical foundation, I was able to select case study methodology from 
the five main traditions within qualitative research. Ethnography, Biography, 
Phenomenology and Grounded Theory did not seem as relevant approaches to this study 
because of the need for the complex combination of structure without too much rigidity.  
                                                            
18 Table inspired by Creswell, 1999, p. 75. 
101 
 
The case study is defined by Merriam (1998) as an approach that seeks to “gain 
an in-depth understanding of the situation and meaning for those involved” (p. 19).  
Moreover, the focus is on the process and not solely on the outcomes; on the context 
rather than simply on the specific variable; and on discovery more than confirming 
assumptions that could skew the study (Merriam, 1998). Additionally, one attribute of the 
case study that was particularly applicable to this study was its ability to focus on a unit 
(Romania) during a bounded time (1989-2007). In addition to data that existed within the 
boundaries of 1989 and 2007, however, I also provided relevant historical 
contextualization that predated 1989. Because case study methodology also allows for a 
combination of data sources of both qualitative and quantitative origins, I was able to 
combine document (policy) assessment from both qualitative and quantitative based 
literature in Chapter II coupled with original research via interviews with Romanian 
educators in subsequent chapters. Specifically, the case study design was a combination 
of exploratory and heuristic. As a means of understanding many aspects that impacted 
education in Romania, an exploratory approach provided the necessary foundation for 
better explaining the many variables. As a means of understanding the phenomenon of 
exogenous forces’ and transitions’ impact on the role of education, this study is also  
heuristic by its attempt to bring about a new understanding or confirm what is already 
known or assumed about Romania’s transition. Finally, to explore education’s role and 
context amidst its transition towards democracy in Romania, the case study would offer a 
new perspective due to both the subject as well as the tradition itself.   
Although reform continues today, January 1, 2007 is an appropriate end to the 
case study because Romania completed accession into the EU on that date—a literal and 
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symbolic unification of Romania to the whole of Europe. Within these dates, I explored 
the context for democratic transition in Eastern Europe to a limited extent and 
incorporated study of emerging exogenous influences (and the concepts that help explain 
and explore their impact) that each country faced and still faces: neo- and traditional 
colonialism, globalization and isomorphism. Finally, I will provide suggestions for 
Romanian elites to work within these contexts by challenging short-term thinking and 
incorporating emerging alternatives such as long-term ecological perspectives.  
 
Data Collection 
I collected data via interviews with a small group of Romanian bureaucratic elites 
(n = 11), individuals who held positions that influenced reform during the time 
boundaries of this case study, or who now influence reform in an official capacity. To 
supplement these interviews, I reviewed policy documents, articles and books to provide 
a context for my interviews, which were conducted in person in Romania. One challenge 
of data collection was to ensure that the questions and collected data were significant 
enough to be comparable to the literature review and document analysis. Fortunately, a 
significantly high proportion of policy and literature were available in English, including 
all principal documents and policies, since most Romanian publishing occurs in both 
Romanian and English.  
The interview data collection required particular attention due to interviews being 
conducted in Romania. In advance of my travels, I set up interviews with a core of 
potential informants, who I hoped would make referrals for additional interviewees. 
Because I funded this entire trip myself, and included my wife, who acted as an 
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interpreter due to her fluency in Romanian and as a dual-citizen of Romania and 
America, I was financially constrained to one week of data collection. This time 
constraint meant I had approximately two to three hours per person for discussions, 
which fortunately provided a significant foundation of data for analysis. While a small 
amount of external funding existed, this only source of funding was from the Romanian 
government, and taking these funds may have decreased the credibility and 
trustworthiness of my study, if only in appearance. I wanted this study to be free from 
any kind of perception of bias or agenda-based influences, so I was comfortable with how 
small fiscal resources may limit the duration of my study and resulting number of 
interviews. I was also unable to follow-up with the interviewees, and therefore use the 
interviews in their original format. 
Finally, 10 out of 11 interviewees agreed to be digitally recorded on my audio 
recorder with accompanying handwritten notes taken by my two assistants and me. Only 
one interviewee allowed for only handwritten notes so that the interviewee could retain 
deniability should conveyed ideas or concepts be considered or portrayed as 
controversial. I also treated all interviewees’ identity and comments with confidentiality – 
thereby ensuring their responses would be presented without identifying information and 
would also be coded. Additionally, conversations with various citizens while in Romania, 
and with Romanian family back in the U.S., allowed for further contextualization and 
observational research that is interspersed throughout this study. Between the interviews 
which generated over 160 pages of text and the accompanying document analysis and 




While I conducted a literature review and document analysis for a foundation, I 
also conducted original research via interviews, of Romanian bureaucrats who held or 
now hold positions in the administration of Romania’s education system. The questions I 
asked these bureaucrats or elite are written as follows in English, followed by the 
Romanian translation: 
1) Please provide your educational background.  
1. Îmi puteţi împărtăşi experienţa dumneavoastră? 
 
2) Please describe the responsibilities of your current or former position in the 
Romanian Ministry of Education and Science. 
2. Puteţi să descrieţi responsabilităţile aferente poziţiei dvs precedente sau actuale 
în cadrul Ministerului Educaţiei şi Ştiinţelor? 
 
3) Please define what you currently and previously viewed as “democracy” and/or 
democratization. Do you conceive of any aspects of the Romanian society as 
being democratic during the pre-1945, 1945-89, 1989-99, and 1999-2009 periods? 
As my research focus is on the relationship between education and democracy, I’d 
like to discuss how you view your contribution to promoting democracy and 
democratic citizens in Romania. 
3. Vă rog să definiţi ce semnificaţie are acum termenul de democraţie în contrast 
cu percepţia asupra acestuia înainte de democratizare. Consideraţi că au existat 
aspecte democratice în societatea românească înainte de 1945 şi în perioadele 
1945-1989, 1989-1999 şi 1999-2009? Având în vedere că studiul meu se 
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concentrează pe relaţia dintre educaţie şi democraţie, aş dori să aflu cum vedeţi 
contribuţia dvs. la promovarea unei societăţi democratice şi a cetaţenilor săi. 
 
4) Could you tell me some of the key events/periods that have shaped Romania’s 
education system (as it might contribute to education for democratic citizenship) 
prior to 1945? 
4. Aţi putea să numiţi cîteva momente/perioade-cheie care au conturat sistemul 
educaţional din România (în sensul formării statutului de cetăţean democratic) 
înainte de 1945? 
 
5)    Before 1989, what kinds of public education, K-16 policies were enacted 
under Ceauşescu that might be seen as either promoting knowledge/skills needed 
for democracy or democratic citizenship or developing citizens to function in a 
non-democratic polity? 
5. Ce tip de educaţie publică (K-16) a fost legiferat sub regimul Ceauşescu, 
înainte de 1989 şi care poate fi considerat fie un promotor de informaţii şi abilităţi 
specifice regimului democratic, fie unul care contribuie la dezvoltarea unor 
cetăţeni care să funcţioneze în contextul unei politici non-democratice? 
 
6) How did the Romanian Constitution of 1991 and the private and religious 
freedom provision known as Article 32 affect education for democratic 
citizenship in Romania? 
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6. Cum au afectat Constituţia din 1991 şi libertatea persoanei şi a orientării 
religioase cunoscute sub numele de Articolul 32 educaţia pentru statutul de 
cetaţean democrat in România? 
 
7) How did Act 84 in 1995 affect Romanian education for democratic citizenship? 
7. Cum a afectat Actul 84 din 1995 educaţia pentru statutul de cetaţean democrat 
in România? 
 
8) Was Act 84 directly correlated to European Union accession since Romania 
applied in 1995 as well to work toward the goal of developing democratic 
citizens? If so, how?  If not, why not? 
8. A fost Actul 84 corelat cu intrarea în Uniunea Europeană din moment ce 
România a aplicat în 1995 şi cu efortul acesteia de a educa cetăţeni în spiritul 
democraţiei? Dacă da, cum? Dacă nu, de ce? 
 
9) How the Bologna accords may have encouraged educational reform in 
Romania relevant to educating for democratic citizenship? Do you believe that the 
European Union is a beneficial institution as it relates to Romania's transition 
toward democracy? What are the challenges in working with the European 
Union?  
9. Cum a încurajat Acordul de la Bologna reforma educaţiei în România în sensul 
educării cetăţenilor în spiritul democraţiei? Consideraţi că Uniunea Europeană 
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este o instituţie folositoare în ceea ce priveşte tranziţia României către 
democraţie? Care sunt provocările în colaborarea cu Uniunea Europeană? 
 
10) How were you involved with any of these policies? If not, what do you think 
about these policies? Were they enacted soon enough after December 1989 and 
were they sufficient? 
10. În ce măsură aţi contribuit la aceste politici? Dacă nu, ce părere aveţi despre 
ele? Au fost decretate curând după decembrie 1989? Au fost ele suficiente? 
 
11)  What external influences may have affected the creation or implementation 
of any of these policies?  
11. Ce influenţe externe e posibil să fi afectat crearea ori implementarea oricăreia 
dintre aceste politici? 
 
12)  Do you believe that any external pressures, such as globalization may have 
pushed for certain changes in Romanian education?  
12. Credeţi că au existat presiuni externe, precum globalizarea, care au împins 
educaţia din România către anumite schimbări?  
 
13) What is your perception of the civic competency of Romania youth today, 10 
years ago, and at least generally prior to 1989? How might you explain the data 
which show poor civic competency and interpretability in comparison with most 
other countries in the region and world based on IEA data?  
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13. Care este părerea dvs. în ceea ce priveşte educaţia civică a tinerilor români din 
ziua de astăzi, de acum 10 ani şi înainte de 1989? Cum aţi putea explica 
informaţiile care indică competenţe civice slabe în comparaţie cu majoritatea 
ţărilor din regiune şi din lume, conform datelor Asociaţiei Internaţionale a 
Evaluării Educaţiei (IEA)? 
 
14) What would you have done differently if you could make any changes to 
policies or decisions that were made between 1989 and 2007? 
14. Ce anume aţi fi făcut dacă ar fi fost posibil să modificaţi politicile şi deciziile 
care s-au luat între 1989 şi 2007? 
 
15)  Are there any other topics you would like to discuss regarding how education 
in Romania may be effectively or not-so-effectively contributing to developing 
youth to be citizens in a democracy? 
15. Mai sunt si alte aspecte pe care aţi dori să le dezbateţi legate de cum educaţia 
în România poate contribui sau nu la dezvoltarea tinerilor în spiritul democraţiei? 
 
With carefully crafted questions that provided time to build rapport, gain trust, 
and then discuss a variety of open-ended and closed questions, the interviews helped 
answer the research questions and simultaneously provided a very unique perspective on 





To select these interviewees, I reviewed many sampling techniques. I opted to 
employ stratified systematic sampling because I had a core list of those I wished to 
interview and rightly assumed I would garner referrals when in Romania from a wide-
ranging network. This sampling technique does not ensure extrapolation across all 
education bureaucratic elites; however, because enough commonality was found, their 
collective voice provided a new insight into the case of Romania. Through stratified 
sampling, I was able to ensure that those I interviewed comprised various age groups, 
both genders and most of the political parties,19 thus approximating some level of 
population extrapolation.  
The interviews took place in Bucharest, the Romanian capital and location of the 
Ministry of Education. I selected Romanian education elite who had a 
NGO/political/governmental post within the time boundaries of my study, and who had 
the capacity to impact education nationwide. These individuals, whether active or 
inactive officials, were directly connected to the relevant policies via creation, 
implementation or analysis. Moreover, I was able to interview very prominent elite 
within the education system in Romania ranging from former Ministers of Education, 
designers of national curricula, researchers teachers, and bureaucrats of high rank within 
the Ministry of Education—as a group, they were part of the education system before the 
coup, during the bounded dates and even today, which provides a rich and broad view of 
                                                            
19 Many political parties exist in Romania and frequently change names. 
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perspectives, even with a small sample size. The following figure provides anonymous20 
biographical information for later contextualizing their comments: 
  
                                                            
20 Pseudonyms were selected to protect the identity of the interviewees and do not 
correlate necessarily to the gender of the interviewee. 
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Table 2: Interviewee Characteristics 








Researcher NA  X 
Dan Researcher Teacher X X 
Mihai Researcher Teacher X X 
Raul Professor Teacher X X 
Victor Researcher Teacher X X 
Simona CEO 24 
Senior official ; national 
curriculum design X X 
Daniela UN official Senior official25 X X 
Aurelia 
Senior Academic 
Leader Minister of Education X X 
Ana CEO26  Business Sector  X 
Raluca 
High Ranking 
official in Ministry 
of Education 
Mid-level official in 
Ministry of Education X X 
Mona CEO27  Senior official; citizenship X X 
 
With family and professional contacts in Romania, I may have had a foundation 
of trust that allowed interviewees to “open up” more than they may have otherwise done. 
                                                            
21 The pseudonym was created without gender alignment. 
22 For these two service columns, and “X” indicates service during the era indicated. 
Specific years would have provided identifying information. 
23 Many interviewees participated in an official engagement with the Ministry of 
Education at some point in their career in a position of influence. 
24 CEO= leader of education-related entity. 
25 In a human rights related entity. 




This tactic allowed me to tap into their experience and connection to this transition. 
Moreover, because my interview questions highlighted the challenges these bureaucratic 
elites faced in transitioning as opposed to criticizing their failures, the interviewees were 
more open to talking freely with me and provided key data for my study. This approach 
ran counter to an early assumptions that, because Romania is a post-communist country 
where mistrust and fear were prevalent for so many years, I would not be able to secure 
interviews, most or all would not wish to be recorded on my digital recorder, or they 
would provide me with little helpful information as a way of “protecting” their recent 
past—something I would never know for sure.  
Finally, due to the critically important task of building trust so that the 
interviewees would have a free discussion with me, I clearly had to meet with 
interviewees in person and not over the telephone. A telephone conversation with 
someone whom I did not know may not be the appropriate venue for establishing trust 
and eliciting the type of responses I wanted—open, critical and informative. Finally, 
based on finances, logistics and time, I interviewed ten bureaucratic elites who provided 
me with 160 pages of text, which provided sufficient information for the purpose of my 
study.  
 
Observations about Interviewees  
The interviewees with whom I met shared a common characteristic: a strong 
desire to communicate with me. This characteristic ran counter to what I expected, which 
was a post-totalitarian state where the bureaucrats would be reluctant to speak for various 
reasons. Some of these assumed and false reasons included: a fear of repercussions from 
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speaking openly with me; a lack of trust in me as an “outsider” or non-Romanian; a 
general apathy toward my study; and a failure to understand my motives in conducting 
such a study or how they could play a pivotal role in exploring various themes. In the 
end, I was wholly wrong: each person I contacted agreed to meet, and many 
recommended colleagues as additional interviewees. Moreover, ten out of eleven 
interviewees agreed to be recorded via digital audio recorder and signed my recording 
consent form. Even the one interviewee who did not agree to be recorded did permit my 
two translators and me to take copious notes.  
Based on my observations and strong personal history with Romania, I considered 
it crucial that I not revisit interviewees to confirm my findings or even clarify intended 
meanings. My reasoning, besides personal experience with the culture as previously 
expressed regarding my ethnic and familial connection to Eastern Europe and Romania, 
is observational evidence of other studies whose interviewees later changed their 
wording, meanings or willingness to participate, following possible encounters with other 
colleagues and a fear of repercussions. Were I to go back and verify findings, I might 
have jeopardized the integrity of my original research, which should be interpreted with 
this understanding, based on precedent from other students’ dissertations in post-
totalitarian settings.  
My interviews were conducted in English, with one exception where the 
interviewee required no translators. All interviews were conducted with a fluent 
English/Romanian translator in attendance so clarifications of meanings, questions or 
themes could be addressed immediately. My colleagues, one local Romanian and one 
Romanian-born American (my wife), helped me with translating. Following every 
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interview, and again after all of the interviews were conducted, we discussed and 
reviewed my findings. Without exception, we agreed on these issues. Overall, the 
interviewees’ competency of English was sufficient and, given translators’ assistance, I 
am reasonably confident that meaning was not lost in translation. 
I found the interviewees to be warm, intelligent, well-educated and open to 
speaking candidly and critically about their country, the transition and education’s role in 
this transition. The bureaucrats I interviewed held or now hold positions of influence 
within the education system of Romania, whether in the Ministry, Research Institutes or 
NGOs; therefore, I rightly anticipated a level of understanding about education that 
would serve as a strong foundation from which we would engage in more thoughtful 
conversation and reflection, thereby spotlighting their views, their words, and providing a 
venue for their ideas to reach a broader audience.  
Based on my observations and perspectives, all interviewees were competent and 
well-informed. All provided a critical perspective, but were conscious of avoiding 
pessimism. For example, Interviewee Victor commented that, “I do not want to provide a 
very pessimistic view of Romania,” while at the same time providing a very critical 
perspective.  
Moreover, most of the interviewees had experience in America or western 
countries via education or work-related travel, with interviewee Auralia commenting “so 
I’m influenced, somehow, by the American university.” In sum, while I cannot provide 
additional identifying information due to a desire to maintain their anonymity, the 






As it relates to data analysis, my intensive, long-term involvement with Romania 
is very important. While I am not performing an extended ethnography, purely 
quantitative or solely interview-based qualitative study that may necessitate a long-term 
stay in Romania, my connection to the country increases the credibility of my findings 
significantly. Reasons for this claim of trustworthiness are as follows: part of my ancestry 
is Romanian as well as Slovakian, which provided a long-time cognizance of this region; 
my wife is Romanian, born in Bucharest, and helped support translation, cultural and 
navigation needs while in Romania for the interviews; and I have focused all of my 
studies when possible on Eastern Europe from university onward, yielding more than a 
decade of study on this region. Finally, my employment since university has focused on 
education at all levels, both domestically and internationally, thereby enhancing my 
academic preparedness. Therefore, with involvement on both personal and professional 
levels with Romania and Eastern Europe, I am familiar with many aspects of Romanian 
culture that helped me as a researcher by providing the ability to read through and 
analyze data with a perspective not probable by someone without my deep connection to 
the country. 
For the analysis of my data, I triangulated the literature with my interview 
findings and also uncovered new emerging categories for understanding and reporting on 
interview data. To facilitate this analysis for organizational purposes, I used the NVivo 8 
software program. By taking the transcriptions, reading and memoing, and then coding 
based on three emerging themes, I was able to efficiently extract quotations and ideas that 
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may otherwise have been lost. The following are the emerging categories for interview 
data based on the number of times mentioned throughout all transcripts, which I utilized 




Table 4: Emerging Categories 
BEFORE 1945 EDUCATION + 
SPECIAL NEEDS 
















RULE OF LAW 
DEMOCRACY + 
TRUST 


















Moreover, I was able to weave the story with intact quotations to preserve the 
integrity of what each interviewee said; paraphrasing would have represented a form of 
censorship, even for the sake of efficiency. For the document analysis, I explored 
recurring themes, supporting and non-supporting context that was subsequently 
triangulated with the interviews. Together, the interviews and document analysis 
contributed to achieving the goals of my study: understanding the context and the extent 





To address standards of quality, I employed a number of strategies to preserve the 
integrity of the data and worked with the interviewees and their responses in a forthright 
manner. Regarding the issues of quality, one of the key aspects that supported proper data 
management pertained to the strong and well-developed context within which my 
interviews are situated. By conducting interviews in each interviewee’s respective office, 
there was a sense of comfort and familiarity, which may not have occurred  in another 
setting. Sufficient privacy existed, however, within the office setting. 
 The dependability of my data was partially addressed because my study 
evaluated a case from a historical perspective. Also, many examples of countries that 
have transitioned toward democracy already exist, and it is possible that more democratic 
transitions are to come. Therefore, it is likely that this study will be dependable at least 
for countries whose circumstances resemble Romania’s—that is, countries transitioning 
toward democracy without an alternative elite or who contend with forces such as 
colonialism, globalization or isomorphism.  
One of the major challenges I faced as a researcher, but was mitigated by my 
status as a citizen of the United States, was the confirmable nature of this study. Because 
I am not a Romanian citizen, I did not directly benefit as a result of this study. Also, 
while another researcher could highlight aspects of the transition that I am not discussing, 
intentionally or otherwise, I believe my study will be confirmable because I focused on 
the interviewees as opposed to only a document analysis. This combination allows for a 
higher degree of confirmation.  
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To ensure appropriate, professional and ethical treatment of this research, I drew 
from my studies in Eastern and Western philosophy coupled with training from my 
professors, and lessons and guidelines from the Institutional Review Board (IRB),28 
which are relatively extensive and relate directly to ethics. The topic of ethics also relates 
to one of the driving forces of this study, which is the linkage between the potential of 
democracy and individual freedom—hence, my interest in the topic of democratic 
transition. Therefore, ethics were a core of my interest in studying transitional 
democracies in Eastern Europe and also played a role in the extent to which I brought a 
critical lens. To be critical, however, was to evaluate, or at least describe and analyze, 
without necessarily portraying a person or idea negatively. For my study, this point was 
key: I maintained a feeling of trust between myself and the interviewee, and protected 
their identity through coding and careful quotation integration without identifying 
characteristics. I also did not ask questions that would make interviewees expose 
incriminating or controversial information. However, there were no real dangers for any 
involved in my study as this was an exploratory case study seeking to understand instead 
of seeking to assess blame for historical events that may have gone awry.  
 
Threats to Credibility 
The most important potential threat to my study was that I performed a single 
country case study and my comparative data may have limited legitimacy for 
extrapolation beyond the borders of Romania. A second threat to my study could be the 
                                                            
28 Interviewees signed consent forms that were presented in both English and Romanian, 
thereby explaining the study, how I would protect their identity and that I was given 
permission to record digitally their interview. 
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perspective I bring as an “outsider,” as someone who could be perceived by interviewees 
or those who read my study as not being able to comprehend the idiosyncratic or cultural 
aspects of Romania. A potential third threat to my study pertains to the interviewees and 
their respective answers to my questions. For example, if they were to entirely dismiss 
any consideration of the exogenous forces I purported to be an important factor in their 
decision-making, my study would have a different character than if they affirmed my 
theoretical postulation.  
To address the first threat, I intentionally performed an exploratory study and 
explored the role of education in a transitional democracy and the perspective of 
bureaucratic elites within one country in the context of Eastern Europe. While there may 
be supporting evidence for future studies that could be extrapolated onto other countries, 
I did not use my findings in such a manner. To address the second threat, I took the 
stance that being an “outsider” will help provide a lens through which I could see 
perspectives that an “insider,” or local Romanian, might not. Moreover, my direct 
connection to the country and vast experience with the culture through family allowed me 
to bridge the gap between outsider and insider. To address the third threat, I did not 
perform a value-laden study (i.e., I did not judge the elite’s remarks in the context of U.S. 
values) and hoped to elucidate as much verifiable information as possible, even if it was 
from the perspective of the interviewee. Therefore, if the interviewees’ experiences were 
to not corroborate my concepts, the understanding of Romanian transition would still be 
clearer, thereby adding substance and contribution. Although my study had three known 
inherent threats to its credibility, I have three clear solutions that I believe mitigated these 




Limitations of the Study 
The limitations of my study started with the decision to focus on elites and reform 
as opposed to taking a “grass roots” or “grass tops” view of the transition that would have 
focused on schools, students, parents or teachers. Therefore, my top-level or macro 
perspective means I intentionally omitted important aspects of the transition. However, I 
believed these omissions to be necessary for the purpose of providing a new and 
necessary contribution to the research on this topic. Moreover, omitting the perspectives 
of students or teachers, or omitting a study about a particular school or university, did not 
negatively impact the credibility of my study. Instead, by having a particular lens, I was 
able to avoid too broad a study and was able to triangulate literature review findings with 
interview findings.  
A more literal limitation was based on time. My study was limited by the amount 
of time I could spend researching, as well as how much time I could spend writing my 
dissertation. The study was also bounded by fiscal limitations as I was not able to spend 
extended periods of time in Romania for fiscal and employment reasons. However, any 
researcher would face similar difficulties, since all researchers must assess their resources 
and assess the start and end point of their research without compromising the credibility 
of their work.  
In addition, my study was limited because I am an American who brought an 
“outside” perspective studying an Eastern European country. However, I addressed this 
limitation in that my perspective brought forth new ideas and concepts that an “inside” 
perspective may miss. Lastly, my study was limited because of limited English-language 
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research on Romanian education. Fortunately, sufficient information existed for the 
contextualization and understanding of education in the context of exploring its role in a 
transition. Moreover, I employed the support of fluent native-speaking Romanians who 
supported any translation of interview comments and documents ensuring that the 
language barrier was not a major obstacle to my research. Further, most of the 
information that did exist was available via the internet or through the acquisition of 
books—sufficient information existed on the concepts I explored, and sufficient 





CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH FINDINGS, THE IMPACT OF TRANSITION 
 
Introduction 
 The purpose of my study was to explore the role of education in Romania amidst 
transition and the context for education reform. I bounded my study by time, between 
October 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, and January 1, 2007, the date when Romania 
entered the EU. To better understand this time period, I completed an analysis of 
education policy and law, coupled with a literature review. To provide a voice for the 
Romanian people who held or now hold positions of authority in the education 
bureaucracy, I conducted in-person interviews in Romania, focusing on the following two 
research questions: 
(1) What factors impacted Romania’s transition from a totalitarian regime 
toward democracy? 
(2) What role did education play in Romania’s transition from a totalitarian 
regime toward democracy? 
The findings from these interviews, conducted in March of 2009 in Bucharest, form this 
chapter, which will focus on interview findings to explore question (1), and the next 
chapter, Chapter V, which addresses question (2).  
 To clearly report the findings from my original research, I have chosen to 
organize interview responses around the major emerging themes that, collectively, all 
eleven interviewees discussed to some extent. Based on the literature review, no 
significant issues were neglected during the interviews. To protect the identities of my 
interviewees, I have opted to not present my findings on an individual case basis, since 
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the context for each interviewee’s comments would undoubtedly link that person with 
what was said and expose their identity. By focusing on emerging themes that fill a gap 
in the literature and by reporting the findings without any attributing information, their 
voices can be heard without compromising their job or person in any manner, per 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) policy. Finally, because the thrust of my research was 
to provide a voice for the Romanian people, even if partially represented via the 
bureaucrats who held positions before or during my research, and before or during the 
transition, I will provide as many relevant quotations as possible, and will keep 
paraphrasing to a minimum so as to spotlight what they had to say.   
 
Findings  
The following are themes derived from eleven interviewees as they relates to 
macro-level issues that impacted Romania’s transition. While the interviewees are not 
representative of the Romanian citizenry or the Romanian government, they are 
representative of voices from Romania and provide keen insights into the education 
system and its context in Romania.  
 
Before 1945  
Before I discuss this period, dating from 1945 to 1989, I will first provide a 
perspective of pre-totalitarian times, which most interviewees considered the Interwar 
Period—a time period that was as far distant as they deemed relevant to discussing 
Romania today, aside from the occasional comment on previous colonial influences. The 
time period coded as “Before 1945,” was characterized as having many positive 
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elements, such as democratic features and other aspects that were later influenced or 
destroyed by the totalitarian Ceauşescu regime. Interviewee Petre commented that  
[h]istorically speaking, you can say that in Romania in the interwar period, that 
would be between 1918, after the First World War and until 1938, you could say 
that you had some kind of democratic mechanism. You cannot call it a democratic 
regime because we were actually a monarchy. It was close to the constitutional 
monarchy, but not a complete constitutional monarchy, that is, the king had one 
big power, and that was to name the prime minister. And what happened in the 
interwar period was that the king named the prime minister every four years, or 
even sooner, if there was unrest or something in the country, and then the prime 
minister organized the elections. And of course, his party always won, so this was 
the democracy in the interwar period. 
The interviewee went on to say, 
[c]ompared to communism, yeah, you had freedom of speech, you had free media, 
free newspapers. From this point of view, you had a very strong political 
movement, let’s say, in the media of the time. 
These elements of democracy, whether “freedom of speech” or a strong “political 
movement,” provide a foundation for Romania and its future democratic growth. 
Interviewee Petre went on to say that 
until 1938, and in 1938, there was the royal dictatorship [that] was installed. And 
that was for two years, and then we had an extreme right regime governed by 
Marshall Antonescu … with no freedom at all. [Moreover,] in Romania, there is a 
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very particular characteristic of this extreme right movement. They’re Nazi and 
fascist in their ideas and in their doctrine, let’s say, and in their actions, also… 
This Antonescu regime, according to Interviewee Petre, 
had a particular trait. They were also fundamentally Orthodox, as in Orthodoxy 
the religion, so they also had this trait, which is really particular in the case of 
fascism and Nazism yet they didn’t use religious symbolism. But in Romania, you 
had this very strong religious symbolism that was used by the extreme right 
movement, all of the organizations, and even the state during the National 
Legionary State, 1940 till 1941. 
Interviewee Petre continued, saying 
You had this very strong connection with the church and views of religious 
symbols as a way of legitimizing and supporting power. And you had, also, a very 
strong connection with the church as an institution, a number of high-ranked 
priests, let’s say, and even the head of the Romanian Orthodox Church marched 
in rallies along the extreme right movement, the legionaries, Marshall Antonescu 
and so on. So you had this very strong connection, which is unparalleled to other 
similar movements. 
Based on this interviewee’s comments and observations, it seems possible that the 
fascist and, later, totalitarian regimes were powerful forces in undermining interwar and 
future democratic development. Moreover, while most Christian churches typically focus 
on character and ethics to some degree, the Church in Romania may be impacted by the 
type of leadership and type of regime in power. Therefore, while the church in Romania 
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could have preserved elements to later support democracy, it seems to have not on a 
systemic level, while various individuals could have played a different role. 
With a religion and church that changes its foci depending on the regime in power 
and a constant struggle for identity amidst many political changes, the context for this 
authoritarian growth and, subsequently, any democratic growth in Romania is based on a 
dualistic history. According to Interviewee Simona, the Northwest portion of Romania, 
Transylvania, has many differences in comparison to the South-centrally located 
Bucharest: 
Romania is a double country that is still trying to find its own identity. Why is 
this? So Romania is composed by two main parts, which is Transylvania [and 
Bucharest], and Transylvania traditionally, historically, was all the time having an 
Austrian/Hungarian background. That means basically, German culture, 
Austrian/Hungarian background, and this still can be seen in the country, 
probably the guys know that when somebody comes from Transylvania, we in 
Bucharest think that these people are different. 
This dualistic history, or search for culture, influenced education. Interviewee Simona 
went on to say that 
Bucharest is very different from what you can see in Transylvania, [which 
follows] mostly the Austrian/Hungarian pattern, cultural pattern educational 
pattern, doing education. People were educated in very different ways for 
centuries there. And again, I can give you sources where you can see the big 




Coupled with the Austrian/Hungarian pattern in the northwest, an attempt to follow a 
French style of education is seen in Bucharest and some outlying areas. The French 
pattern or French style is one that is worth discussing as a context for this case study for 
its foundational impact on Romanian education, as explained by Interviewee Simona:  
I’m talking on this part of the country. So that when you go back to Romania 
between the two World Wars, you have a French-type of education. If you go to 
the programs of study, the curricula, the mechanisms, the manner, the culture, the 
school culture is profoundly French. 
And this happened, for instance, the best Romanian education was in between the 
two World Wars, big successes between the two World Wars, big successes. It 
was a huge development of culture, education, somehow making the compulsory 
for grade education in countryside places, encouraging countryside schools. So 
education was somehow flourishing for those times.  
 
Post WWII Overview 
 Following the installation of the fascist regime and subsequent communist 
leadership under Georgieu-Dej, a hardliner who won power over the more intellectual 
Ana Pauker, Nicolae Ceauşescu assumed power. This is the beginning of the period 
between fascism and the coup d’état in 1989. As a factor of influence on my case study, 
this time period is perhaps the most significant, as it set the stage for the subsequent lack 




After WWII, as previously discussed, Romania went through a profound change 
with the creation of a fascist regime and the subsequent Soviet occupation. Interviewee 
Auralia explained that 
there was a reform in higher education in 1947 or ’48 or something like that. The 
promoter of the reform is [inaudible], the Minister of Education at that time 
because you don’t have – you have to understand that the education system 
doesn’t change rapidly, so the Russians came into the country, and we finished 
the Second World War in ’45, and education has changed, no. 
So the education in the system was the same until 1948. In 1948, the system 
changed, and from a German and French-type system, it converted to [a] 
Russian[-type system]. 
Following the Soviet invasion, Romanian education was forcibly changed from a 
western-leaning and more liberal arts focused French system, which was also influenced 
by the German and Austro-Hungarian systems, to the Russian system.  
  However, the changes to the education system did not happen as quickly as the 
change in national leadership. Interviewee Auralia explained that 
[higher education reform in 1948] was the first major reform. You know, the 
change did not [take] place suddenly. The professors could not be – they could be 
kicked out, all of them. Of course, there were a lot of fake professors, trusted by 
the – okay, trusted and well liked by the new government. But the majority of the 
professors were the old guys, and very few places, a good professor has been 




Between 1945 and 1989 
Many perspectives were provided by the interviewees on this time period. Some 
were young during this communist era; others had already received most of their 
schooling. Interviewee Petre described this period:  
When the Communist regime came to Romania, you have a completely different 
story for a number of reasons. There was a nationalist feeling among the leaders 
of the Communist Party at the beginning, but again, there were not a lot of 
Romanians – of ethnic Romanians – heading the party at that time. And also, for 
the Communist regime, the Jewish minority in Romania was a very good source 
of money because, basically, what has been discovered through the archives was 
the Romania state was [literally] selling [Jews] to Israel, for example, for large 
sums of money. So it was a very good income source. But again, this is history as 
written in the textbooks. 
This interviewee used interesting word choice relating to the communist regime, as it 
“came to Romania,” as if from abroad. This comment may be based on the fact that 
communism came concurrently with the occupation by the Soviet Army, when soldiers 
swiftly came into Romania and power changed. The interviewee’s comments on the 
Jewish citizenry are interesting because many of the intellectual communists were 
Jewish, including Ana Pauker, who wanted communism installed for egalitarian reasons, 
not for the authoritarian reasons that the occupying Soviets later implemented.  
The interviewee went on to say that it is challenging to study this time period, 




before ’89 you have no idea what really happened because nobody studied the 
field. You had no social sciences in the period from 1980 to 1989, so for ten 
years, you have no history of social sciences in Romania, basically. [Education 
was] very limited to engineering, mathematics, physics. 
The interviewee went on to say that  
there was no democracy before ’89, so there is no topic of conversation, not even 
theoretically. You cannot find any traits of democracy before ’89. 
Moreover, the interviewee’s comment contradicts previous claims by other interviewees 
that democratic traits existed during the Interwar period (Between WWI and WWII), but 
perhaps at a vague and unverifiable level.  
 The “Before 1989” era was also characterized as nationalistic, more than before 
1945. Almost overnight, the Romanian government created an awareness and 
understanding of their proud and ancient heritage based on observational data. 
Interviewee Petre discussed this heritage as having “a certain viewpoint”: 
history had a certain viewpoint, let’s say. They had a viewpoint they had to obey, 
and it was centered on the exceptional qualities of the Romanian people dating 
back to ancient times, to the Romans and starting from the Roman invasions, 
which we resisted brilliantly, but in the end, were defeated, but not because we 
were bad. And going all the way to modern times. It was called the Golden Era by 
Ceauşescu, the period from 1980, let’s say, until ’89, it was called by the Golden 
Era. It was the peak of our development as a people, our nation.  
This is interesting about the Romanian communist regime is that it had a very 
strong nationalistic trait, which is, again, not really found in other communist 
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regimes, but Ceauşescu, especially, he had a very strong nationalistic dimension29 
of his dictatorship. And this appealed to a lot of people, actually. 
Interviewee Simona provided a more distinct historical framework for 
understanding the “Before 1989” era, with dates and markers. This particular portion of 
the interview process was informative, as no literature has been made public that provides 
details regarding Romania’s communist education system in terms of the transition from 
a communist state to a totalitarian state. Interview Simona begins by explaining that   
because even though in communist times, we had some influence coming from 
Soviet Union in the ‘50s, basically, in the ‘60s, Romanian education went 
somehow back to the former pattern. Nobody declared this, but this was basically 
the French pattern. So if you go back to the ‘60s, to the ‘70s, and you check 
Romanian educational programs, and curricula, you would see that the differences 
are not that big, as compared to the curricula of France or Spain or all these 
Western countries in the ‘60s or the ‘70s. It’s very difficult to explain; maybe we 
can come back to this. So now, that means that in 1989 and ’90, when the change 
happened, so then, the Romanian education was, on the surface, a profoundly 
communist education with some clear characteristics. 
Interviewee Simona continued: 
Starting with ’49, there were different periods of time because actually, we had 
from ’49 to ’53, up to Stalin died, so it was – so basically, it was a kind of trial to 
get very much Romanian education towards the Soviet model, so that happened 
                                                            
29 This nationalistic tendency is not unique to Romania in comparison to other countries, 
but is unique to Romania when considering its history. 
133 
 
from ’49 to ’53. Even in the sense that textbooks have been revised in this kind of 
Romanian tradition out of the textbooks, everything that was this kind of 
bourgeoisie type of education out of the textbooks, and so on and so forth. Then it 
seems that from let’s say in ’61, ’62, we started getting out somehow from the 
Soviet influence. And even though Ceauşescu came to power in ’65, it seems that 
already from ’63, ’64, gradually the system went back towards the so-called good 
Romanian traditions. 
How did Romania compare to other Eastern European countries in terms of the severity 
of their totalitarian state? Interviewee Raluca commented that 
I had some relatives – I don’t have that many in Romania, but I know a little bit 
how the life was going on in Poland, in Germany…so it is not to be compared 
with what it was here…Looks like North Korea here. 
Such drastic comparisons to North Korea, a country that represents totalitarianism 
combined with extreme oppression accompanied by dire economic and humanitarian 
circumstances, exemplify the struggle that Romanians endured, and the place from which 
they started when subsequently commencing their transition toward democracy.  
A key moment during Romania’s increasing authoritarian rule, according to 
Interviewee Simona, was  
from ’65 to ’71, the system opened very much towards western culture. And 
basically, from ’65, in Romania, you all the time had, and this is one of my 
explanations that we still kept contact with western world is that we never had a 
very important censor for literature. 
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Not all the time officially, and culturally, from ’65 to ’71, and even later, again, 
we had outstanding cultural elite that kept good quality theatre, good quality and 
western theatre that happened all the time, probably theatre was one of the 
cultural things that kept this, how to say, some traces of any kind of democratic 
movement.  
For instance, in the ‘70s, even after – ’71 was an important moment because 
Ceauşescu went to visit North Korea, and he saw this strict North Korean model, 
and when he came back, he immediately promoted this new – I don’t remember 
what was the bloody name of this thing, this new ideological education movement 
something. So in ’71, things started to be closed. Like less western literature, 
more Romanian tradition, and from ’75 even, he became this nationalist 
communist thing, so going back to the Dacians, the Thracians—this huge tradition 
[which started] 3,000 [years ago]. Suddenly, we discovered that we are old of 
3,000 years, and going back to the old Dacian kings, and all this nationalistic stuff 
 As it relates to higher education, the focus on the West was supported by 
international travel and study that preceded the 1971 closing of Romania. When Romania 
students and scholars were prohibited from traveling outside Romania, interpersonal 
exchanges of knowledge were lost. For instance, according to Simona, before 1971: 
all university professors were sent to study somewhere, a lot of grants to students, 
a lot of good people that were attracted to work in universities. So generally, very 
good quality stuff, but then after ’71, it was, how to say, certain cultural leaders 
that kept this kind of relations, good translations [of research and literature were 
available] in these years.  
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While international travel was prohibited after this time, certain teachers, as vaguely 
alluded here in this interviewee’s comments, tried to keep the openness of ideas alive 
through subversive ideas, or, as I shall call it, subversive pedagogy.  
 Teachers had to work in a very challenging setting however, especially if they 
were trying to preserve Western liberal arts in an increasingly industrialized system 
focused on engineering and mathematics. After 1971, Ceauşescu made a move that both 
physically and figuratively changed the focus of higher education, known as the 
integration period. According to Interviewee Auralia: 
from the education point of view, the universities started to be built inside the 
factories. For example, they did not build a new faculty, a mechanical engineering 
faculty on the hill, but Ceauşescu ordered it to be built in the factory, in the area 
where the industrial area was. 
 When asked if the interviewee felt about how the quality of education was impacted, and 
if it was a higher or lower quality education, the interviewee responded by saying that 
there was “less quality.” Moreover, Auralia continued: 
in this period, which was called the integration period, two things happened to the 
higher education system. First, technical universities got more and more money in 
places, so they grew because the politics of the government was to ensure more 
and more people with technical skills, and the classical universities were 
shrinking.  
Another Interviewee, Raluca, had a similar take on the Integration Period: 
during the Ceauşescu regime, in the beginning of ‘70s, after a visit paid to China 
and North Korean, once back from there, Ceauşescu decided that we are not in 
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need of theoretical secondary education and everything should be technical and 
vocational in order to serve better the purposes of Communism and to become 
extremely qualified to work for the economy and for all enterprises.  This is why 
at this age he decided that anything of school should work with an enterprise, and 
teachers became employees of the enterprise.  
The values or the mission of the school was extremely changed and it was just the 
idea of having graduates for prospective enterprise.  What kind of democracy?  
Almost [none].  I mean, what kind of society – it was the regime and that’s all. 
There were some elements of democracy prior to Romania’s transition toward 
democracy. Interviewee Victor stated that  
it was interesting in these types of activities [subversive teaching practices], 
which were full of doctrine that the teachers leading them were ironic to the 
system. It was very interesting in a way what happened.  
  Interviewer: So there was a subtle or quiet type of criticism that existed. 
  Interviewee: Yes, for sure. 
  Interviewer: And you see that criticism being an element of democracy? 
 Interviewee: I think it was an indirect way of defending democracy. In a way, it 
depended on each person if he became democratic or not. He would behave 
democratic or not. This is very important because even if the system is a 
totalitarian one, if most of the people in their relationship with others behave 
democratic, it can be very useful. 
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 Interviewee Victor continued discussing possible elements of democracy that 
existed during totalitarianism. In this example, the interviewee discussed the existence of 
teachers who criticized [societal] class-based education via the story of a 
math teacher that was angry at a student. Make a circle with a compass. It was not 
good. He threw the compass away and said “god damn the working class” [for 
fear of being fired, imprisoned, or worse]. They were afraid that what would 
happen the next day because he said something forbidden. One of the pupils in the 
class was the son of the mayor. But of course, we liked his courage.  
Within the classroom in totalitarian Romania, there were characteristics of 
learning that, while not taught as “democratic education,” provided democratic skills of a 
sort. Interviewee Victor explained that democratic education comprises the following 
attributes: 
to provide arguments. To be elected as class leader. In each class, there were three 
groups. Each group had a leader. The process was a democratic one, actually. It 
was a propaganda system. I remember it was organized like this.  
For group leaders, there were proposals made by the pupils, and there was voting. 
It was an open vote. You could raise your hand. The pupil that had more votes 
was elected as the group leader. Then the similar process for the class leader, 
which was called commandante. Then school elections for the school leader. This 
school unit leader was usually going in the summer to represent the school in 
extra-curricular activities. This was – if the teachers behaved democratically, he 
or she didn't influence the way of the vote.  
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The combination of these ad hoc democracy skills could have provided some semblance 
of a foundation for democratic citizenship once Romania became a democracy, but the 
interviews discuss an overall lack of an organized effort and not enough substance to 
prepare students adequately.  
 
Education Before 1989 
 While there are some interviewee comments that overlap this category with the 
previous one, it is worth discussing that during the communist period, primary and 
secondary education followed programs primarily focused on engineering and 
mathematics, while the delivery of subjects such as history or literature was highly 
politicized and limited in scope. History and literature, according to Raul, “were more 
prone to political influence in terms of content.” In addition, as Interviewee Mihai 
remarked, “[t]he accent was, at that moment, to – for mathematics, technology, not for 
humanities. Interviewee Mihai described education as 
during that time, we started a lot of subjects having no – or not too much relations 
with the qualifications. We studied those ideological subjects. History was very 
much influenced by ideology. And we started political economy, and so on.  
This ideological education displaced time and resources that could have been attributed to 
skill-building. Despite this attribution of resources and time, interviewee Mihai said that 
it was based, in a way, on our aptitude to become primary school teacher or other 
qualification. But I think that it was, also, at the level of theory, it was a very good 
relation between the practical activities– my colleges were done in some 
139 
 
enterprises. Now, as I heard, it is – this problem of practical activities, it is really 
a problem. 
Therefore, communist education according to this interviewee was ideological and 
theoretical and less practical with the exception of vocations such as engineering. 
Regarding the quality of communist education, interviewee Mihai said that  
actually education was really good. Education was really good and if you know, 
we really had huge performances. Now again, I don’t know, I cannot explain why 
[that was] just because all of us really wanted a better life and we had higher 
motivation. All of us, we had with only a small percentage ended up there, and 
then at the present time for higher education results and everything else. But we 
are really performing at an international level. So the education was good in terms 
of content and specialized education in different fields and so on. 
However, this interviewee narrowed the scope of the comment on education quality by 
stating that 
the quality of education before [during communism], it seemed, and correct me if 
I’m wrong, but was very strong in mathematics, engineering, and physics, but it 
seemed that history was somewhat limited because it was ideological; humanities 
was limited because it was ideological.   
College-educated Romanians who emigrated to other countries excelled in mathematics- 
and engineering-related jobs, thereby representing the system as a whole when in fact 
they were among the best educated.  Based on my observations, in countries such as the 
United States, Romanians with engineering or mathematics degrees out-performed 
American colleagues on the basis of skill-level. This performance, however, represents 
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college-educated Romanians who mostly emigrated from the high quality universities of 
Bucharest.  
 Observational evidence from émigrés is, of course, subjective, but Romania’s 
performance in the Mathematics Olympics, aligns with the observations in that certain 
populations within Romania were better educated than other populations.  The 
Mathematics Olympics was biased in favor of urban students who could be coached and 
then celebrated as representatives of Romania and Romania’s education system. 
Interviewee Simona explained that 
The second meter [besides excelling in employment abroad] for Romanians was 
in ’93 …, we have all these Olympics. When we send Romanian kids to the 
Mathematics Olympics, we are the first. We have the gold medals. Nobody thinks 
that these are two students over-trained by ten teachers. 
The impact of the Olympiad during this time period before 1989 was further explained by 
Interviewee Petre, who said that  
the student – there are special classes created for this [Olympiad]. Again, it’s a 
really big issue, but nobody will formally recognize this. Nobody will say that this 
is true, but if you look into the field, you can easily see it. So you have these 
classes of students who are bred like cattle for this Olympiad – it’s a little bit 
exaggerated, but something – for this international contest where they go, and 
usually, they win because there is no competition. If you study for eight hours a 
day only math for three months, you are going to win. 
It could be said that the elitist and urban-focused Olympics created the impression 
that Romania’s education was strong, even though the focus was on one or two 
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subjects, and even though the percentage of students competing in these Olympics 
represented less than 1% of the total student body. 
The ramifications of the Olympics are linked to education reform today, which can be 
seen as a reaction against the old system that cultivated a small educational elite. it is 
worth noting that Interviewee Raul considered the Olympics to be a standard to which 
today’s “massification” or education for all is compared, as if it were a pinnacle in 
Romania’s educational history: 
at the moment, worldwide, the trend is from elite to massification, but this means 
a high level of lowering of the student entry body, and it shows.  Legislation does 
not allow us, for instance, to form groups like elite groups and less elite groups, 
and they’re mixed in the groups of students. Then you might have Olympics, like 
very [high] performing people, where some people just entered. Then discussion 
in your seminars, in your classes, it’s very unequal, heterogeneous. It’s difficult. 
To address both, and some of them, they just come with brilliant solutions and 
stuff like that, and these people otherwise did not understand what the smart ones 
have done. 
 Related to a focus on certain populations of students for the Olympics, Romanian 
education seemed to focus on urban vs. rural. Interviewee Raluca commented on the 
impact of the move from rural areas to urban areas as a way of control: 
but after that, it was during the Ceauşescu, what he did, he moved the whole 
population from the rural areas to town.  So this is just to say that you do not have 
any longer the feeling of belonging to anything because you have been out of your 
own environment, going in a big town where you are depersonalized, and then 
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being offered, if you are very good as origin, to become a leader.  This was the 
only quality, in the beginning – or maybe later on. 
This shift from rural to urban impacted the leadership and composition of 
communities and possibly destroyed the network of support that communities offer 
students, at least initially. To this point, Interviewee Mona expressed the following 
sentiment regarding the quality of communist education: “whoever says that is not a 
professional. Universities under communism were bad because [they had] restricted to 
certain areas. Also, [they] had lots of indoctrination.” However, it can be surmised that 
the scope of what was studied was narrow, and subjects such as history would be 
politically skewed in favor of the party to the detriment of truly understanding history.  
Within this constrictive paradigm, teachers created opportunities to tend to 
students’ needs. Interviewee Victor said that 
teachers could – also limited, depending on their availability to introduce new 
topics, take care of pupils' interests and introduce a topic that is needed or that the 
pupils are interested in, even if it's not in the analytical syllabus. For example, at 
that time, the textbook was created in a very strict accordance with the syllabus. 
The order of the lessons in the textbooks was similar with the order of the topics 
in the curriculum, which is not the case now. I remember that there were some 
lessons we didn't actually do or approach, and the teachers, knowing that we are 
interested in…made a lesson about the United States because it was a similar 
democracy and we were very interested. Everybody said it was a joke. Americans 
will come [to liberate us from totalitarianism]. 
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Moreover, Interviewee Victor stated that “education was valued before '90s” by the 
Romanian citizenry, as something “to be proud of.” Teachers also found clever loopholes 
in the program requirements that enabled them to preserve non-ideological or different 
elements of education. For example, on the topic of the teacher’s ability as an individual 
actor, Interviewee Simona stated that 
for instance, I do remember that when you had the Marxist- Leninist course, the 
professor was simply telling us that look, this year, we talk on the origins of the 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy. And the origins are actually Kant and Hegel, and he 
told all the year on Kant and Hegel, nothing on Marx and Engels, and this 
happened in the faculty in ’76, ’77. So for instance, in my faculty, we didn’t have 
this kind of ideological education because no one of the professors promoted 
anything like this.  
In another example provided by Interviewee Simona regarding subversive activities: 
I taught Romanian language, and all the textbooks started with a poem to the 
leader, but it was a method you want to do this in the classroom or not. And all 
the times, for instance, [I assigned this task for homework]. And I said, okay, this 
year, the first text is a very nice [poem] [I said this] because you had to say that 
it’s a very nice [poem]. 
Through such means, it seems teachers were able to maintain a sense of western culture 
or, at least, of non-communist Romanian values and skills. Therefore, the teachers in high 
school and higher education, when they chose to, contributed to what Interviewee Simona 
considered a “double education,” meaning that while the students learned one perspective 
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at home, they could learn an alternative perspective in the school, depending on the 
teacher.  
 
Change in Romania: Revolution or Coup d’état?  
 Was Romania’s march toward democracy an organic, grass-roots revolution 
whereby the people overthrew Ceauşescu and his regime, or was it a coup d’état and 
therefore a “processed” democracy, a phrase I created to describe the forced nature of the 
democratic beginning? The literature points to this transition as being a coup d’état, as 
Ceauşescu was removed from power following two key historical events: 1) the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, which symbolized the fall of the communist authoritarian rule, and 2) a 
meeting he had with Iranian leadership regarding his potential desire to procure nuclear 
material, which allegedly caused a stir in Washington, D.C., and Moscow. Interviewees’ 
tones and insinuation, as well as direct comments reflected the idea that Romania did not 
indeed have a revolution, even though it was the only country in all of Eastern Europe to 
experience a bloody, armed transition. However, other statements by the interviewees are 
less clear. To this point, Interviewee Simona explained that the 1989 coup was often 
referred to as the “’89 event.” The ambivalence with the nomenclature may insinuate that 
the “event” was not simply a malevolent coup without sufficient leadership change, nor 
was it an organic revolution from the people; instead, this change was somewhere in-
between,  but more closely resembling a “welcomed” coup.  
 One interviewee had a particularly interesting way of explaining the “event” of 
1989, and discussed its unique status. In particular, Interviewee Raluca discussed the in-
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between nature of the event as having aspects of a coup and a revolution. The following 
exchange with the interviewee is as follows: 
Interviewee: It was not a civil war.  When the war is starting, you can’t any 
longer control.  There are enough innocent dying for what has been in December 
’89, but it is not to be compared with what is Iraq, Afghanistan or another area. 
Interviewer: Someone said that the transition followed a perestroika style, very 
slow – for a while, anyway – very slow, very calculated, to keep stability.  Does 
that seem accurate, that maybe until ’99, maybe, or the beginning, the idea that 
there wasn’t an entire new population in the government.  It was still some people 
who were formerly in the government for the reason of preserving stability, 
whereas Czech Republic had a whole new population of people. 
Interviewee: I’m not very sure to which extent it was done on purpose or it was 
just an accident that has been this way.  I think that the change in ’89, it was not 
towards democracy.  I think that is was just a hope of changing the leader.   
Interviewer: A coup d'état? 
Interviewee: Just to get rid of Ceauşescu.  Because there were that many slow 
changes, and only in ’92, ’93, we learned that yes, maybe democracy is the 
solution.  But I think that there are a lot of hopes of those – I’m not in favor of I 
don’t know what kind of [word to use] to name it.  I believe it was a sort of a 
revolution.  I don’t think that has been done by the Romanian population at all, 
but I don’t even, as I said, think that it has been done for changing the regime, a 
total change of the regime, I mean, to move towards democracy.  I still believe 
that it was a sort of humanistic phase of communism or sort of a socialism.   
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And that’s why those that lost their power when democracy more or less has been 
installed, they continue acting against democratic change.  And I still believe that, 
also in our days, you have a lot of nostalgia, not those that, for example, they lost 
their jobs, and to some extent, you can believe that they have the right to say, 
okay, we came from rural areas, we had no studies, but we were very good in the 
Communist Party with a lot of revenues and now we are nobody.  Them, you can 
understand.  They lost a lot.  But also, the leaders, they lost a lot.   
And I still believe that also those that were working for the Securitate, they split 
in[to] different groups.  They continue to fight each other.  It’s still something to 
continue in. 
This sense of nostalgia can be problematic, partially because inherent in the concept of 
nostalgia is a sense of incorrectly remembering aspects, both positive and negative, of 
whatever particular phenomenon is focused upon. If this is the case, nostalgia may lead to 
an incorrect or tainted frame of reference. Due to this transition, where many reformed 
totalitarian leaders remained in power in the fledgling democracy, what ensued over the 
next twenty years in many ways echoed the way in which Romania’s new government 
began in 1990: top-down, elite-driven, and lacking an alternative elite with experience in 
democratization or decentralization. This approach did not incorporate the citizenry and 
represented a “business as usual” approach, thereby possibly undermining support or 
momentum that could have been utilized to motivate substantive change. During the 
beginning of the transition, from a symbolic perspective, the new form of government 
may have wished to distance itself from the Ceauşescu regime through different policy or 
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structure of government given the overall citizen discontent. However, interviewee Petre 
characterized the first period of time after the coup as being 
a time of slow reforms, I would say. From ’89 until ’99, you had – even in 
education, this is something you’d see – you had contradicting reforms. That is, 
every change of government produced a new policy in a field, even in education, 
a new view, let’s say, of how to do things. So this is why the process was often 
chaotic and you cannot find guidelines and ideas running around through it. There 
were some public goals that the government said we have to reach, that is, 
membership in NATO and membership of the European Union. These were our 
goals. Basically, somehow, we tried to do things in a way to get there. 
While seemingly optimistic in terms of progress toward a democracy, Interviewee Petre 
acknowledged that there were other domestic forces at play: 
[one] had in power the Social Democratic Party, which is better known for its 
communist origin, let’s say, because most of the founding fathers of the new 
Social Democratic Party in Romania after ’89 are coming from the ranks of the 
Communist Party, and they even had public positions before ’89. Even the 
president of the country at the time, Ion Iliescu, who is famous, even he was the 
assistant minister for young people or something like that, so he held public office 
before ’89. And so this Social Democratic Party is better known for its communist 
origins.  
About ten to 15 years later, there was a third component to consider: the next generations 
of leaders. To this point, Interview Petre said that 
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in fact, there is a second generation starting to come to take over now who has no 
connections to communists for age-related reasons because they were very young 
then, so it’s very hard to say that they had any connections. Some people are 
trying to do that based on their family background, which is not very nice, but 
then, it’s politics. They’re trying to use the family background and say even he 
was young but his parents or her parents did that and that and that. But you have 
this second generation now coming, and it is not very social democratic 
[progressive, leftist] as ideology, but this is the name of the party, so you have to 
assume that they are.  
What are the implications for these three forces: those who want a democracy, those who 
were from the original communist party, and those who are the next generation? 
Interviewee Petre concluded with the following sentiments: 
[the next generation] think that they are the ones who, somehow, pushed for some 
reforms because if you relate to the old leaders of the party, then okay, no reform 
has been done, from their point of view. What really happened was that in 
Romania, there is this problem, which is also in education and other fields, as 
well, because all things are, somehow, related, and if you talk to different people, 
you will see. You have these old administrative systems, which dates before the 
communist regime. It dates from the interwar period and even before that, which 
is based on the Napoleonic bureaucracy, so it’s inspired from the Belgian and 
French administration systems, together with the legislation and the code of laws. 
 Moreover, Interview Petre added that  
149 
 
what happened after ’89, coming back to that, is that I think that we inherited a 
system and … we changed parts of it, [but] we never paid attention to the 
connections between the parts we changed and the whole of the system, and so 
what happened is that now we have a system that has bits from that period, it has 
bits from the newer period, you have other bits that are – and it’s pretty much 
chaotic. And this, somehow, leads to things not working very well in certain 
fields, but you cannot say that the system is failing, as a whole. The system is 
working; it’s just not coherent with itself. 
There is also a link between the transition leadership during communism and that of the 
nascent democracy in the years following 1989. Interviewee Raul, when asked about this 
overlapping relationship between the leadership, remarked that 
at this stage [2009], no. At the beginning of 1990’s, probably it was sort of 
overlapped and some of the people who used to be in leadership before, now 
generations have changed, and they are really very few, I don’t think that we still 
have such people. Even Iliescu, who used to be; now he’s already in his own 
party, he’s old, and it’s outgoing. So I think generations have changed and it’s a 
matter of lack of practice of democracy, and I think that it is a normal process that 
we are learning , but of course, sometimes the population would like that they 
would learn faster, and affects to be quicker and in our favor. 
A possible explanation as to why the citizenry of Romania would “permit” or “allow” 
authoritative leadership to occur relates to the mindset of Romanians. Interviewee 
Victor’s comment regarding civic or citizenship responsibility illuminated it: 
150 
 
people liked to be free [post 1989], of course. Everybody wanted to be free, but 
they forgot about being responsible—in any way of life – in any field of life – 
public life, private life, everywhere. And, of course, it was the role of elite 
politicians, cultural personalities, but there was something interesting. The 
powerful personalities – I'm speaking about the writers, composers, scientists, 
were also confused because the social values were changing, so they were not 
anymore seen as models, and they retired. They made a step back. They didn't like 
to go to the television and were scared, and say a lot of things and show their 
private life, for example, how others are doing. 
This disconnect between what a democracy requires from its citizens and what the 
citizens expect without sufficient “input” has comprises the citizenry at all levels, 
including the cultural or technical elite as annotated by Victor. Whatever the failure or 
shortcoming in the transition, some of the citizenry, according to interviewee Mihai, are 
looking back to alleged halcyon days: 
I heard many people saying that it was better [under] communism than it is now. 
Democracy doesn't work. It's something that you should not claim for because the 
life is harder. Society is more violent. I don't know if violence existed in the 
communism. Maybe it was at the same level or less because the rule of law was 
higher and stronger, or maybe it was at the same level but it was not revealed in 
such a large scale.  
Like the political system, reverberations from a challenging transition have been felt in 
the school system; Interviewee Daniela felt that there were some positive attributes that 
have now been lost:  
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Interviewee: I think that the education system was smart. It created extraordinarily 
resilient characters; it built character. And like now – even – and like after ‘89.  
Interviewer: Yes, so character suffers.  
Interviewee: Character suffers. Education in moral character suffers. So in that 
respect, the education system passed before ‘45, was a builder of real 
character…So this is the crux of the matter – is that you have in many ways, at 
least in the beginning, you have a travesty of reform because in fact, the 
willpower to change did not exist –  
Whether based upon a lack of willpower to change or insufficient experience, the starting 
point of this transition is mired in ambiguity, with a deep impact on both the political and 
education systems.  
 
Post-coup Reform 
The transition year of 1989 and the context surrounding the precipitous collapse 
of the Soviet sphere of influence established a foundation for Romania’s decentralization 
and subsequent democratization. With the latent ambiguity that existed during totalitarian 
Romania, which is evident in the interviews themselves when discussing this period, 
some overlap in discussion between time periods is inevitable, but in this section, drills 
down to some deeper explanations and meanings. For example, Interviewee Daniela, 
when asked if there were any carryover from the communist era that impacted reform, or 
whether it a fresh start, responded 
no, there’s never a blank slate, as you know. There’s never a blank slate. But 
inasmuch as you see carryovers from the former pre-45 system, is perhaps the 
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relearning of history and re-evaluation of the past. And these whole – that whole 
sort of parentheses that was the Communist period starts being put in a different 
light... and you get all these nostalgias about the past.  
Another important facet of post-coup Romania was how to rebound and tackle the 
challenge of human resources: who was to be trained to rebuild the education system in 
this country? For example, how does one address the lack of a blank slate, and tackle the 
momentum of history? As a partial explanation, Interviewee Raluca commented that a 
starting point is in rethinking the Romanian student and their characteristics: 
in ’89, when it was about changing, it was not only to move through to a market 
economy and which kind of skills someone should achieve in order to better serve 
the economy, as such, but it was also the problem how all these graduates, being 
just robots serving the economy, could also be trained to act as citizens.  And then 
I think that a lot of challenges also on the shoulders of those in charge of 
restructuring the technical and vocational education.   
The idea of overcoming the idea of being “robots” is particularly interesting, as one can 
imagine the focus on mathematics and engineering being predisposed to rational, logical 
thinking and not necessarily creative, or lateral thinking. While not conclusive, the 
interviewee indicated that operating within a free-market economy and operating in a 
communist economy requires such disparate skills. Nevertheless, the “robot” mentality 
may have empowered the administration before 1989, a phenomenon that lingers today as 
Interviewee Raluca stated: 
[i]t was the idea that those working as teachers and decision-makers for the 
general education previous to ’72 or ’73…but they were very angry with those 
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working in technical and vocational education because it’s also part of the regime.  
Who’s guilty?  Not me.  I’m the leader.  I’m the godfather.  I’m blessing you 
everywhere.  But all the others, they wanted to do change the whole system into 
the technical and vocational education.  They had been against continuing your 
values just before ’45, as you said, because it was a lot of tradition in that.   
Therefore, the elite in post-coup Romania took no responsibility for their part in shaping 
the education system during communist times, and pointed fingers at others. Because no 
responsibility was taken for causing the problem, it seems that no one wished to take 
responsibility to solve it, either.  
Based on this response, a pattern is emerging: while Romania’s transition was 
unique, there are common elements that perhaps all humans experience during periods of 
change, e.g., not exhibiting enough patience for the reform process to be implemented 
and evaluated. Interviewee Simona concluded comments on this topic by stating 
I would say that probably in the first ten years just – very conventionally, roughly 
speaking, the role of elite was in designing, developing, pushing forward, coming 
with ideas, generating new stuff, trying to change, raising awareness, so it was 
very, very much proactive. 
This concept of pushing for ideas may seem to countermand the concept of Perestroika 
and a slow and controlled process. However, one must consider that some of my 
interviewees may have been part of these processes and therefore related to their creation, 
representing some bias. In addition, while the passage of many ideas or “pushing 
forward” could have occurred at the law and policy level more than in the classrooms 
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which, therefore, means the core of education may not have substantially changed despite 
these policies and laws.  
The challenge in post-coup Romania was to not fully abandon technical and 
vocational education because of the stigma attached to it due to the Ceauşescu regime, 
but to identify the education strengths that could be borrowed and applied within the new 
democracy. Interviewee Raluca explained that the system in Romania, while technical 
and vocational, incorporated apprenticeships: 
The dual system, as it is defined in Germany, has been very successful in 
Romania in those days before WWII, and also the apprenticeship type of 
education, as defined in France, because there were a lot of influences from 
France and Germany that stayed in Romania.  And you can imagine that after that, 
all the relation in between the school and the enterprise is giving now a lot of 
headaches because this is the reverse effect because you can’t any longer speak 
about go and cooperate in between school and enterprise because everyone having 
memory of the Ceauşescu regime is thinking what is was during Ceauşescu [and 
not before 1945].   
And this was another compromise, then, by schools because they were pretending 
that we are going to be trained and we did almost nothing during the time…  
According to this interviewee, education in post-coup Romania may have been too 
reactionary and may be abandoning areas of strength that could be reformed, and thereby 
are missing out opportunities. 
 With the potential to open to the “outside world”, it was challenging to determine 
how to proceed and upon what should decisions be made. For example, data for all levels 
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of schooling were, according to Interviewee Mona, not to be trusted, “because it came 
from the state and it was secretive.” Without this foundation of data, it is challenging to 
determine the strengths and weaknesses within the system, especially since it needed to 
be modified to prepare students for the nascent democracy and free-market economy. 
“Now,” in post-coup Romania, according to Interviewee Mona, “statistics [are] gathered 
at the Institute by gathering information from schools. Financial stats come from 
Ministry.” While this move is wholly new—those who manage education are in charge of 
statistics, instead of a centralized government entity not affiliated with education—the 
challenge is the lack of comparative data. Moreover, based on observation in discussions 
about this topic of data legitimacy and data accuracy, many lingering issues exist 
regarding whether the data can be trusted or whether the data are collected using modern 
methods and analyzed according to contemporary best practices. Still, as it relates to data, 
symbolic and literal changes seemed to have occurred.  
 One of the challenges of reform in post-coup Romania, both with general political 
reform related to decentralization and democratization, as well as with education reform, 
involves the expectations of change happening quickly. When the transition was just 
beginning, Interview Victor said that 
it was a well known political analyst saying in the 1990's that we will need 20 
years to become a democratic and normal society with decent living30. Everybody 
said wow, 20 years? It seems to be a very long time. 
                                                            




If it was commonly thought that the transition would proceed far sooner than in 20 years, 
Romania’s transition proved to be contrary to that point. The impression, based on the 
disconnected reforms and seemingly shallow changes, was that change would happen 
simply by removing, literally and symbolically, the head of the totalitarian regime and the 
country would transition far sooner than 20 years to a stable democracy with a thriving 
economy.31 Instead, the idea that democracy was hard work was exposed to both the 
Romanian elite and the Romanian citizenry—democracy is not simply a political choice, 
it is a way of life that requires sacrifice, effort and individual responsibility.  
 Interviewee Raul provided a few insightful thoughts that could have been applied 
during this case, and possibly still could be applied today: 
one of the problems in our reforms, it was in the delayed implementation. So in 
terms of legislative reforms, I think that over the time they [the Romanian 
government after 1989]  managed to pass good laws at the level of knowledge at 
that particular moment, I think that they were good laws. But in terms of 
implementation, there were always problems. My opinion is that we [Romanians 
with decision-making authority] also have a lack of experience in doing that, and 
it really showed. So for this implementation, what I would actually have done, 
and they [the Ministry of Education] don’t do it even now. So we don’t have the 
system as you have it, [public discussion about the issue. For us, it’s still top 
down,] and then implementation is much more difficult.  
Interviewee Raul continued: 
                                                            
31 In observing the interviewees and in discussions with other Romanians, it is assumed 
that the goal is a stable and functioning democracy with a strong, free-market economy, 
but what that exactly means is not commonly discussed. 
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I would [have tried] to bring people to buy the idea at the level of planning it or 
conceiving or designing it. And then people, people meaning academics, if you 
talk about higher education, those who are supposed to implement, students and 
so on. I would popularize it more at the design stage and get their input, but in the 
real terms because now [today] they heard or they learned that this is how policy 
should be designed, and they organize more with a focus group with ten people 
and then we had invited the public. This is not what it’s supposed to do. 
These two interviewees believed, as did others in subsequent sections, that the process of 
post-coup reform did not incorporate long-term, collaborative efforts—it was business as 
usual (as under the communist regime), but in a different political paradigm.   
Interviewee Simona explained a center [intentionally nameless here as it would be 
an identifier] in Romania that was founded to specifically address education 
implementation challenges related to the shortcomings of short-term decision-making and 
a lack of collaboration, described as follows: 
the Center was conceived from the very beginning, as a Center that was supposed 
to work in grassroots, at the grassroots level, somehow implementing, trying out 
implementation mechanisms, and implementation models. And somehow, 
offering to the Ministry the grassroots flavor, and trying to feed in grassroots 
happenings and grassroots good experiences into the national policy. So actually, 
[we [those in the center]] tried to do something interesting with the Center, 
creating a kind of double-sided reform, so the one that comes from the Ministry 
that was theoretical, and nicely worded out. So the Ministry’s supposed to 
develop the top-down stuff, promote the top-down policies, but then, all the times 
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[there were] problems in implementing. So that the Center was seen as a very 
powerful implementation agency, and worked very much with the Ministry, and 
many of the policies promoted at the level of the Center, entered later on in 
national policies [in the early stages of Romania’s transition]. 
Interviewee Simona made a very lucid observation about policy creation and lack of 
publicity: “[s]ometimes, very quickly, and sometimes without knowing – at that time, I 
didn’t know that much on how difficult it is to change educational system.”  
then gradually working very much in the system, working in many countries, of 
course, that now my understanding is that look, we should have been more 
patient, should have waited more, should have explained more to people, let them 
understand, digest. We didn’t have that time. We just pushed things all the time, 
new, new, new, all the time. Now, what happened is that we simply didn’t realize 
that on elite, because we didn’t have that much time, and know the exercise to 
talk with teachers, to go to schools, to see schools, to discuss with people. 
This emphasis on “new, new, new” aligned with the majority of interviewee opinions on 
the general reform process; however, what has emerged from the findings thus far is that 
while some new policies were created, allegedly just to show symbolic change, or 
possibly to incite real change, the pace of substantive reform remained slow, despite 
many policies. With so much reform happening, there was a lack of comparison with 
other policies and difficulty establishing base-lines against which progress could be 




I’m also comparing with other countries where, for instance, I work now in 
Azerbaijan, so we are just at the point to build up Ministry policies. So that means 
that I can wait for the first results in five, six years. They do not understand, they 
want the results in two years, and I will tell the same, “Look, it cannot be done 
because all ministers start on something, and they want something happening 
when they are ministers, while they are ministers.”  
Based on this interviewee’s comment, Romanian ministers are not alone in their desire to 
pass legislation to incite change, but this mentality of top-down policy without enough 
focus on implementation may contribute to why substantive reform remains slow in such 
examples.  
 One interviewee separated the process of reform from the process of change in the 
education system itself as an issue of the need to focus on implementation. As a way of 
exploring implementation through the lens of the education system and social 
reproduction, Interviewee Daniela stated that 
[o]ne is the process of educational reform – legislation, blah, blah, blah. But the 
other is sort of the mechanics of education and what people are being taught. No, 
not what people are being taught, how they are being taught. The second is the 
relationship between teacher and student and how they’re being taught…the third 
is the mechanics of grading and of evaluation. 
To this point, Interviewee Daniela continued: 
The Romanian system – so far – in the past, has been designed to reproduce a 
social, political, and economic order, which was based on control, right? So the 
student, the parent, the – not the student– the parent, the teacher, the Party, the 
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leadership, were paternalistic figures – information and knowledge came from the 
top down…there was nothing to do but to obey and to accumulate knowledge. 
And that knowledge was meant to make the person subservient to the hierarchy... 
So you can see this very much in the political arena, but you can see this also in 
families. And you can see this also in the classroom. 
Therefore, Interviewee Daniela, by circling back to the concept of the reproduction of 
social order that was alluded to in the section that discussed “Before 1989,” is focusing 
on the idea that reform challenges and misdirection may indicate the need for new 
leadership in a democracy, but the citizenry were not equipped to shoulder this burden 
and were, still, waiting for the top-down reform efforts.  
Further challenges to the reform efforts were echoed by another interviewee, who 
likened pre-coup Romania to a feudal castle. Interviewee Auralia said that  
Romania has been like Feudal Castle. You know the concept of the Feudal 
Castle? You are a castle, you don’t know who [your neighbors are], you don’t 
care. You fight only with your neighbors. You are producing everything inside. 
So Romania, for a long period of time, has been like a Feudal Castle. When we 
open the gates of the castle, and we opened our society to the western influence, 
to the external influence, and we realized that we are not alone [in the West]. 
Some other people are doing what we are doing, but they are doing it better. And 
the universities were the first to understand that… 
This idea of a “Feudal Castle” is also an appropriate simile, especially given Romania’s 
Pre-1945 status as a monarchy and during the totalitarian era as an isolationist country 
stuck behind its own castle walls. Throughout the decades since that time, an 
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authoritative elite remains whose existence impacted the culture of the Romanian 
people—a destructive force on community-building and a sense of civic responsibility. 
 There is a sense that some of the overall reform effort was positive. First, and 
most obvious, Romania did not become frozen in a pseudo-democracy like Belarus based 
on various transition and development indicators, or remain unable to reform at all until 
2010 as with Moldova; instead it managed to establish working systems of government, 
economy and education within this new form of government. As time progressed during 
the transition, some positive momentum was established, perhaps as decision-makers 
gained experience. Interviewee Auralia expressed that  
we are in a very turbulent [time] – things [education, political, cultural and 
economic] are changing. You cannot stop the change, and not all the changes are 
good. There are some changes, which are not so good. But things definitely are 
changing. They are becoming – they are getting more complex or sometimes are 
getting more clarified, and much better organized. 
With this comment, the same interviewee who described Romania as a Feudal Castle felt 
that things were changing for the better, in some respects, a conflicting feeling that 
seemed to pervade many of the interviewees, i.e., was it really changing for the better, or 
changing and changing within a confusing paradigm of reform without momentum?   
A final consideration of the overall reform process relates to the catalyst for 
reform decisions that occurred between 1989 and 2007. Interviewee Mona believed that 




Romanian reforms [are] donor driven, [by] OSI, WB [and] EU. [The] EU is [a] 
major one because give the most money but problem of coherence because each 
entity has different ideology and goals. EU wants de-centralization and 
partnerships. WB wants accountability and structures. OSI focus on partnerships 
between institutions. 
While later sections will comment further on exogenous forces and the roles of 
international agencies or countries that stepped in to impact or drive reform, a lack of 
coherence and overall strategy may have limited the attainment of policy goals. 
 
Democracy 
 Because democracy in Romania seemed to be the only alternative to 
totalitarianism, based on my observations and participation in various discussions on this 
topic, and because the roots of Romania’s democracy were elite-led and not grass-roots 
efforts, there seemed to be a sense that democracy is still an idea or theory rather than a 
fully implemented form of government. The interviewees with whom I spoke discussed 
democracy very abstractly, and any efforts to drill down to unearth a more specific 
definition or overall meaning was rebuffed and kept at a theoretical level. Moreover, each 
interviewee focused on various aspects of democratic theory or even democratic 
education, each providing a unique perspective. For example, Interviewee Petre said that  
I think from a political point of view, it’s a type of social organization of political 
life, basically, which allows citizens to express their views and opinions and 
values, to talk about them and express them publicly, to run for office and freely 
choose people that are running for office. I express it as a space of relative 
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freedom, I’d say, in which all the citizens are obliged to play by the rules. And 
they get the biggest freedom that’s possible under a social and political setting. 
That would be idealistically speaking.  
Other interviewees provided additional opinions and beliefs about what a democracy 
entailed. Interviewee Victor remarked that 
the first understanding of democracy was the liberty, and – exaggeration of 
liberty. Democracy is liberty. I can do anything I want. I should not care about the 
others, and a lot of effects appeared because of this first understanding. I think not 
real characteristics of democracy were perceived by the common citizens, and not 
even by the politicians. They preferred to have this overview. The first stage of 
the democracy was chaos period immediately in 1991. I remember everybody was 
confused, and even in the school system…changed overnight. Nothing was for 
sure. You couldn't have long term [plans].  
This observed confusion about what democracy means, and more applicably, how a 
country should transition and what a person’s role is within that transition, demonstrates 
the complexity of post-coup Romania both from an administrative as well as an 
individual perspective. Interviewee Raul provided a different construct as well as a 
comparison to Romania’s political past: 
theoretically, democracy has to do with participation or more participation in 
decision-making or high level decision making of people. And I would say that 
yes, this does happen or did happen in Romania, however, implementing such 
participation to decision making, let’s say it’s a little bit blurred. So then, you 
would not really know how representative is the opinion of X, representative that 
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you have elected for your opinion. So once people are there, they do whatever 
they want to do on their own.  
So then it’s incomparable, it’s much more than you choose to be, when we have 
this totalitarian system, but still, I think that we are maturing and still did not 
reach the state of a mature democracy. 
Based on these comments, becoming a participatory democracy would require shifting 
the culture of expectations in Romania. Moreover, the citizenry, especially its leaders in 
education, may benefit from understanding clearly the end-game for Romania’s 
transition, as this remained a glaring piece of missing data. 
Throughout the interview process, it became clear that an understanding of 
democracy at a theoretical level was clear and well-informed. How this theory was 
implemented in Romania is a different story, however, and slightly differs from the 
discussion about the implementation of education policy implementation. For instance, 
Interviewee Raul indicated that many of Romania’s elite behave as they did before the 
transition to democracy, and that Romania’s lack of an alternative elite significantly 
impacted its democratic development.  Many interviewees offered their ideas about how 
democracy works in Romania—or how it has failed. Interviewee Petre said that  
if you refer to democracy in Romania, for example, after ’89, you can say that, 
formally, Romania is a democratic state since we had a number of elections 
already, so we have 20 years this year, 20 years of free elections, so that would be 
five electoral cycles. We also have free elections for the European Parliament 
since 2007, so we are also in a larger institutional setting, which surpasses the 
national framework because European Parliamentary elections are organized 
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nationally, but the representatives go to Brussels. So from this point of view, 
formally speaking, you can say that Romania is already a strong democracy with 
this 20-year history.  
 Interestingly, this interviewee went on to provide contradictory points regarding the 
strength of Romania’s democracy: 
however, as in all democracies, there are some problems that you can witness, 
especially during recent electoral exercises. You had, for example, violence in 
small and very separate areas, especially in the countryside. You had very violent 
election process…it’s not a wide phenomenon, but it’s interesting because it 
developed recently. We didn’t have that, for example, at the beginning of the 
democracy in the 1990’s, let’s say. So you had factions or different supporters of 
different parties that had violent meetings during the Election Day or before that, 
during the electoral campaign.  
There are other aspects, however, that Interviewee Petre commented on that deserve a 
strong focus: 
The government is trying to have transparent and publicly disputed, let’s say, 
policies and so on, but usually, most of the decisions are not very transparent and 
not all the time the political process is influenced, let’s say, by the civic society or 
other actors in the life. I’m talking here not only about NGOs, for example, I’m 
also talking about labor unions or employers’ associations and so on. So the 
influence coming from the [civil] society on the political class is not yet very big, 
and this may be, also, because lobby, for example, is not yet accepted and 
166 
 
officially recognized as a form of influencing policy in Romania. So you don’t 
have a lobby law, you don’t have official lobby groups. 
This idea of lobbying—petitioning one’s government to incite reform—is still new to 
Romania, a symptom of a citizenry that rarely demands representatives create a particular 
law and of a legislative body that does not, presumably, spontaneously creates  laws that 
concede power to the citizenry.  
 A final discussion point with regard to Romania’s democracy and the latent power 
of history was the idea that, since the Yalta conference when “Europe was divided” 
(Glenny, 1999, p. 523) following World War II, Romanians were, according to 
interviewee Ana, “all were waiting for the Americans.” Interviewee Ana continued: 
Because everybody saw that the Americans will come to the occupied Romania 
because nobody could believe that we were given to the Soviets. And if you go 
back – so some days ago, I saw on television, the Yalta Conference where they 
had the confidence of Churchill and Stalin, and they showed how they divided the 
map. So it simply happened that this bloody country got under the Stalin part of 
the whole thing. 
This perspective of waiting for the Americans is problematic for two main reasons. One, 
although the United States has a strong and stable democracy, it has its own challenges 
and is not a perfect model to emulate, even if the model was possible to emulate. Two, 
Romania has its own personal resources to resolve its domestic challenges, and does not 
need to “wait” for anyone to save them.  
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Interviewee Auralia even remarked about how different Romania might be today 
had Yalta gone a different way, from an economic perspective, and had the United States 
been Romania’s “frame of reference”: 
Very different, I would say. Very different. If the U.S. was there, so then Romania 
would have been currently, in my view, for instance, in ’39, Romania 
economically was better than Holland, Belgium, Denmark.  
Therefore, this awareness that there was an alternative to Russia, and that alternative was 
the United States, was preserved throughout Romania’s communist and later totalitarian 
era. Eventually, when Romania became a democracy, the notion of connecting to other 
countries with strong democracies, like the United States, represented a fifty-year dream.  
The emerging notion that liberty was for individual freedom without 
responsibility. The necessary skills Romania needed as a country transitioning toward a 
democracy with a free-market economy Interviewee Raluca said, was not only  
for high-order thinking skills, which U.S. is defining of having only need of them 
because of the knowledge economy, which was, to some extent, already achieved 
in the U.S.  In Europe, we are still looking for achievement of it, and therefore, 
the range of skills are not necessarily specific only to knowledge economy, but we 
are still looking for post-industrial economy that is going on in Europe.   
Of course, Romania can’t be an exception because we are not necessarily at the 
level of the knowledge economy at all, and therefore, the transition from this 
centrally planned economy at the level of the modernization stage, just trying to 
go ahead into the market economy and reaching the post-industrial phase and 
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moving through different developments to this knowledge-based economy, this is 
where we are, for the moment.   
 What are lacking, perhaps, are not simply skills but rather the right attitudes and beliefs 
to seek out the skills. Interviewee Raluca continued, remarking that 
the capacity of living in a city and being capable to be proactive, meaning that 
you have not simply to look for what the others are doing, but to try to defend 
your rights.  Your capacity to live as a citizen, meaning the rights to know 
institutions which are their responsibility, who’s doing what in order to serve your 
rights, what you should do in order to serve the community and all the other 
citizens, and then all the other kind of education to be able to support, for 
example, the education for the ecological education, supporting the environment 
or protecting those that are either kids or the old generation or the old population 
in a town.   
It was, to some extent, focused on learning about the institution of democracy, 
their rules and responsibilities, where to go to fight for your rights or to ask your 
rights.  So knowing that, and then about individuals, so how you as an individual 
should act in the prospective of being a so-called good citizen.  And also defining 
…which kind of values we are serving – I mean, freedom, but what to do with the 
freedom?  So in terms of written curriculum, I should say that it was not such a 
long process because it was quite easy to communicate with experts from other 
democracies and to look what they did.   
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While the comments thus far have focused on Romania’s democracy and relatively 
macro-level perspectives, Interviewee Raluca connected the idea of citizenship with civic 
education, believing that  
in case of civic education, maybe we could say it’s achieved.  I’m not a specialist 
and I do not want to have opinion in this respect, but I’m referring to those 
teachers that are acting in the field of the specialized skills, we do not have any 
longer subjects, we are working based on modules, and that’s why I find it very 
difficult to – we have integrated skills into a module just to be able to do 
something when you finish a module.  And I feel this need of support.   
Then everyone to be a citizen and to know just discussing with the student is not 
only becoming a specialist in, I don’t know which qualification, but also, to find 
solutions and to be enough imaginative to instill a little bit, again, and to infuse a 
little bit of attitude of civic education in there.  But because we have a lot of – the 
teachers almost at the age of retirement, the big majority of them, so could it 
change [their] attitudes at this age?  Hard to believe.   
Therefore, the interviewee was arguing that it is not curriculum at fault for failing to  
adequately preparing citizens for democratic citizenship but rather teachers who were 
educated and taught under the totalitarian regime and have not adapted their pedagogy. 
When asked whether Romania was unique as a democracy and with its challenges, 
Interviewee Raluca remarked that  
[i]t was a Ceauşescu regime, as such.  That’s why we are, unfortunately, so 




Interviewee: Absolutely.  More even than that.  
Because Romania was a totalitarian state and not simply a communist state, it perhaps 




As Romania’s democracy was developing, concurrent efforts were made to 
establish and refine its economy, including finding ways to participate in the global 
economy. The first challenge was to privatize and commoditize many aspects of 
Romania’s economy and establish a free-market economy.32 This aspect of Romania’s 
transition occurred quickly, and the interviews suggest that the efforts to establish a free-
market economy superseded the desire to have a strong democracy. However, there were 
many challenges with the economy in general and the economy as it relates to education 
in a free-market context. Interviewee Victor explained that 
it was interesting that several years after the communism because the life was 
very hard, we found what inflation is about. We found out what unemployment 
means. We didn't know that before. [Under] communism, we had money, but 
nothing to buy. Then we didn't have money but a lot of things to buy. The level of 
frustration was very high. 
The government of Romania needed to find a source of revenue, and a flat tax was one of 
their solutions. Interviewee Petre remarked that “currently, the tax in Romania is 16 
                                                            
32 The author is using this term to discuss the type of economy to which they are 
transitioning toward, based on both observation and literature; it should be noted that the 
words “free-market” economy may not be always used by the interviewees. 
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percent for everything you own, for all income. It’s a fixed rate.”  With this tax rate and 
already marginal incomes, it is challenging for Romanians to have enough money to feel 
the benefits of a free-market economy—or at least to the degree that may have been 
expected. However, there is a balance between wanting more money and too much 
money. Interviewee Petre explained that the mindset of Romanians may contradict the 
notion of earning money beyond a certain amount, and therefore may undermine the 
concept of growing an economy beyond its current size:  
it’s not a very good thing in Romania to [earn] a lot of money, so it’s better to 
keep a decent level…People don’t like rich people. 
  Interviewer: Because of trust? 
Interviewee: Because usually, big sums of money come from uncertain places. 
And usually – you can find this in – we have this yearly social opinion polls about 
stuff and they ask, also, about this is one of the items in the questionnaire is 
regards people’s opinion on fortune, how is fortune made in Romania. And most 
people say it’s out of theft.  
 While the focus of my interview questions and the subsequent discussion briefly 
touched upon the subject of the economy at large, there were many interesting aspects of 
the new economy that affected education, and higher education in particular. For the first 
time in over 50 years, education became part of a free-market economy and its various 
components such as textbooks, salaries, heating, construction etc., required revenue, and 
there were many ensuing challenges. Also, due to Article 32 of the Romanian 
Constitution, private higher education was permitted, which also complicated reform 
efforts and the idea of commoditizing education. As it relates to the economy’s impact on 
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educational quality, or rather, how educational quality was impacted by the transition 
toward a new free-market economy, there were many factors to consider. Interviewee 
Victor said that  
unfortunately, during these 19 years of transition, also in the public universities, 
there were some changes that affected the quality. One of them is the principle of 
finance per student. If you have a higher number of students, you receive more 
money from the state budget. Indirectly, it was a perverse secondary affect that 
you should try to have more students. Don't be so demanding. A smaller number 
of students means less money. 
Interviewee Petre discussed the challenges with public higher education fees, and how 
Romania has adapted: 
There is an admission exam in the public universities. According to the grade, you 
get free or you have to pay. But on the other hand, most state-run public 
universities in the past three years, let’s say, have started admitting students only 
based on their baccalaureate grade, which is something they come from their 
home high schools. Or even easier than that, they just require them to come for an 
interview with some staff members from the university, which is an interview 
based on general culture the person has and a small file containing the CV and 
what they did, which is not a lot.  
When asked if the interviewee thought that this change will increase parity so that more 
students from rural areas can gain access, the interviewee responded by saying that 
[s]o far, it hasn’t done that. I think the reason this happened was because there are 
less and less – demographically speaking, our population is getting older and we 
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have less and less children that are coming into universities, and so we have to 
relax the criteria to be sure that we get people inside because we need students. 
And so it’s kind of a contest between universities which one has the easiest way 
of getting in to attract more students because financing of public higher education 
institutions is made, first of all, according to the number of students they have. 
This is the main criteria for financing higher education institutions. And since 
higher education is not compulsory, then you have to attract students. 
There is a similar story in private higher education. Quantity over quality is a 
challenge in this sector of higher education, too. Interviewee Victor remarked that 
[i]t depends on the institutional policy. There is one of the higher universities – 
the private universities. It is well known as a business. It is called Spiru Haret. I 
don't know right now the figures, but let's say that Romania has 300,000 students. 
From these 300,000 students, 250,000 students are in Spiru Haret University. It is 
just an example. I'm not sure. What I am trying to say is that more three fourths of 
the students are in one university in the country, so this is really a business. 
While private higher education could have taken advantage of a fresh start and led the 
transition in terms of innovation and democratic education with a liberal arts focus, 
commensurate with the respect of a leader, it finds itself in a clear 2nd tier, with rarely any 
positive comments from the interviewees about its quality or profit-making intentions. 
 With regards to primary and secondary education in Romania’s new free-market 
economy, there are many challenges. The main, overarching challenge is related to the 
decentralization that all aspects of Romanian bureaucracy faced. As the Ministry of 
Education decentralized responsibilities to the local administration, there were clearly 
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gaps in terms of ability and competency, as well as an overall plan with regard to 
execution. To provide an overview of the mechanisms in funding primary and secondary 
education, Interviewee Dan described the process as 
80 percent of the resources put in education are for salaries, so for human 
resources, yeah? This is covered entirely by central government, via local 
government. Local governments are like ATM machines, so they are not – 
actually, they are not putting any – but it's a way of – they're supposed to pay 
some tax to the government. The government said okay, don't pay this tax until 
you pay the salary to the – but actually, this money is coming from the central 
government, but being paid by local government, sometimes they are mistaken 
and they think that it is a local administration contribution …there is 20 percent 
left. Out of this 20 percent, again, more than 10-12 percent of this are covered, 
also, by central government, big, national programs with exchanging furniture or 
rebuilding some schools and so on. So at the end of the day, for real investment, 
only a few city halls or local governments can afford to do this. Most of the time, 
what they really cover is the maintenance because on paper, the schools belong to 
local administration. They are administered by local administration. 
Therefore, taxes do not flow from the local to the federal and back to the local, as 
explained by Interviewee Dan: 
In practice, it is done is that the local – some of the value added tax is not paid – 
that is due to the government is not actually paid by a local administration, but it's 
kept by this local administration to pay the salary of the teachers, for instance. So 
it's a way of – how not to exchange a lot of tax money between different layers of 
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government. But in fact, how much and who is paying it, it actually is the 
government who decides, at the beginning of the year, that this is the share of – 
let's say 6 percent. This is why we have a sort of craziness about what is the 
percentage of the education this year – it's 6 percent; it's 4 percent; it's 5 percent. 
  Interviewer: Of GDP? 
  Interviewee: Of GDP, exactly. 
  Interviewer: And what is it, on average – around 5 or 6? 
Interviewee: Well, on paper, last year was 6, but it was – yeah, it was. It's much 
less than this because some of the money were not spent; some of the money were 
not put by government, but by foreign programs or – you know that this – for 
instance, European projects and so on, but they have their own logic in 
development, so actually, at the end of the year, they saw that this money were 
only on paper because it was not actually used by schools and so on. 
Romania spends a low high percentage of its GDP on education33 in comparison with 
other European nations, and because its economy is smaller, this portion does not 
necessarily correlate with proportionate expenditures per student. Moreover, the system 
as outlined is complicated and inefficient, as it leaves fiduciary responsibility to the local 
administration who are historically never in the role of making decisions but rather 
executing what is dictated by the centralized Ministry. This challenge of decentralization 








 In this section, I report on interviewees’ comments related to the three emerging 
concepts in the course of my literature review: colonialism, globalization and 
isomorphism. While the interviewees may not have utilized exactly these terms for the 
exogenous forces, their descriptions usually align with the forces I have defined 
previously and serve as examples to better understand what occurred. While this chapter 
will discuss the forces and phenomena themselves, Chapter VII will delve into the 
theoretical reflections.  
Before delving into the interviewee responses, it is important to note the 
following understanding of these forces’ relationship as being both linear over time and 
overlapping in effect. A clear way to articulate these relationships is depicted in Figure 7 
and Figure 8, below. Figure 7 represents the ordinal relationship between the exogenous 
forces, with respective examples or characteristics for points of reference. While the 
emerging themes follows a timeline, the following represents the blurring of the lines, 
and how the concepts are not clear cut, when they seek to explain the phenomena that 
occurred. Rather, they are ways of explaining historically less-powerful countries that 
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lot of different factors to analyze. And all the studies I reviewed, nobody has done 
a macro study, a big – a broad study to look at all of the external factors.  
Interviewee: External factors? Yes, there are some contributions, but I don’t know 
if they are official, the reports made by the World Bank…we had a very big 
project of the World Bank, and now we refer to this period as to the reform made 
by the World Bank. And we usually add the Government of Romania, but the 
main words, it’s [the] World Bank.  
This interviewee did not discuss the role of the external forces as being negative, or the 
sole source influencing the transition,  but rather part of an entire collection of forces both 
domestic and exogenous that impacted change. 
 However, the majority opinion was that external forces were critically important 
in Romania’s transition, and particularly influential on the education system. The 
following exchange with Interviewee Daniela articulated the importance and positive 
impact of the exogenous forces on Romania’s transition:  
Pressure, outside pressure. Everything in Romania happens because of outside 
pressure. And the reason why nothing happened before is partly because nothing 
was desired, quite frankly. Very little was set in motion to change this social 
reproduction. 
Then, as the various other international players, such as USAID and the European 
Commission – European Delegation – started into the field. All of a sudden, you 
had all of the policies, all the pressure, all the might of the US Government 
because we were a private player, right. All the might of the US Government 
through USAID, even though it wasn’t brought to bear, but their mere presence 
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meant institutional governmental presence; and therefore, indirect pressure. And 
the might of the European Union.  
And by the way, you should know that the UN – Romania was one of the few 
East European countries that had an ongoing UN presence in the ‘70s.  
When asked if the Interviewee felt that these external pressures were seen as positive 
forces, the Interviewee responded by saying: “Of course. Of course. Of course.” Finally, 
when asked how an international aid organization or NGO becomes a force, or pressure, 
Interviewee Daniela said  
the EU becomes a magnet for change. It becomes a “pressure.” Once the accords 
of association are signed in 1999 – but before – they don’t – they are not pressures 
because they don’t have to conform. Romania doesn’t have to conform to any 
special legislation, or whatever, in order to be a full partner – a full-fledged 
partner. On the other hand, what’s interesting, is the mere sort of presence of 
these policy experts and all of these exchanges, and all that is a way to put the 
wheels in motion to reform. So in fact, you can really consider that “pressure” is 
only inasmuch as Romania seeks to belong to the club, to NATO, to the Euro-
Atlantic integration…to NATO and to the European Union. 
Therefore, there is a difference between a formal pressure, such as when a country 
becomes a member of an organization, and a vague force, such as globalization. For 
example, Interviewee Daniela stated that 
otherwise, there is no formal pressure. I mean there is no pressure, allegedly, not 
even when you want to belong to the club. But, in fact, the fact of conforming to 
some sets and some standards puts pressure to reform. Before, it’s just sort of the 
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mere existence of an alternative model and the exchanges that create a 
transformation.  
  Exogenous pressures were largely seen as positive and even inspirational, as one 
interviewee concluded. One of the main outside players in Romania’s transition was the 
World Bank, whose efforts at the beginning of the transition were crucial to commencing 
a series of reforms that transpired prior to and along with reforms for the EU as well as 
general domestic interests. Interviewee Victor explained that of the many outside forces, 
the World Bank was  
very well received. It started in 1994, the preparation, but the first curriculum was 
introduced in 1998. I was a teacher at that time, so I tested the real new 
curriculum because it was the first curriculum bringing real changes. I think at 
that time, the level of the availability to change was still high. Teachers and 
parents and everybody agreed that we need changes in the education system, that 
we should have better quality, that we should have more individualized training 
routes and so on. 
Interviewee Raluca explained that these external forces  
inspired us a lot especially when it came [to] the case of EU accession. We did a 
lot just following the requirements, and maybe again, without paying enough 
attention to the negotiations because we have been very easygoing negotiators.  
And that’s why, by now, we are out of constraints to overcome… 
Interviewer: Meaning the various administrations would go along with whatever 
was said.  They’d say, yes, yes, we’ll do this, we’ll do that.  And now, all of a 
sudden, you have to do it and it’s challenging? 
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Interviewee: Yeah.  I think that because of this legacy of the totalitarianism, we 
do very much at the request, rather than being innovative.   
While the perception of exogenous forces was largely positive, as discussed, one 
of the byproducts of “waiting” for outside pressure is that the desire for reform is not 
organic, and the momentum is upheld by external factors that, when removed, slow. As 
Interviewee Raluca explained 
after 2007, the pressure of becoming a [EU] member disappeared and since there 
is no one with a stick calling for new achievements, we laxed very much.  I don’t 
know, maybe this agreement with IMF will give back a little bit of accountability 
to someone.  This is not to say that – there is a sort of a not strong reporting, but a 
light reporting still goes on as a member state, but it’s too light for motivating us 
to do it.  And then there is not very much consensus to one idea.  I think that we 
are very much behaving [by] having an external opinion. 
While the discussion of post-2007 is outside the scope of this case study, this comment is 
worth acknowledging because the perception of exogenous forces can be misleading 
because the interviewees or literature often dismiss or do not acknowledge the negative 
aspects of these forces’ existence. The comment above reinforces the previously 
mentioned concept that “nothing happens in Romania without outside pressure,” which 
means that there is either an internal ability or desire to generate change. Always looking 
to the outside for inspiration or legitimacy for ideas diminishes the role of the citizen and 






 The first phenomenon to explore in a discussion of the three emerging forces is 
colonialism/neocolonialism. In speaking with interviewees, the word colonialism and its 
variants were used, but few acknowledged that Romania was officially colonized. There 
was very little mention of anything before 1945 unless explicitly asked, with the 
exception of the occasional comment about the Ottomans. For instance, Simona 
explained that  
in Romania, generally, this is the main problem, bureaucracies, complicated, it’s 
sort of a Turkish bureaucracy, which has a lot of things to show you that you are a 
small ant in front of the bureaucrat. But they don’t have procedures, and whatever 
they [inaudible]. They have a good will. If they want, they do it. If they don’t, 
they don’t do it. That’s the problem we have.  
However, Simona explained that the word or concept of colonialism is not the best to use 
to describe Romania’s historic “forced” relationships with other countries or empires: 
The best word is not colonialism. It’s a kind of if you wish, I would call it kind of 
well accepted or self – how to say, something that you are willing to accept. It 
wasn’t a colonialism imposed to Romanians. And if we talk on something similar 
as colonialism, it would be some kind of influence or a set of influences or a 
system of influences, we openly accepted, and we had all the times this. At least 
starting from the 19th century, when we can talk in the second part of the 19th 
century, we can talk on Romania that is already started to becoming a nation state, 
and a state that has an awareness of statehood, so on and so forth. 
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 Interestingly, this perspective does not acknowledge fully the possibility of Romania’s 
refusal to become a suzerainty of any of the former colonizers, creating the perspective 
that Romania chose to have these relationships. Interviewee Simona continued: 
Even though we had a German king [early 1900’s], I told you that we went 
towards a French type of – and what was interesting is that the German king never 
tried to colonize Romania, and to make it a German country, never. It tried to take 
everything from everything that was very open and very, how to say, a novelty 
from many other countries, and this was very interesting with the German king 
that basically shaped modern Romania. But we had all the time this – 
  Interviewer: What was his name? 
Interviewee: Charles I, Carol in Romanian. And then all the kings actually did, 
but he was a German guy, a German official coming as a king of Romania, and he 
could have done like simply to say that look, this should be – the legislation 
should be the German, and so on and so forth because I am the king, and this is 
what I want. No, he didn’t do this, and Romania continued to be this French-type 
of something. So I would say that we had all the times this kind of complex I 
would call of a small nation that should have a frame of reference. 
Therefore, although the King of Romania during the Hapsburg Era was German and 
installed without choice, Romanians like this interviewee do not consider this to have 
been colonization. Instead, as Interviewee Simona explained,  
So then, again, coming back to this not colonialism, it’s a well accepted – the 
need for a frame of reference that a small country with a smaller culture feels the 
need to have somebody bigger to report us to. And this was the French, most of 
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the time, never the Russians. Even in Soviet times, the big opposition was that 
nobody accepted – so the fact that the Soviet culture, and the Soviet influence did 
not go through was that culturally… 
Even though the Soviets came into Romania after the Yalta conference with tanks and 
soldiers to establish a formal occupation followed by a Stalinization of the Romanian 
education system (in which students were required to learn Russian, for example), it is a 
commonly held opinions in Romania that Romania was not colonized. Instead, it seems 
that Romanians acknowledge their status as not being among the most powerful or 
influential countries, and therefore choose, as Interviewee Simona explained below, to 
have a “frame of reference” once freed from Soviet and subsequently totalitarian rule: 
After the ‘80s, after the ‘90s, like ’89, ’90, it was very clear that again, as a 
smaller country, we needed some kind of frame of reference that was United 
States and the European Union. 
 One of the factors to explain this mentality is that, as Interviewee Simona said, “that 
look, in society, we were not fighters.” Raluca explained that the problem is not 
colonialism but instead the source: 
is coming more from inside, without trusting each other and without trusting 
institutions, we think that, the usual saying, you can’t be prophet in your own 
country, but we really believe that the prophet is only outside of the country and 
don’t trust very much.  This was also the case when a lot of auditors came to 
Romania from outside.  They were better placed than ourselves in telling to the 
administration, look, we think that we have to do that.  Well, maybe, but when it 
was said in a foreign language, better sense to that was there.   
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Ironically, this comment provides some linkages to the findings that it is partially because 
of colonialism, to a major extent, that there is a deficit of trust within Romania’s borders, 
and that this lack of trust fosters a continuous dependency on foreign powers or foreign 
institutions for guidance or, as mentioned, to be a “frame of reference.” Moreover, the 
interviews have brought forth the idea that Romanians often see external as better or 
more trustworthy and insider “prophets.” This combination may set in motion a paradigm 
whereby trust in domestic ability struggles to gain momentum.   
 
Globalization 
In this section, I will explore how the interviewees understood globalization 
specifically, or some aspect of the concept broadly, before discussing their perspective on 
the implications for Romania. In the case of Romania and its education system, there 
were many connected but not necessarily related events that illuminate the impacts of 
globalization. For example, Interviewee Petre believed that 
if we talk about primary education, I would say that these international tests, the 
PISA, the TIMSS,34 that we agreed to participate, are a very good indicator for the 
level of performance of students, which is an indicator and which shows 
something. So from this point of view, I think that is it a good opportunity to 
network with other countries and try to benchmark ourselves to their systems. In 
                                                            
34 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) “assesses how far students near 
the end of compulsory education have acquired some of the knowledge and skills that are 
essential for full participation in society” (pisa.oecd.org); Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) “provides reliable and timely data on the 
mathematics and science achievement of U.S. 4th- and 8th-grade students compared to 
that of students in other countries” (nces.ed.gov/timss). 
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higher education, which is closer to my interest and I know more about higher 
education, I think that there are two aspects of this problem. First of all, we have 
traditionally known universities in certain fields like medicine, for example, 
medical schools.  
You have students coming from the Middle East, for example, to study and we 
have a tradition for that. From Greece, also, and from Africa. We have very good 
contacts. We have a lot of students coming to Romania to study in medical 
schools in Bucharest and in Cluj, especially.  
Based on this perception, the fact that students come from abroad provides the sense that 
the education is of high enough quality, and, more to the point, there is international 
demand and therefore the schools are internationally competitive, despite performance in 
TIMSS and PISA. Speaking about individual countries and their impact on Romania vis-
à-vis globalization, Interviewee Simona provided an overview based on international 
influence in the 1990’s:  
And in ’90, so we were not that much interested in what is going on in France, but 
most of us were interested in seeing what happens in northern countries, in U.K., 
in United States, Canada, and so on, and we had to learn English.  
’93, we started to change somehow the cultural patterns embedded in schools 
from the French-type of cultural pattern towards the so-called – here it’s called 
Anglo-Saxon pattern… 
The ‘90s were a period of huge openness towards the world, an unbelievable one. 
No. 2, two words, Anglo-Saxon word, not that much the others, a lot of 
experience in, I told to you, American, U.K., Canada, New Zealand, this kind of 
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stuff, northern countries, very much Finland and so on, Holland. But a very big 
openness towards the world, a huge World Bank project, and then general 
education policy that was shaped in the Ministry, and that was basically top-down 
type, pushed into the system, toward the system from the top to down, and getting 
there somehow slowly, slowly, slowly. 
Therefore, there was an appetite for external influence. However, the main observation is 
that categorizing globalization as negative or positive based on these interviewee’s 
responses is challenging based on the sparseness of data. However, any comments on the 
topic of globalization did not speak to negative influences, but rather missed 




 The third emerging theme and force that influenced Romania’s transition is 
isomorphism. Isomorphism takes many shapes, and has varied impacts on countries like 
Romania. While interviewees never uttered the word “isomorphism,” which was 
expected as I am newly applying this concept to education and transition, they did speak 
of a force and phenomena that fits my definition of isomorphism. Petre explained, 
most of the people wanted these things for historical reasons, of course. 
NATO was, basically, the Americans and we have been waiting for the 
Americans since the Second World War to come and save us , and from the Cold 
War, of course, we were also waiting for the Americans to come and save us from 
Soviet Union, from Russia, basically. And so NATO was perceived as finally the 
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Americans are going to come and save us. And the European Union was 
something different. It was viewed as, let’s say, a select club where we want to 
get because we are also Europeans. We have the same values as they do, so we 
want to be in their club.  
It was also perceived as a means of economic prosperity. And we still have pretty 
much still high consensus among the new members of the European Union; 
Romania is still one of the most optimistic countries, from this point of view, 
unlike Poland, for example, or the Czech Republic, where Euro skepticism is 
much more powerful than in Romania. 
This concept of euroskepticism is particularly interesting because, as explained in the 
literature review, the Czech Republic and Poland have stronger democracies and more 
robust free-market economies in Romania, and also have a higher degree of 
euroskepticism, or concern about outside European influences dictating reform and 
possibly negatively impacting culture. As an observation beyond the scope of the 
interviews, while euroskepticism may not have a causal relationship between the pace 
and depth of transitional progress, it is interesting to note that the countries that did not 
need as much external support have progressed further, which may be an indication that 
their alternative elite were better equipped to manage the transition. Romania’s desire to 
be part of the European “club,” and attach its frame of reference to a western institution 
such as the EU is partially a survival mechanism to distance themselves from Russia and, 
perhaps, the Middle East, both symbolically and literally.  
 While countries like the Czech Republic and Poland remained, as Interviewee 
Petre further explained, 
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more and more skeptical of the EU and its role and the way it can help their 
countries. But in Romania, we are still optimistic about it and we still like very 
much being members, even though it’s becoming harder because we finally need 
to do stuff. Until now, we had to declare we did stuff, which was pretty easy. And 
now we have to do stuff, so it’s becoming harder. The hard work begins, and 
we’ll see what will happen because it’s an ongoing process.  
Romania did, perhaps, treat the EU at first like a colonizer, but one they desired to have 
by agreeing to reform even before really determining how to actually implement the 
reforms. Their desire to actually change seems to be a lesser priority than that of 
appearing to change or being willing to change, which is partially explained by 
Interviewee Petre and the notion that the only true change happened when it was truly 
required: 
The Bologna Process, for example, that doesn’t have such a powerful stick like 
NATO or the EU because NATO and the EU are powerful organizations. They 
have very strict rules and so on, and they can follow very strictly what you do. 
The Bologna Process is more like a gentleman’s agreement, let’s say, more of an 
understanding between countries. If you don’t follow the Bologna Guidelines – 
they are called Guidelines and Recommendations, they are not compulsory, so if 
you don’t do things the way they say you should do or it’s recommendable for 
you to do, there is no punishment directly to you as a state authority or as a 
Ministry.  
The only thing that happens is that, for example, diplomas are not going to be 
recognized in other Bologna Process member countries. For example, I get a 
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diploma here in social sciences, I want to go and work in France, for example, I 
need to pass some exams to accumulate my diploma. If the Bologna Process goes 
correctly, then it’s supposed to, somehow, bring about official recognitions of all 
diplomas in this place, but this has not happened yet, and if it happens and we are 
left outside, the Ministry doesn’t really have a personal problem with that. It 
happened; we will somehow solve it. So from this point of view, I don’t think that 
reforms were brought about in the same way.  
Therefore, as this comment demonstrates, the aesthetics of belonging to the club are 
strongly desired, and perhaps without much thought or attention paid to what it will take 
to truly follow the guidelines of that club. The consequences of decisions like this are felt 
in education, but in different ways. For example, Interviewee Petre said that the impact 
was felt strongly in higher education: 
I think that there are very big differences between higher education and primary 
education, from this point of view, because forces related to them are different,  
people are different, and everything is completely a separate story. I think that in 
higher education, most of the changes were, somehow, of the reforms that 
happened were of the cause of factors that people could not control. For example, 
private universities, they put some pressure on the system, they changed 
something by just the simple fact that they appeared. And the state had to make 
some mechanisms to deal with that.  
The Accreditation Law, for example, of ’93 was the first thing that happened, and 
then in 2006 , we were forced, again, somehow, to change this Accreditation Law 
and take into account quality assurance, also, as a topic because it’s of interest, 
192 
 
it’s part of the Bologna Process, everybody else is doing it. So it was like a peer 
pressure thing. And so we had to adopt this, also.  
Through a combination of required reformation such as ECTS and voluntary but expected 
“peer pressure” reformation such as Bologna, higher education was deeply impacted by 
reforms, which will be further discussed in the next chapter. Primary education was a bit 
different, as it experienced less of an external impact. Interviewee Petre explained: 
In terms of primary education, I think that I’m not sure what to say because it’s 
not really my field and I’m not really sure what happened, but there, you have a 
lot of reforms that happened in a very short time, and often contradicting one 
another, and so right now, I’m not really sure what’s happening there in primary 
education. 
Because the EU is “hands off” with primary and secondary education, the impact from 
formal isomorphism seems to be less severe.   
 Some of the positive attributes of isomorphism is helping Romania modernize its 
education system. Between the World Bank and EU, various examples arose in the 
interviews that demonstrate each organization’s isomorphic influence on Romania, and 
through various means. Mihai explained that curriculum was not even part of the 
Romanian vernacular before the World Bank provided expertise for reform:  
In two or three years after we entered the institute, our department become a 
curriculum department. So we adopted this word [curriculum], which was not 
very well known before 1990. And so we became the Curriculum Department, 
and very soon, I think that in 1993, or 1994, was designed this project with the 
World Bank. And then a lot of activity we’ve done here in my department was 
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related to this educational project. Because we were a Curriculum Department, 
we’ve been involved in designing the new curricula for all the subjects.  
Because the philosophy, as I understood…the World Bank don’t try to impose a, 
kind of, let’s say, targets.  
While curriculum provided a choice, when providing the option for funds, the influence 
increased: Auralia explained the way in which the World Bank and FAAR [funds that 
support international exchange] had more stringent requirements upon the acceptance of 
funds and the signing of the MOU: 
Well, you see, World Bank like FAAR, so I put World Bank and FAAR in the 
same basket. They both tried to use the principle learning by doing. So World 
Bank said I’ll give you loans, but you have to do it according to my rules. So they 
gave a loan for research, for example, for higher education reform, for things like 
that, and they imposed the rules, the financial rules, the competition, the 
evaluation, and things like that.  
So it’s not the amount of money, of course, for us, the amount of money was like 
heaven. But basically, it was not the amount of money. The basic principle was 
that you had to learn day by day how the rules are, and how to obey all the rules.  
While the support was restrictive, it was also beneficial according to Interviewee Auralia: 
Yes, it was good, but at that stage, it was good. Yes, at that stage. Well, World 
Bank is not making anything in Romania because Romania became the member 
of the European Union. World Bank is not dealing with the members of the 
European Union. 
  Interviewer: Was Romania able to pay that loan back? 
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  Interviewee: It’s paying it back. 
Thus, isomorphism is a complicated issue because the reformation necessary for 
compliance, though forced rather than optional, can nevertheless often support a country 
in increasing the quality of its education, or at least help progress toward a certain goal. 
As explained by Interviewee Victor, this type of decision is not without consequence: 
I said unfortunately because at the end of the '90s when our social ideal became 
the European integration, we heard many, many times the explanation that this is 
the request of the European Union and we should do that. We should give up and 
leave behind some good issues in the education system because we have to meet 
the European standards and the European way of teaching, the European way of 
learning and so on. I think the public perception of the European standards, which 
was good at the beginning and welcomed at the beginning, became something 
with no value. Just a reason to comply with something. 
I think Bologna was something like that. Most of the teachers and the higher 
education institutions perceived it as something that has to be done. This is the 
trend. Not as something that could really provide some benefits to the education 
system. We have done research on Bologna implementation in Romania, and 
there are interesting results. One way of rejecting the education reform in general 
was the way of implementing and starting it from top down to grassroots level.  
Another issue was that it was implemented in a hurry, like many other European 




Therefore, the pace of reform was quick, and certain elements may have been ignored or 
abandoned in favor of becoming members of the EU. What is most challenging, is 
determining the areas in which isomorphism is almost invisible. As Interviewee Simona 
explained,  
[e]ven though, you know, the Union does not do that much on education or they 
do not request, actually, anything in education except – basically, we say that they 
do not ask anything, but actually, they ask for many things. Because you have the 
Bologna process, you have the key competencies, and these all are taken over. 
Somehow, they should be observed by the countries. So I have a study, I don’t 
know in one of these books or some – one book of education policy just appeared 
last week. I edited it, and I guess that there I have a study on the European Union 
accession, and I’m reflecting on what happened, actually. My vision is that 
nothing happened important. We entered the Union, but in education, I don’t see a 
shift of paradigm. So education was actually the first chapter closed, but it was 
closed in ’97, when we had that very revolutionary minister. But this time, it’s not 
that easy because even as a minister, you are a minister in a European Union 
country, and you should think twice when you do something. 
This invisible force of isomorphism is both powerful and challenging to understand. It is 
best described as being mimetic isomorphism, because of the unwritten nature of the 
reform direction and unsaid expectations.  The challenging aspect of the invisible force of 




with the Union, I have the feeling that when we go to Brussels, we say, look, 
yeah, we are okay with Bologna because just we tick the boxes and we report that 
things are done, so it’s not a formal reason. And this happened already in the ‘50s, 
when we had something coming from Moscow, and everybody said that, yes, yes, 
if somebody in Moscow says that there are 8, of course, that the Union is very 
different from what was before the communist group of countries. But very 
certain bureaucracy, and there is – in my view, always on education, educational 
documents, there is a lot of bureaucracy, even this method.  
The correlation between the EU and Russia elucidates the underlying notion that 
colonialism paved the way for institutional isomorphism and the homogenizing effects of 
organizations such as the EU. This point was also articulated by Interviewee Ana, who 
said that  
it’s just the way they’ve [Romanians] always dealt with outsiders, with the rulers. 
Basically, the EU is their new ruler, and they give lip service to them, they say 
what they want to hear, and then they go about business as usual. It’s so true with 
the whole corruption thing.  
Overall, it is not possible or necessary to determine if institutional isomorphism is 
ultimately good or bad in this example, or even understood in this dualistic manner, but it 




Summary of Chapter Findings 
 To answer the research question “What factors impacted Romania’s transition 
from a totalitarian regime toward democracy?”, interviewees concluded that the 
following factors were critical: 1) domestic factors such as Romania’s history and 
culture, coupled with its nascent political system and colonized mentality, and 2) 
exogenous factors as they relate to those forces or phenomena that come from beyond 
Romania’s borders. The existence of domestic and exogenous factors, coupled with the 
interview findings, explain the slow development of a democratic education system in 
Romania.  
 Moreover, Interviewee Victor, my interpreter, a Romanian doctor and family 
cousin, remarked that  
there were jokes about the Americans coming because they have a history of 
[inaudible] and hope that the Russians would come and have an influence on us. 
They didn't come, and since then, each year, they hoped the Americans would 
come, and it became the '80s when we were in school that it had almost become 
like a joke. The children were interested in the Americans. The joke was that so 
much time passed, saying that the Americans would come, it almost seemed like a 
joke. Children were interested in finding out about the Americans. 
This point tied into the overall perspective of Romania needing a frame of reference, and 
how it therefore is susceptible to more powerful, trend-setting countries like France or the 
United States, which means Romania walks the line between benefitting from exogenous 




CHAPTER V:  
RESEARCH FINDINGS, EDUCATION AMIDST TRANSITION 
 
Introduction 
Following my exploration of the impact of exogenous forces and the possible 
effects of Romania’s history and culture within this case study, the second research 
question that must be explored is: “What role did education play in Romania’s transition 
from a totalitarian regime toward democracy?” This question allowed me to engineer a 
more specific, example-based exploration of Romania’s education system and its role in 
the transition between 1989 and 2007.  
The interviewee questions delved into many areas, but provided ample 
opportunity for interviewees’ unsolicited, independent observations—thus filling a need 
in a literature that rarely seeks out contributions from practical experts. The major context 
for education reform during the transition touched upon the following themes: 
democracy-building, curriculum, access, decentralization and teacher education. All of 
these topics stem from the fact that Romania transitioned from a totalitarian state toward 
a democracy, but it should be noted that many interviewees described this transition as 
decentralization. This etymological distinction must be made as it places the emphasis on 
transition, not democracy, acknowledging the Romanian perspective that the nation was 
decentralizing first, and democratizing second. In the same vein, Romanians often speak 
of transitioning toward democracy or decentralizing rather than democratizing. Based on 
these interviews, and with awareness of this perception, the discussion to answer my 
second research question will first discuss emerging themes from the interviewees’ 
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discussions as they relate to primary and secondary education, then  to public higher 
education and, finally, to private higher education.  
 
Primary and Secondary Education 
 During the period examined in this case study, Romanian education was 
supposedly moving toward an education system suited to a democratic state. While most 
interviewees did not describe education’s transition as literally, the following exploration 
of education’s role and examples of what occurred between 1989 and 2007 indicate that it 
clearly was a system in transition. Whether coordinated or not, Romania was 
transitioning toward democracy and all efforts, whether on the right track or not, were 
toward that end.  
 
Decentralization of Education 
As discussed in the literature review, decentralization itself does not guarantee the 
intended goals of efficiency and effectiveness in providing citizens with government 
services if the local administration is not prepared for the responsibility. This finding is 
particularly true with regard to Romania’s decentralization efforts, which are not to be 
conflated with democratization efforts, as this section will explore. To this point, 
Interviewee Mona explained two main attributes to consider: 
Rural schools [were] not prepared to take ownership. Also, [there are] problems 
between regions, not just urban-rural. Example, in the Hungarian regions of 
Romania they are hungry for transform and are the first to arrive to take new 
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initiatives. Other regions have the opposite problem. The Austro-German section 
called Bucovina also has [a] tradition of self-help.  
When asked how to remedy this challenge with regard to “ownership” and awareness that 
different locales viewed their responsibilities differently, Interviewee Mona responded by 
saying that the elite should have 
patience because pushing could lead to political shifts and turbulence. There are 
three phases of democratization. Under communism it was education for all. Early 
transition it was more political such as rights. Now issue is quality. We don’t use 
the term “democratization” but rather developing education quality. 
This comment is significant because the interviewee is one of the main actors in 
education reform and, particularly, in democratic education. These comments by 
Interviewee Mona triangulates with the literature review I conducted because while 
transition is complicated and three-dimensional, it did have three distinct phases, some of 
which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
There interviewees frequently commented on decentralization, sometimes 
focusing on the distribution of responsibility from the central to the local government. 
Interviewee Petre said that decentralization did not really commence until halfway 
through the period of this case study, meaning about ten years had been lost: 
The ideas are before that, but let’s say they started around 2000, approximately. 
What this decentralization means is that local authorities, like the mayor’s office, 
take more responsibility in the life of the school. This was translated in Romania 
that the mayor’s office is responsible for renovating and administrating the school 
as a building, and then you had the teachers and the content of the school, the 
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teachers and the things that they teach, which is still centralized at the Ministry. 
So, the Ministry of Education says what teachers go to what school, what they 
teach, in terms of programs and curriculum, so it’s a centralized decision.  
 Therefore, infrastructure maintenance was distributed to local authorities, while the bulk 
of responsibility remained in the hands of the Ministry. Interviewee Petre continued: 
This has also generated a lot of problems because usually, in small, rural 
communities, there are two centers of power, the mayor and the headmaster of the 
school. And if they don’t get along, then the mayor doesn’t give money to the 
school anymore, and you have the headmaster and the teachers, which are being 
paid from the Ministry and they go to the school, but the school is in really bad 
shape, the building. And now we’re in a situation that 90 percent of Romanian 
schools are not meeting European criteria, which we had to adopt, finally, in 
2009, because it’s been two years we are members now, and we have new criteria 
for the living conditions, basically, in the school.  
This comment spoke to the challenges in decentralization: quality control and 
consistency. The local authorities were not able to maintain the same quality standards as 
during centralized education, which undermined the efforts of decentralization, and may 
have prompted questions about its value from those who were frustrated with the slow 
process.  
Another aspect of decentralization was the shift of not only responsibility but also 
power and authority. This concept was discussed by the interviewees as “autonomy.” 
While autonomy largely related to higher education, its legal precedence now represented 
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a symbolic shift which impacted all levels of schooling. Interviewee Mona explained the 
process as impacting education in the following manner: 
[f]or political reasons one of the first needs was autonomy. University autonomy 
was a principle but changed at a slow pace. How universities are autonomous but 
have quality control and accreditation. In 1997 schools became more 
autonomous... more autonomous [from the] administration. Universities run on 
local budgets. Slogan [is] “money for students.”  
This step represented the first in decentralization: a shift in responsibility and a shift in 
power. The next step would be ‘rebounding’ to the same level of quality as before the 
shift; the final step would be an increase in quality—theoretically.  
 
Democracy and Trust 
One of the major challenges in decentralizing was that by decentralizing toward 
becoming a democracy, the Ministry of Education must trust the local government to 
implement reform and take on additional responsibilities. One of the obstacles was that 
agencies and ministries are comprised of people, people who were severely impacted by 
the totalitarian regime, with a resulting deficit of trust that has carried over into the new 
democracy. This section will provide an overview of various perspectives on the issue of 
trust, followed by examples such as the lobby law and lack of public integration with 
policy-making, and how these factors impacted education and its role in the transition. 
One of the carryovers from the totalitarian period was the reality that those in the 
Securitate and those who supported their efforts, the informers, were still in governmental 
positions after 1989. This type of person was categorized by Interviewee Petre as 
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the people who did the crimes, the beatings, the arrests, the tortures and so on, and 
then you had the so-called informers, which are normal people with normal jobs, 
only periodically, they reported to the secret police what their colleagues were 
doing, what they have been writing, for example, where they keep their hidden 
writings that are not meant for public and who says what and who goes where and 
who meets with whom. Practically, they were agents of the secret police because 
they had a signed contract with the secret police. 
Those who had the ability, post-coup, tried to cover up the names of those who were 
informers, but increasingly, the names were leaked, according to Interviewee Petre: 
and what happens now is that we have, slowly after 1989, very slowly, and only 
in the past year, this has become public and in the public eye, we have the files of 
the old secret police, which are being guarded by an institution, of course, because 
we don’t want to lose them or things might happen. And periodically, we find 
files of people who are public figures or members of the academia, which are very 
known, publicly, because they write books, they are very known and very 
admired teachers, in a way.  
Therefore, what exists now is a paradigm of what can be called a political witchhunt, but 
names are only exposed for political gain, often to discredit opponents during elections 
—there is not a policy of overall transparency of these names. The very manner in which 
this process occurs represents the signfiicant mistrust and continued secrecey that 
undermines the Romanian democracy. As Interviewee Petre went on to say, “those 
people are still in their jobs,” and, overall, “this part of their past is completely ignored”; 
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the fact that an overall purging has not occurred, or at alternatively, an expunging of the 
records, casts a shadow on the transition. 
 Another interviewee connected the idea of the trust deficit with external reseach, 
and therefore showed an awareness of the issue at both a practical and theoretical level. 
Interviewee Raluca said that the challenges in reform are  
mainly, my explanation of that is that as Fukuyama discovered, the lack of trust in 
between individuals, it continues to be so high that we would prefer to refer to 
models coming from abroad, rather than trusting models from inside.  So then you 
need to go back to all the whole social network that you have in the country and 
to try to cure, to some extent, what is there and there.   
And then, speaking about, again, the result of Fukuyama’s studies about the trust 
in institutions, which is even worse than the trust in individuals, then you can 
understand which level of democracy we are speaking here about.  With lot of 
people, they are reading in our days and reading Putnam and the way that he is 
describing democracy in the States, and then with all the other authors and with 
the deficit of democracy we are facing in Europe, then a lot of people are 
speaking that defending the current situation in Romania, saying but also in other 
places the situation is not that good.  So then you are always in between.  But for 
me, building democracy, it is part of the cure.   
Key to building this democracy is education, but while the questions I asked of 
interviewees pertained to education, the issue of trust kept recurring as a cultural issue 
that must be dealt with on many levels and from many angles. Interviewee Raluca 
continued, saying that 
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you can’t really cure the population, the people, and if something else is to be 
done, why not?  But let’s first be sure that we are able to walk on our feet and to 
think with our minds and to live together, and then we can, maybe, look for 
another kind of regime that is going there. Still, speaking about going back, 
technical and vocational education should work together with enterprises.  I need 
an individual as a school manager able to communicate, to enter in a dialogue, to 
have this capacity of negotiating for the benefit of the public, rather than 
individual benefit.  So then how this are fitting with the corruption that there is in 
society?  For the benefit of whom they are negotiating?   
The interviewee goes on to provide a solution to these questions: 
So we are losing just wasting our effort and time for rebuilding trust, rather than 
saying, okay, by merit will continue because we want, for example, to introduce 
now the financing of the schools.  It will be something like 5 to 10 percent paid to 
schools for their results, performance-based funding.  But how we are going to do 
that if the civil servants will not be allowed to be paid?  That’s why being in a 
high is not always a good sign. 
Hence, the inherent lack of trust, as previously discussed, is a problem carried over from 
communism or totalitarianism, and tackling it is complicated. Interviewee Raluca 
concluded this point in the following exchange: 
 Interviewer: You think this lack of trust comes from the Communist era? 
Interviewee: I’m absolutely sure because with the many Securitate, people you 
never know with whom you are speaking.   
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Even in post-coup Romania, one is never sure “with whom [one] is speaking,” because 
Romania never purged its totalitarian past via a true revolution, and maintains enough 
overlap with the previous regmine in terms of those who hold political positions that it is 
challenging for the population at large to have a culture regarding trust. These issues are 
nationwideand indirectly impact education, especially as Romania continues to 
decentralize and responsibilities and power change hands.  
 
Reform and Culture 
 Part of the challenge related to democracy and mistrust is the location of the issue 
atthe personal and cultural level, not merely the institutional level. A discussion of 
findings from interviewees on the subject of reform and culture will partially address this 
issue, and will provide a deeper understanding of both why and how the reform took 
place in the manner in which it did.  
 One of the challenges in the necessary shift in culture during post-coup Romania 
was answering the question, “toward what end and toward what design are we 
transitioning?” Since an overarching plan was not in place, any changes in culture were 
viewed with skepticism, especially in education. Interviewee Simona explained that 
in the communist education is that the surface was communist, but the profound 
part, the culture, the educational culture, was a very serious, profound French-
type of stuff. [In] ’93, we started to change somehow the cultural patterns 
embedded in schools from the French-type of cultural pattern towards the so-
called – here it’s called Anglo-Saxon pattern.More pragmatic going towards 
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outcomes, competencies, skills, so you know, the typical Anglo-Saxon things, 
which is much more functional than the French one, in my view.  
However, one of the challenges was that the political elite and some of the population, 
according to this interviewee, did not know the sources from which Romanian education 
evolved. Interviewee Simona continued: 
people wouldn’t understand this, and you tried to change the cultural pattern of 
this country, and that was when I really realized then after the discussion, one of 
these members of the parliament, this kind of nationalistic guy was like pointing 
me, saying that you intend to change the cultural pattern of this country.Currently, 
if you take the cultural and educational elite, nobody goes back saying that their 
background is the French-type of background. 
In the difficulties in this scenario are twofold: 1) to what extent was Romania’s education 
truly based on a French style of education, and how much of that basis was destroyed 
under totalitarianism; and 2) what should change to meet the demands of the new Anglo-
Saxon design of outcomes based reform?. The current belief, as Interviewee Simona 
explained, was that  
people are interested to give a lot of knowledge, and then all teachers think that 
with lot of knowledge, so at a certain point, students will somehow gather the 
skills they would need, and they can manage in life. This is the vision.  
And the second meter for Romanians was in ’93 that look, we have all these 
Olympics. When we send Romanian kids to the mathematics Olympics, we are 
the first. We have the gold medals. Nobody thinks that these are two students 
over-trained by ten teachers here in Bucharest.  
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With Romania’s out-dated focus on a banking methodology of instruction coupled with a 
misunderstanding of national performance based on the skewed results at the 
mathematics Olympics, it is necessary for Romania to assess its true culture, by assessing 
the quality of its education system to accurately inform policy creation and 
implementation as well as curriculum design and pedagogical practices.   
 Another aspect of culture to be explored was the culture of community, which fed 
into an understanding of those aspects of democracy that are not required or forced, but 
are crucial to the quality of life in a democracy. This culture of community is strongly 
supported by volunteering, which is a new concept for post-coup Romania. However, one 
of the challenges to support volunteering and the forging of community, which in turn 
supports schooling, is the notion of character. Interviewee Daniela, in the following 
exchange, parsed character in post-coup Romania, starting with what education before 
1945 entailed, and then during communist and post-coup education: 
Interviewee: I think that the education system was smart. It created extraordinarily 
resilient characters; it built character. And like now – even – and like after ’89.  
  Interviewer: Yes, so character suffers.  
Interviewee: Character suffers. Education in moral character suffers. So in that 
respect, the education system passed before ‘45, was a builder of real character, 
right? 
  Interviewer: Yes.  
Interviewee: Whereas now – after – whereas – during the Communist period it 
was destroyed and during the ‘45  – passed ‘45 to – blah, blah – was during the 
Communist period was destroyed. And after ‘89, it was irrelevant because nobody 
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wanted to build character; everyone wanted to build competencies or knowledge. 
Right? So very different approach. 
With a history of charcter education prior to 1945, there were lingering elements which 
impacted post-coup Romania. Certainly, the indoctrination approach to character building 
was hollow due to the motivcation of character being for the benefit of the state, not the 
individual, and certainly not the community. As a result, the concept of volunteering, 
which can be a proxy for understanding one’s attitude toward one’s community, was 
explored in the following exchange with Interviewee Raluca: 
there are, also, other values that I think that are in the process of being redefined.  
For example, volunteers.  If you are telling someone in Romania let’s volunteer 
for that, again, this will be an immediate question. I remember a lot of campaigns 
that we did for environment purposes, starting with lot of public individuals, 
public persons.  For example, let’s go for having a tree in front of the house or I 
don’t know what.   
In the respective day, when it was the day of the planet, for example, because of 
the television and the image, everyone is volunteering.  After, nothing.  It is not 
an attitude, this is what I’m saying.  It is not part of it.  It is not educated. 
Interviewer: It’s not part of the culture? 
Interviewee: No.  No.  They don’t have the feeling of belonging to their 
respective behavior.  It’s not there.  It’s not part of it. 
Interviewer: Belonging to the community? 
Interviewee: Yeah.  Just for doing for the public good.  Because it is also 
because of – my opinion is, and there might be, also, some other explanations that 
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could come to my mind, but right now, I think that the major problem is the status 
of the property.  Before ’89, everything was public, meaning nothing.  Protecting 
what?  You had nothing in your hands.  Then it started the process of giving back 
the land, and now, we are judging a lot and we are observing a lot of crimes 
because they feel owners of the land.  But we do not, necessarily, feel, yet, as 
being owners of our community.  
Based on this exchange, it is clear that one of the byproducts of individual propoerty is 
individual responsibility. As with many aspects of a transition, this information does not 
come in any kind of a “democratic handbook guide to citizenship.” Moreover, the focus 
of democratic education, as will be further discussed, is on the theoretical level, not on 
how the individual “acts” in a democracy. Again, there was a history of volunteering that 
existed prior to 1945 that can be looked to in support of the growth of volunteering of 
Romania, as Interviewee Raluca explained: 
Interviewee: Before ’45, I think it was a strong feeling of community.  A lot of 
people being proud of their communities, and I remember, also, the name of our 
street is the name of the minister of education that, in the middle of 19th century, 
created the rural school. 
Interviewer: And that name is? 
Interviewee: Spiru Haret.  He also invested something in respect of the concept 
of the house school building should stay, and he put a small house also for the 
school director in rural area just offering the model to the other citizens.  The way 
that the school director is behaving, the way the priest is behaving should remain 
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the model for the small community, for the small village.  So those days, they had 
their values.   
Ironically, Spiru Haret, as previously mentioned, is the name of Romania’s largest private 
higher education university—a type of university that, at least symbolically, does not 
espouse the public good. Moreover, the legacy of Spiru Haret, a Horace Mann-type 
character believing in education for the masses and not just the elite, had laid the 
groundwork that would have supported a flourishing democracy in Romania. 
Unfortuantely, during the totalitarian era, as Interivewee Raluca said in the following 
discussion, those democratic values in existance were suppressed: 
Interviewer: So it’s almost as if they were dormant during this time of 
totalitarianism.  Is that a good word to use? 
Interviewee: Yeah. 
Interviewer: During this time, they had to subvert and hold back these feelings.  
Now they can bring them back.  So that’s an interesting point, there is an element 
present, of course, mostly with the older generation in Romania, where some of 
these democratic values, community, perhaps, you could say, is a democratic 
value, they were there.  It’s a matter of rebuilding and rekindling, bringing back 
to life these feelings.  So it’s not starting from scratch, starting from zero.  You’re 
starting from – 
Interviewee: It’s not starting from scratch if we are reading books about it.  If 
the society, if the current people really look for valuing what it was in the 




Finally, the interviewee brought up the idea of not starting from a “blank slate,” a 
recurring and emerging theme in this study. There are aspects of this blank slate that are 
challenging, such as the forces to preserve a false sense of culture, but there are also 
postive aspects of the blank slate relating to traditions and attitudes that existed prior to 
1945.  
 One of the ways to help increase the momentum of Romania’s cultural shift to 
embrace democracy fully is to become more exposed. For example, one observation of 
Romania based on my experience with the people and upon my trip was how proud 
Romanians are of their culture and heritage—it is, perhaps, what sustained them and held 
them together through their many colonizations and long history. However, this pride 
decreases the appetite for comparitive studies, especially given the “Olympic” mentality 
that their system was paramount and competitive with those of the best industrialized 
countries. To this point, Inteviewee Raluca discussed the idea of looking to other 
countries that experienced a totalitarian regime to build an international community of 
support: 
first, I have to say that there are a lot of cooperation between what is it in 
Romania happening and in Latin America.  There were a lot of similarities from 
different perspectives. And in 2006, because of the OECD had the first Forum on 
Education in Chile, I have been there and I had a chance of discussing after the 
forum with the authorities about how education is going on there.   
And I was so ashamed because I went there with my preconceptions, 
prejudgments about what Latin America is about, which of course is not the same, 
all the countries are not the same, and I learned there about the Pact on Education 
213 
 
they did and it was done, if I’m not wrong, in ’98, I think they did it, and has been 
kept.  They did it for 15 years, and it has been kept.  And I said why not?  Let’s 
try.  So again, you have to have – 
Interviewer: They’re coming from a totalitarian regime to a – 
Interviewee: That’s it.  If they did it [we can].   
By exposing themselves and trying to overcome their pride, without sacrificing the 
elements of their culture that are their bond, the Romanians can best utilize their 
education system by borrowing and sharing ideas with the international community in a 
truly relevent manner.  
 If this path of comparison is not taken, what will continue to happen may just be 
what occurred during this case study: a lot of change, but not all change for the better. 
Interviewee Raluca explained thisusing the analogy of the road: 
Romanians love a lot of change, not necessarily for specific purpose.  I don’t 
know why, for example, because if you change the name of the streets, saying that 
those are belonging to the totalitarian period and you do not want them any longer 
to be here, but when you are changing an acceptable name with another 
acceptable one, and for this you are paying a lot because everyone should change 
the IDs and things like that, I’m not able to tell you why we are changing.   
Interviewer: To use the road analogy, we were talking about if you change the 
street names, the road still needs to go down the same direction.  And what you’re 
hoping is that it can have a longer term direction. 
Interviewee: This is what I really hope.  I think, really, that if having a sort of a 
pact on a longer term – and it would be a shame to change the road because we 
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are working very much for the image.  So once having this agreement on long 
term, they are just going to bring, for example, the nuances of the respective party 
that is the leading party or the coalition, which if fine, again.  It’s normal to be 
there.  But you do not touch the core, the substance because there are some issues 
no one will be, for example, against building democracy.   
By tapping into the “substance” of what is needed for building a democracy, individuals 
from any political party in power can claim victories while enacting a common plan of 
decentralization and democratization, instead of sometimes conflicting or poorly 
organized changes. These substantive changes can then address the underlying impact of 
culture and shift the expectations and attitudes from a “from the state” mentality to a 
“from the people” mentality. To achieve this change, however, specific reforms in 
democratic education must occur, as will be explained in the following section.  
 
Democratic Education 
 Having reported the interviewees’ comments as they relate to decentralization, the 
following will be a discussion of the interviewees’ responses as they related to 
democratic education. Specifically, in some instances, interviewees discussed changes or 
reforms that related to democratic education as an end, in addition to themes such as 
democracy, trust and teacher education. While the significantly important topics of 
education’s role in nation-building and social reproduction were not adequately addressed 
in this exploratory case study in the context of these interviews, subsequent studies on 




While the overarching theme of the reform was decentralization as it was 
previously defined and framed by the Romanian interviewees, decentralization had the 
potential to focus on fostering a more democratic country via a democratic education 
system. One of the major impetuses for Romania to install a democratic education 
component to its curriculum was the Bologna Accords of 1999. While not compulsory, 
the cost of not following these Accords would have jeopardized Romania’s perceived 
development as a nascent democratic country. Still, these Accords were not as 
prescriptive as necessary to help guide a country like Romania which lacks experience 
with democracy. To help provide clarity on Bologna’s impact, Interviewee Petre 
provided a perspective on the relationship between the Bologna Accords and democratic 
education: 
I think you can say that, but if you read the country reports, Romania has made, 
every two years – for the Bologna Process because we had to do it because it’s 
part of the process – every two years at the Minister’s Meeting in Berlin, Prague, 
London, and so on, each country presents its own report. If you look at that report, 
you would see that most of the changes that have been done were in the structural, 
institutional functioning of things and not in the content of democratic citizenship 
is something related to content more than institutional framework...  
So in terms of content, it’s all relative…you have social science universities, for 
example, where you could say that students are trained for and they receive 
information and knowledge about what it means to be a citizen, what rights you 
have, what a democracy is and so on. Then you have the polytechnic universities, 
for example, where there is no such information because it is not relevant to the 
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engineering field. So they consider it why should a future engineer learn about 
democracy and citizenship rights and so on?  
 Overall, an emerging trend for democratic education is the idea that democracy is a 
structural system with reform focusing on the systems themselves more than the 
citiznery. The trend in higher eduation as outlined above by Interviewee Petre is not 
without exception, however: 
on the other hand, for example, I know of faculty in the area of engineering 
studies who have, as an optional course, political science or citizenship and 
democracy,  something related to the civic activities of the – and so from this 
point of view, things are rather okay, I think. You have the freedom to choose 
courses.  
While there may be outliers, as mentioned by Interviewee Petre, where a faculty member 
may encourage or provide an optional citizenship course, the overall opinions of the 
interviewees was that this was rare. For a country that is heavily focused on mathematics 
and engineering, i.e., a narrow curriculum, this informal approach to civic education can 
be problematic because knowledge would not be learned elsewhere within the system. It 
is worth noting, however, that much of democratic education in most countries occurs in 
primary and secondary education, so its minimal existance in Romania’s higher education 
system is not necessarily alarming. 
 However, in regards to primary and secondary eduation, it was challenging to get 
a clear answer about democratic education aside from the structural changes. Even when 
meeting with one of the most influential creators of Romania’s modern democratic 
education system, the focus was placed on decentralization, not democratization. When 
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not focused on decentralization or structural changes, the focus was more on the 
theoretical and abstract, not on individual empowerment or individual responsibility—or 
character. Interviewee Petre characterized democratic education in primary education as 
follows: 
in primary education, you have civic education, which is compulsory, and where 
you theoretically learn what is the state, what is democracy, what is a citizen, 
what laws you have, discrimination is not nice, you have to tolerate – so in the 
third and fourth grade, you have civic education…And then you go into the 
seventh grade at 14 years old and you have this civic education again. And then in 
high school, you have one year of high school some social sciences, which is 
economics, philosophy, logics, and sociology. And each year of high school, you 
do one of those.  
 When asked if democracy was seen as something one can teach as a course and not 
taught as part of culture or translated from theory to practice, Inteviewee Petre answered 
that: 
no, it’s a course. You learn what is democracy, what are human rights, what is the 
state. You learn definitions. 
  Interviewer: So it’s more technical, not personal ? 
Interviewee: I think so, yeah.  
The technical aspect of democratic education has other challenges related to what is 
taught and what is learned, and more specifically, what is expected to be taught based on 
the curriculum and what the teachers emphasize and omit. Interviewee Mihai explained 
that there is  
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unfortunately, it is a very big gap between curriculum and competencies; students 
proving in several moments in one…the problem of implementation was very 
difficult, and it is considered, probably, that this major educational reform doesn’t 
have too much success because the strategy of implementation was not very well 
done.  
Based on this interviewee’s contribution, one of the challenges for providing a stronger 
democratic education was due to poorly implemented reforms. More specifically, 
however, Interviewee Mihai went on to explain why this may be the case: 
teacher(s) in the civic education are very well trained , and there are a lot of 
projects, especially with the United States, in the field of education – civic 
education.  
  Interviewer: So where is the disconnect, or the – do you think?  
  Interviewee: I think that also motivation, also – I don’t know. 
Interestingly, this particular interviewee, who echoed a few of the other interviewees, put 
the focus of the gap between what is taught and what is learned on the student. This 
emerging theme of pointing figures to various actors or parties within the system is 
common in many countries. However, in Romania’s case, blaming the student for a lack 
of competency does provide a satisfactory reason for low student motivation—could lack 
of motivation be due to lack of focus or respect for the curriculum in its own right?  
 Other interviewees felt that civic education, used interchangeably in this study 
with citizenship education or democratic education, was sufficient and was adequately 
addressed early in the transition. Interviewee Simona explained that 
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actually, in ’90, ’91, probably, civics was the first thing that was introduced like 
civic education.  
Then sometimes, you know, I don’t know if this kind of civic education also had 
very much, if we refer to education, but in the last at least five, six years, seven 
years, the fact that Romanians traveled very much, would help the whole 
democratic process more than all civic education together for 20 years.  
Therefore, according to this interviewee, democratic education was not a critical 
component of learning how to operate within a democracy or how to contribute to that 
democracy’s continual improvement. Instead, this interviwee explained that “education 
has an important role, but you know, in Romania, when we invent subjects, they suddenly 
become very much knowledge based.” While this interviwee felt that the subject was 
invented, or as the comment was intended, introduced, it was primarily based on an 
“American type of civic education” because there were a small handful of principle 
architects of the Romanian democratic education system who had conducted work with 
some American universities. When asked how there was such a disconnect between this 
allegedly American-style civic education and student competency, Interviewee Simona 
expressed that  
when these nice textbooks and things go down to schools, then they tend to 
become – very quickly to become this very didactic thing where people teach that 
this is the definition of democracy, this is the definition of being a citizen...And so 
if you learn the definition, and you don’t understand what is behind… 
Another emerging theme may partially explain or contextualize this disconnect between 
education borrowing and implementation. In a previous section, one interviewee 
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explained how connected the Romanian education system was to the French system, and 
yet the output of the Romanian system is decidedly not French. Similarly, if the roots of 
the democratic education system is an American system, and the output is decidedly not 
American, it seems that there is a uniquely Romanian [narrow] correlation between how 
external systems, curricula, or concepts are interpreted or implemented. Whether fault 
lies upon the teachers, the books, the students, or some combination, it is clear that this 
factor must be explored in a future study. 
 
Impact of Education Policy & Law 
 A central topic for this study is the impact of education policy and law because 
these factors provided a legal and functional framework for the transition. While the 
timing, quality, thoroughness and efficacy of these policies and laws can be disputed, 
they are critical components of a democratic country. As discussed in the section on 
democratic education, if the citizenry are not adequately prepared to operate within a 
democracy, education policy and law can both bear some of the blame and provide a 
possible solution. For example, reforms passed in 1995, namely the Education Law of 
1995, served to provide a framework for subsequent education reform and simultanesouly 
addressed challenges that existed between 1989 and 1995. This tendency to both attempt 
to  to resolve past challenges while looking to the future may be one reason that the 
Romanian government passed so many reforms between 1989 and 2007. Some 
interviewees blame the frequency of reform for challenges in the education system. 
Others blame the “see-saw” nature of the reform undoing and redoing policies based on 
the political party, resulting in a lack of momentum or ability to longitudinally compare 
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student performance over time. Finally, transparency remains a central challenge of 
education policy and  law as it relates to informing the citizenry on upcoming referenda; 
how laws were created or are meant to be implemented; or how previous laws or policies 
were evaluated and deemed ineffective. 
 With regard to transparency, Interviewee Petre illuminated the way in which the 
Romanian government is—or more accurately, is not—transparent: 
the government is trying to have transparent and publicly disputed, let’s say, 
policies and so on, but usually, most of the decisions are not very transparent and 
not all the time the political process is influenced, let’s say, by the civic society or 
other actors in the life. I’m talking here not only about NGOs, for example, I’m 
also talking about labor unions or employers’ associations and so on. So the 
influence coming from the civic society on the political class is not yet very big, 
and this may be, also, because lobby[ing], for example is not yet accepted and 
officially recognized as a form of influencing policy in Romania. So you don’t 
have a lobby law, you don’t have official lobby groups. 
The disconnect between civil society and the creation of policy and law possibly 
represents a byproduct of totalitarianism and lack of alternative elite—democracy in 
Romania seems to be status quo, as previously mentioned. If the citizenry are not 
engaged intentionally in the policy or law-making process, and decisions are made 
without their input, the process remains elite-driven. While citizen apathy could be cited 
as one reason for a lack of civic engagement, if there is not a public component of the 
policy or law-making process, the government is intentionally omitting their input. 
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Moreover, as Interviewee Raluca explained, it is necessary for law-making to hold a 
public referendum: 
It is possible because there are, according to the law interests on the transparency 
of the decision-making process, you have to have 30 days, allowing people to 
look to a draft, make their reactions.  You could also organize another way of 
consultation, not necessarily through the website.  But you are obliged to open a 
forum for debate. 
Interviewees commented that the website referendum might be posted “last minute” to 
avoid citizen input and decrease the likelihood of legislative defeats. Therefore, the laws 
on transparency and civic engagement may need to be reevaluated to engage citizens in 
the law-making process, which may support implementation among other beneficial 
results.  
This concept of no-lobby law is also a major point on which to focus this 
discussion of education policy and law. Interviewee Petre explained that this law is   
not in the constitution. There is no reference to lobby whatsoever…there is a law 
that somehow limits lobby, so you cannot have the name, lobby group. You can 
do that activity, like, for example, an NGO can have the functions of a lobby 
group, but they cannot name themselves a lobby group. 
Regardless of the name, there was a decidedly small representation of the citizenry 
outside of government as it relates to education policy and law. What was the impetus for 
repressing the right to lobby? Interviewee Petre believed that it was 
not because they opposed it, but because it implied very large amount of laws that 
needed to be changed, and ultimately, of mentality that needed to, somehow, be 
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changed, to somehow shape the way people thought about stuff. And there were a 
number of things that we had that Romania was obliged to do, and which we did, 
reluctantly, and this is one of the reasons legislation, for example, in certain fields 
is not being implements in Romania.  
Therefore, the right to lobby and the act of lobbying was seen by the elite who created the 
constitution as something that would slow down or impede reform—or at least reform in 
the way in which they wished to create it and along the timeline they wished to follow. 
The right to lobby is certainly not without legal loopholes that enable financially well-
supported parties to abuse power. However, to suppress the right to lobby results in the 
diminishing of the role of the citizenry. One of the byproducts of this issue can be 
explained with the example of discrimination law. Interviewee Petre expressed that in  
the field of gender equality...in Romania, there is no kind of discrimination and 
this is punished [according to law].  
And then you have the practice of discrimination, for example, in hiring people, 
you have still practices of discrimination, either by gender, ethnic in some cases, 
and there is no reaction from the state. I mean that the law is not being 
implemented. Formally, you can go and complain. There is a government – it’s 
called the National Council Against Discrimination – you can go there and submit 
a complaint, but they have no legal power. They can issue some kind of 
recommendation, and then you can go with that recommendation to the tribunal, 
so it’s a very lengthy process. And also, you need to know the way the system 
works, which normal people don’t.  
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Certainly not every law or policy in every democracy works flawlessly. In this case, 
however, in a country where the issue of feminism has not yet been formally broached, 
policy and law are not leading in the transition process, and the gap between the creation 
of the law and policy and its intended effect remains wide. This is encouraged by the fact 
that exogenous institutions like the EU are content to see that Romania has, for instance, 
a law prohibiting discrimination; these institutions generally do not follow up to see if the 
law is enforced or if discrimination has, in fact, diminished. Therefore, the potential for 
substantive change is diminished: Romania may have met minimum accession 
requirements without actually changing or advancing attitudes and behaviors.  
  What makes this particular issue of policy and law more challenging and 
troublesome is the way in which the judicial system was founded. Interviewee Petre 
explained that  
the judicial system in Romania is not based on, like in the States, on previous 
cases. It’s based on a code of laws, which was invented, let’s say, by Napoleon in 
France and exported around Europe. And you have this very large and inflexible 
system. Membership to the European Union, somehow, assumes that you try to 
make this system more flexible, and you start governing through public policies 
and not laws, you start governing through initiative and dialogue and so on with 
private actors, with civic society, lobby groups, and so on.  
This reality placed a very strong burden on law due to its emphasis over policy and value 
over implementation. A major byproduct of this reality is that instead of interpreting the 
laws differently, and drafting updated or modified supporting policies, the Romanian 
government simply passes new laws. The legal framework is always shifting and remains 
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unclear to those who are not informed, but to what extent this is intentional as a political 
tool for retaining power is unclear. Unfortunately, this is an example where an 
organization like the EU could step in and provide guidance, especially for the institution 
of education which needs momentum and consistency to support quality. However, as 
Interviewee Petre concluded, there was no relationship between the passing of the 
Education Law of 1995 and the fact that Romania applied to enter the EU in 1995 
because 
education is not a part of EU membership. There was no laws, no compulsory 
stuff we had to do. So education has no connection to the European Union. There 
is the Bologna Process, which is not related to the European Union membership 
because in the Bologna Process, you have countries from Europe, but you also 
have Georgia, for example, and Albania and so on, so it’s a European process, but 
not linked to the European Union as an organization. So from this point of view, 
there is no connection between EU and the Law of Education. I think it’s just a 
coincidence in time. 
When asked if there was a symbolic connection, Interviewee Petre was decidedly clear in 
responding  
no. I think we needed a new law for education, first of all, because you had a lot 
of things that developed, especially in higher education, over that period of time. 
You had this very large number of private universities that appeared. You have a 
previous step was in 1993, when we passed the Accreditation Law for Higher 
Education Institution...[which] limited to the right of the university to admit 
diplomas and to function as a higher education institution. But the Law of 
226 
 
Education in 1995 is a very good one because it clearly sets the autonomy of 
higher education institutions, which was needed for democratic purposes, of 
course. 
Therefore, concurrent efforts related to policy and law were underway in Romania—
those related to EU accession and those already being conducted as part of the domestic 
agenda—and there was not always a direct relationship to them, and the influence of the 
EU was almost too late to provide the guidance that Romania may have needed, 
especially since the Law of 1995 was perceived as the “backbone” of all subsequent 
education law according to Interviewee Mihai. While the EU may not be to blame, this 
complexity exposes the challenges that countries face when transitioning toward 
democracy.  
 After the Education Law of 1995, the next major policy that impacted Romanian 
education originated from the Bologna Accords in 1999. Interviewee Raul explained the 
differences in the time periods as follows: 
Bologna started in 1999. So previous to that period, we were making changes 
because we wanted to reform the higher education system. In the pre-1999 period, 
lots of the changes were made at the legislative level, so we managed to pass 
laws, but it was very difficult in terms of implementation. So, many of them 
ended up being implemented at a later stage. Now after 1990, not immediately, all 
these Bologna principles entered in our reforms, but I would say that after 2005, 
most of the things are done according to Bologna principles and Bologna 
requirements and yes, at the present, it does affect to a large extent, and we are 
doing whatever is necessary to align to and have results. 
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Therefore, while reforms were being passed on one timeline, implementation was 
occurring on a slower timeline, which speaks to another major theme of policy and law: 
the frequency of reforms and how it impacted the process. Interviewee Raul felt that the 
concurrent Bologna reforms, while seeming to lack positive attributes, actually was timed 
well with domestic reforms in Romania: 
my opinion is that the fact that we are in the reforming process, at the same time 
was the new requirements from the Bologna process; it comes at our advantage 
because I think that it’s much more easier here in Romania because we were in 
the changing process, transformation process anyhow. So now we transform 
according to some of the new requirements, as opposed to the old Europe where 
people all of a sudden, they’re asked to make the changes. So you know what, 
attitudinally, it’s much more easier for us.  
Therefore, the notion that too much change or overly frequent changes can only adversely 
impact a country does not take into account a country’s history. For Romania, this time 
period represents what I have referred to in my literature review as a “policy window,” 
which is Kingdon’s (2003) concept that there is a particular time when reform is more 
likely due to the “appetite” or “attitude” of the population or elite who pass the reform. 
The alternative, therefore, would be too little political and legal reform, leaving the 
education system without any kind of framework from which it can participate in the 
democratic system. So, even though as Interviewee Raul stated, “people did not know 
how to implement [university] autonomy,” or the plethora of  lesser changes that were 
passed following 1995 and 1999, one could argue that at least the legislation is in place 
for when this concept is better understood.  
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 In addition to the frequency of reform and the lack of legal transparency, there is a 
third and final emerging theme regarding policy and law, which I have called a “see-saw” 
political game.  In such a game, every ministerial change or newly elected prime 
minister, new policies or laws are created to countermand the previous political party, 
thereby undermining the momentum of reform and reducing the ability to compare the 
impact of reforms longitudinally. While as Interviewee Victor stated, “the legislation was 
not harmonized” with regard to higher education reform and the EU regarding ECTS and 
credits, the challenge with “see-saw” policy was primarily domestic in origin. 
Interviewee Victor commented that  
in 2002, when another Ministry came, some changes – they said the optional 
subjects were not a success because teachers were not prepared to design their 
own curriculum, which was false, in a way. Maybe it was thorough in the first 
year, but after four years of doing this, they learned, and they said well, it is too 
much liberty, so we have to reduce the optional part of the curriculum to 5 percent 
from 20. It was smaller in the first grade and increasing with the high school. 
After a decade of high-level reforms, the change in 2002 signified a focus on more micro-
level, grass-roots reforms. However, the shift in focus almost swung away from macro to 
the point of neglect, and seemed not to factor in the macro-policy when passing micro-
policy such as the example above with teacher input in curriculum. Part of the challenge 
in this case is the power of the Ministry, as Interviewee Simona outlined: 
You have subjective things in educational change, pressure of public intellectuals, 
and the legislation, I would say that this would be the order. Subjective things, 
then the law, the law is older, but the legislation – don’t think that the legislation 
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is the one that moves things in a country like Romania, not yet. This is my 
opinion. This is my experience for many years, so people are very important. If 
this minister wants to do things, she can do these things with or without 
legislation. Of course, she cannot break the law, but she would put in the 
legislation what she feels that she needs. 
This interviewee’s contribution spoke to the power of the elite, which will be discussed in 
a subsequent section, and how the minister can almost operate outside of policy and yet 
somehow within the law, as explained further by Interviewee Simona: 
No, it was a kind of neutral legislation that – how can I define it? The ’95 Law of 
Education was one that didn’t stop you to do things, but it didn’t encourage you to 
do. It wasn’t so in the legislation you can have educational laws that, how to say, 
stabilize the system or legislation that – or laws to the system to move forward. I 
would say that the ’95 was one that tried to stabilize the system. 
This comment almost undermined other interviewee’s perspective on the power of policy 
and legislation, except that the nuance to consider is the ease with which ministers can 
change policy or law to create a framework within which his or her respective ideology 
or political aspirations can manifest. For example, Interviewee Simona continued, 
So that it’s a framework, and then there are regulations for applying the 
legislation that are very detailed. In Romania, the legislation sometimes is very, 
very detailed, and they put in the law things that are not matter of a law. For 
instance, which are the subject in – you should have your baccalaureate, which is 
not a matter of legislation because this should be changed, this can be changed.  
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So the legislation should be considered…with a certain skepticism, and yesterday 
one of the questions just to show you how people understand legislation, here, the 
minister already announced certain things that she will take measures from 
tomorrow on, let’s say, on the so-called dynamics of the educational person, so 
that how people will be. 
The “dynamics of the educational person” refers to the power of the elite in operating 
within a strict framework that appears rigid but is in fact malleable to each 
administration, which undermines the power of the Education Law of 1995 or the 
Bologna Accords in that their interpretation can be severely impacted by subsequent laws 
that either interpret the original law differently or impact the way in which the law is 
implemented—or not.  
However, not every law is always passed by a minister. One interviewee, Auralia, 
spoke of a lack of success in passing  
a new piece of legislation, [which] said we need an umbrella, and some of the law 
for higher education, the law for undergraduate, and so on, continuous education, 
these are the pieces of legislation that’s a general instruction. But we did not 
succeed imposing, for example, a board for the university. We tried to do it. 
Without divulging the interviewee’s role in this piece of legislation, this umbrella law 
would have attempted to foster some unity within the education system as the reform 
process and “see-saw” political games have fractured the system to a point where unity, 
one could argue, is necessary to better understand or explain: how is education 
characterized in post-coup Romania? What may partially explain this lack of unity in a 
country that was, very recently, centralized under totalitarian rule is that it decentralized 
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after the coup, but may not have fully democratized; power was redistributed throughout 
various facets of control away from the Ministry, not into the citizenry, but instead local 
elite or competing elite. 
 While this “umbrella law” could have provided cohesiveness to Romania’s 
education system, one interviewee did not believe the law is the main obstacle to 
successful reform. Interviewee Ana explained that 
Romania has all the necessary laws. They’re not enforced. And there is this silly 
pact for education that Băsescu created last summer that said, basically, that they 
should do all these things, which actually, they are already the law. But it didn’t 
say anything about how they would be implemented. It was just we need to get 
together and agree that it’s important for children to go to school… 
The question of whether the law or the government was/is to blame for the challenges in 
reform depends on perspective. Interviewee Ana agreed with my characterization that  
it depends on who you talk to… you talk to enough people [and find] there are 
enough overlapping themes, and implementation of law and of policy is the 
[main] issue. There are some who seem to know this right off the bat. Others talk 
around it. And there are some who dismiss the laws and policies altogether and 
believe it’s just a matter of this almost old way of thinking of just learn what you 
need to learn. 
Therefore, law and policy in a democracy provide a critically important framework 
within which the citizenry and government operate. While the interviewees provided 
various perspectives on whether the elite or the laws were the thrust of reform, it is clear 
that because the elite made the laws, the framework is beneficial to those who wield 
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power. In addition, the lack of transparency, frequency of law passage and “see-saw” 
politics that occur provide additional challenges for the reform process. All of these 
forces distract from the activity of educating the students and, while not wholly unique to 
Romania, the effects are particularly pronounced in such a nascent democracy. 
 
Elite 
The role of the elite is a crucial component of Romania’s transition toward 
democracy. After exploring democratization, decentralization, democratic education, 
policy and law, it is important to explore the role of the elite and their impact on these 
processes. Moreover, because Romania lacked an alternative to those who held power 
during the totalitarian regime, an elite who were not trained or educated in a way that 
would directly prepare them for leadership in a nascent democracy, they play a pivital 
role in impacting Romania’s education system. Overall, interviwee responses provided an 
interesting combination of points to consider, with a wide range of perspectives.  
One of the main elite to consider is Ion Iliescu, as Romania’s first president who 
would later be reelected, and former elite in the totalitarian regime. His first term, which 
really encompassed 1990 and 1991 until the constitution was created, as he was the 
default leader of the Frontul Salvării Naţionale, or National Salvation Front, a group of 
communist insiders who did not come from the very top of Ceauşescu’s regime, but held 
positions of importance. His term ended in 1996, but he was later reelected in 2000. 
Interviewee Petre commented on the difference between what we will call his first term 
[1990-1996] and his second term [2000-2004]: 
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I think he was less involved in internal politics and more involved in external 
 politics in 2000.  I think. I think that he was, first of all, he liked more the 
diplomatic thing. It was a personal thing, I think, but also, it’s because of the 
Constitution, because the Constitution had been changed and the president now 
has less power in the internal political system. And this is one of the causes of our 
current president, Băsescu, who is trying to gain more power internally, and he 
cannot do that without changing the Constitution. And so there is this big 
discussion about changing the Constitution or not, which is not really good 
because we need to focus on other things, but again, we’re having elections this 
year.  
Therefore, it was the growing role of the prime minister, who appoints the Minister of 
Education, that impacted Iliescu’s role and may have helped shape his second term as 
president. Interviewee Petre continued: 
from this point of view, I think that Iliescu’s foreign policy approach to his 
presidency between 2002 and 2004 also had very strong contributions to 
Romania’s somehow development because our external relations greatly 
improved during that time. We became better known in, let’s say, the United 
 Nations, for example…And we had a larger part to play there and we had very 
good ambassadors there, from a diplomatic point of view. And also, in 
Washington, we had the current president, was also an ambassador to Washington 
in his previous career. And we had good foreign ministers at that time.  
While Iliescu has alleged ties to the KGB and perhaps with their backing organized the 
miner’s strike that violently quelled any chance of a Revolution and followed a 
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Perestroika-style reform process during most of his first term, he did change his role 
during his second term in a way that this interviewee deemed  positive. This shift from an 
internally focused and anti-pluralistic leader to one who looked outward during a second 
term speaks to the fact that Romania’s transition was not simply two-dimensional along a 
curve. With elite such as Iliescu, of which there are many others to consider, influencing 
Romania’s transition, it is clear that democratic transition is not formulaic or rigid. 
 Other presidents were not as influential as Iliescu, and it was the ministers who 
are of particular interest. Andrei Marga is considered one of the main ministers of interest 
during the transition as he and his administration pushed for many substantive reforms, 
following a time of stability without significant impact on schooling—a byproduct of 
perestroika. He is criticized for pushing too aggressivly for law and policy change, as 
Interviewee Simona explained: 
we had a minister, who was for three years, Minister Marga, who is probably the 
most outstanding personality that led Romanian education after ’90. So he was 
this kind of revolutionary guy, who liked very like this new theme, and he pushed 
us very much to go even quicker than we felt at that time that we should go.  
Marga’s style ran counter to that of Iliescu’s ministers five preceding ministers who held 
office from 1989 to 1997 but, managed to only pass the Accreditation Law of 1993 and 
the Education Law of 1995. However, some recognize that it was his policy that actually 
began the movement toward implementation of law via policy. Aside from Marga, the 
ministers are seen as temporary positions whowere often replaced when prime ministers 
began new terms. When asked why there have been so many ministers since 1989, 
Interviewee Petre explained that it is due to 
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the same reason there have been a lot of government since ’89, the position is a 
political one, first of all, and if the government changes, then the minister 
changes. I don’t think it’s related to the field. I think it’s just a general political, 
natural political Romanian way of changing governments and ministers. 
Most other interviewees when questioned about the frequent changing of education 
ministers did not seem concerned or did not see why this was problematic, as if the 
minister was inconsequential. One interviewee mentioned that the changing ministries  
only accounted for about 10-15 percent of the entire Ministry, despite the real or 
symbolic changes that occurred. Part of the reason for the politicized nature of this 
position is that, according to Interviewee Petre, 
all the ministers of education after ’89 were people from inside the system , 
somehow. They had some relationship to the educational system. Most of the 
ministers came from higher education institutions where they had positions, not 
only academic positions, but also managerial positions. 
Even our current minister of education, she’s on her second mandate. She used to 
be the Director of the Polytechnic University in Bucharest.  
Therefore, most of the ministers have a research or academic background, as opposed to a 
managerial background. Interviewee Petre pointed to one example of a minister who did 
not have a connection to education: 
the only minister who had no connection from this point of view, I think, to the 
educational field was Adomniţei, who had no connections to – he did not come 
from inside the system. He was named politically, let’s say, to be nice. But all the 
other ministers, even the one who succeeded Adomniţeiand was ministers for two 
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months, I think, before the elections, Anton Anton, even he came from research. 
He was the head of the National Agency for Research or something like that. He 
had connections to education. And also, I think that the other way I would 
describe all the ministers we had in education from 1989 is that they were very 
bad managers.  
With the exception of Adomniţei, one would imagine that the experience that the 
ministers had prior to their post in the Ministry would prepare them well for the 
assignment. However, as stated, they were “bad managers” and, 
even though they came from within the system and they pretty much knew the 
problems and the way the system works and what is wrong with it, and maybe 
they had a good idea how to fix it, they never really managed to implement their 
ideas in a good way or at all. So I’m not sure if it is a good thing or a bad thing if 
you change a lot of ministers or a lot of governments. I’m sure from the 
theoretical point of view of the political science theory, it is not a very good sign. 
It’s not a sign of stability, especially because in Romania, you have this – we still 
have this thing that every new administration comes with new people at every 
level.  
The loophole that the government used to replace staff or the minister is that they have 
the right to change the name of the Ministry of Education, which changes about every 
two years, on average. For example, a recent name for the Ministry was: “Ministry for 
Edcation, Research  and Innovation,” but a prime minister could change one word, omit 
two, and come up with a slight variation in name to put in power those who will be 
friendly to his or her ideology, contributing to significant inconsitency if not instability. 
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While Great Britain is known for a similar tactic, the Romanian government pursues this 
legal loophole more voraciously. Finally, Interviewee Petre closed with two major points 
on this topic that pertain to how seemingly unimportant this change actually is, and where 
it came from: 
I don’t see this as corruption and I think it’s the same everywhere because finally, 
there are some other factors beyond the official ones that influence such projects. 
The problem, I think, in this case, is not corruption, it’s access to information, and 
this has to do with the mentality more than the regulations because Romanian 
institutions and Romanian employees have this thing that they have learned that 
you have to keep things a secret. It doesn’t really matter what it is, it’s that it’s 
better that not many people know. 
It’s from the communist time, I’d say. It’s to keep things a secret because you 
never know what can happen if you make them public. It doesn’t really matter if 
you have any responsibility or not...It’s better for things to be a secret and only for 
a select trusted circle of people to know about them… 
This observation brings forward the question about the extent two which Romania has 
democratized, with so much carryover from the previous regime and the manner in which 
allegedly democratic practices are implemented toward the end of maintaining status quo, 
but with the conflicting publicity of constant reform change.  
 The elite maintained control in ways other than exploiting legal loopholes and 
worldwide trends that supported their agenda—chiefly, by controlling information. The 
Ministry of Education and their data for reporting are good examples of this 
phenomenon. As previously discussed, data were skewed and reported incorrectly during 
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the totalitarian regime to showcase an alleged Romanian comparability to Western 
countries, when based on interviewee observation, it is known that special needs children 
were excluded and allegedly not taught, Roma were excluded, and the overall stats were 
skewed. This veil of secrecy and manipulation continued into post-coup Romania as 
Interviewee Dan explained: 
the Ministry lacks an institution focused on educational statistics – but we have an 
INS – a statistic institute with the department, focused on providing data on 
education. Of course, they are not specialists in education, but they gather a lot of 
information on education and they publish statistical briefs for every level of 
education since 1993, I think, or '94. This is good, at least as a starting point, but 
from this, you need a lot of specialists to analyze this and complete this data with 
other kind of – other types of statistical analysis. This is actually locked until, let's 
say, 2003-2004 because somehow, they were mixed. 
The controlling of data by a centralized information bureau seems strikingly similar to a 
centralized bureau under a communist regime, especially since the data archives were not 
opened until 2003 or 2004. With such secrecy, it is challenging to instill trust in the 
statistics that are reported and, therefore, challenging to provide  or monitor educational 
solutions. This level of control by the the elite undermines efforts that could be put in 
place to improve the quality of education in Romania.  
 This top-down control style of management is not new to Romania, and is 
certainly a byproduct of the fascist and later communist/totalitarin regime. As 
Interviewee Simona discussed, the reforms that the elite instituted were a version of what 
they witnessed in the West, but skewed to be interpreted into the Romanian context: 
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this was very much a top down, a reform done by elite that is interesting for you. 
 Done by some people that studied somewhere, and you can imagine that coming 
back after many experiences in the United States, Canada, seeing totally different 
educational systems, we created something Romanian, but having the spirit of 
those things. We never copied anything, so taking for instance, so this is not the 
type of influence I’m talking about, we digested very, very well things. And for 
instance, the first national curricula that was published in ’97, is a result of many 
years of putting things together, comparing Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
United States, the national standards of the United States.  
This perspective is common in Romania: the idea that Romania is unique and does not 
copy from other countries, but instead interprets or “digests” ideas so that they can fit into 
the Romanian context. Ironically, one could argue that it is this very process of 
“digesting” that takes an otherwise strong or effective law, policy, or practice and 
damages it to a point where it no longer retains the key elements that made it successful. 
Worse, the Romanian population could possibly misinterpret the version of whatever 
system, policy, or law from which it was borrowed and actually think it is an authentic 
replica of the original. Therefore, the elite can be considered the filter through which 
external culture and knowledge pass, at least as they relates to the systems, laws, and 
policies that are created, as well as the values that are pushed forward or maintained.  
Interestingly, the elite were relatively well-informed about international theory 
and practice, both historically and in the present time. As Interviewee Simona explained, 
the challenge is more complicated: 
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I  wouldn’t say that pushing hard was a mistake, but I’m simply trying to reflect 
on what happened at that time with elite that had very good theoretical 
educational experience, a lot of reading, a lot of international experiences. But 
people at that time, didn’t have concrete experience of a reform process, a social 
process or doing, applying public policies, so these people did not have – but 
then, the question is who else did have at that time, nobody. So the country didn’t 
have any other, and that happened in education. 
Therefore, it was the lack of practical experience that was one of the main drawbacks of 
an elite-driven reform, which supports the idea of an alternative elite as the one main 
obstacle for any transitional country. To this point, Interviewee Simona provided a salient 
example: 
So for instance, when in ’93, the World Bank came to Romania to start their first 
project, the World Bank tried to find out people in the Ministry that could work 
with them, and that could understand new ideas, new concepts, new vision and so 
on. And in the Ministry building, they didn’t find anybody because the Ministry 
inherited somehow the bureaucrats from the older times. Then they asked – one 
day they asked somebody that looked, “Do you have in Bucharest some kind of, I 
don’t know, research group, institute, some kind of” – they didn’t say younger 
people because not the age was that important. But they simply were looking 
around for people that at least would know something on processes that happen 
all over the world. It happened in ’93, ’94 because the Ministry people didn’t 
seem to have any understanding of these new things.  
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The elite were not ready for the transition or prepared in terms of education policy, law, 
or systemic change, and they were unable to fully maximize the benefits that were 
offered in terms of knowledge and services from the World Bank—a case where 
exogenous forces could have provided a positive push for reform.  
 What brought forward an additional challenege was the indocrincation that 
occurred under totalitarinaism that seemingly impacted even the elite. For example, 
Interviewee Simona explained the reasoning for why they did not rush to substantively 
change the education system post-coup: 
what they said all the time was that, “Look, Romanian education is very good, 
and we have a meter on this.” They say, “Romanian education is very good 
because all Romanian guys that leave for United States are much more better than 
United States kids. They know everything,” which is true. They cannot do 
anything, but they know lots of things, and that means for Romanians that our 
kids are the best, which is profoundly wrong. They know that when they go to 
United States, everybody said, “Oh, my goodness, did you know everything? Do 
you know Gerte, you know, Shelley, you know Shakespeare, you know music, 
you know art, you know everything because you come from a country where this 
was the vision to give students,” and still this is the vision, “to give students 
everything if possible, all knowledge, knowledge, knowledge.”  
This theme of the Romanian student having a strong grasp of knowledge but not 
competency or lacking a pragmatic ability to apply the knowledge underlines both the 
societal and elite perspetive on Romanian education, which is the situation in which the 
World Bank found themselves in 1993, as Interviewee Simona extrapolated: 
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And then, the World Bank came, and then we started building up together the 
World Bank project that was very successful. And that actually gathered all these, 
let’s say, elitist forces that pushed very much the top-down reform.  
The elite, therefore, limited the impact of the World Bank, which may have provided 
resources to create links between knowledge and competency and between democratic 
theory and democratic practice.  
The role of the elite is not static, however, and has changed during this case study. 
When asked about the changing role of elite, Interviewee Simona provided two main 
points. One, it has changed and two, how elite are characterized: 
I wouldn’t say diminished, no, because it’s – look, all the times in Romania, even 
in communist times, I would say that the role of elite was important 
because…Education is not that much social – it’s not that much seen in Romania 
as a social service, as it is seen as a cultural fact. So if you go to western 
countries, so everybody thinks that education is social service. If you come to 
Romania, even very simple Romanians, probably they wouldn’t know the 
concepts and things.  
Regarding how elite are characterized, Interviewee Simona continued: 
Sometimes the country representatives are not experts, they are bureaucrats, and 
so then, somehow what will happen in the future, is that instead of 
professionalism in certain domains, you would go for observing rules and 
regulations that are developed by bureaucrats. Because there’s one story, if I send 
a very good educationalist for developing, let’s say, key competencies for school 
directors, it’s another story if I send a public servant from the Ministry, who just 
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knows the very bureaucratic part of that stuff. And so then, it’s again, when you 
develop things in European Union, do we talk on the public servant elites or do 
we talk on the educational elites or who are the representatives, so this is my big 
question with the Union.  
Therefore, many of the elite in the Ministry and government in general were bureaucrats 
and not necessarily specialists in a given field, unlike the United States, where many 
involved in government have studied political science, international relations, or other 
related fields—I will refer to these bureaucrats as theoretical specialists. Moreover, while 
the majority of education ministers in Romania had experience with education, few had 
the type of experience to manage the reform—a second type of elite who could rise to the 
position but not successfully implement policy or law. These two types of elite, the 
theoretical specialist and the bureaucrat, held and to a degree still hold a majority of the 
key positions necessary to usher forth transition reform. As Interviewee Daniela 
explained,  
after the transition – really, the power that succeeded the Communist power was 
not very different from the precursors, precursor regime. So the last thing they 
wanted was to actually change the status quo and to open up the education system 
because they realized that they would be opening up a Pandora’s Box of 
contestation and of – okay – so it’s only later on when Romania sort of woke up 
and the leadership woke up to the need for international cooperation. 
Whether Interviewee Daniela is correct about reasons for the alarmingly fast reform or 
very slow implementation, both of which contributed to maintaining the status quo, it is 
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clear that those leading Romania’s transition had a profound impact on education policy 
and law, and borrowed from outside nations lens that skewed the realities.  
 There are many examples of how elite have impacted education, and a few will be 
discussed. One interviewee spoke about the role of the elite in a scandal that recently 
surfaced, its origin and impact. Interviewee Auralia explained: 
when education was inflamed because of a very stupid decision taken by the 
parliament to raise the salaries of the staff by 50 percent. The decision was 
something like in the Wild West. It was not based on any economic calculations, 
but unfortunately, it has been taken among others in the parliament, and up to the 
final vote, nobody realized the gravity of the decision. 
To reference a previous point, public input can be omitted from the policy-making 
process by intentionally not advertising forthcoming bills or policy agenda until it is 
practically too late for input. With such tactics, bills like increasing pay by 50 percent 
without informing even the entire parliament, let alone the citizenry, speaks to the extent 
to which secrecy and mistrust continues. 
 A second example of how education is impacted by elite decision-making is well-
explained by Interviewee Raluca, who responded to the question about whether there was 
a need for a longer-term vision for refom as follows: 
[elites] never, ever analyze – or they never go through a decision-making process 
the way that they are teaching in their universities to be done…Why? And they 
never accept – for example, the Laborers [a political party], they lost the power.  
They have plenty of time now [to be retrospective after losing their political 
positions].  If you go and speak with them [and ask if they are] analyzing your 
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activity in the government, just to know who did what in case [their party is 
elected again], [they respond:] What for? And they are [not malevolent] people.   
This interviewee is saying that the elite are not going through a reflexive process to 
determine the efficacy of policy and law, and the extent to which their impact was 
benefiticial or not for their next term. While a challenge, Interviewee Raluca provided a 
possible solution: 
I think that better stability could be achieved if having long-term goals.  If you 
have, for example, a 20-year vision, and you have a set of principles that are 
stable and negotiated, then you could think that, okay, why should I have the 
same ideology?  So I will never defend the idea of having the same ideology or 
the same political party for 30 years.  So no, let the rules of democracy to play.  
The interivewee is arguing that while a longer strategy is good, having the exact same 
ideology is not a good idea. Therefore, a long-term strategy with the input of many elite 
and the citizenry together could create a more robust, and more easily implementable 
policies. 
 A third example of the elite impacting education is the inability of the elite to alter 
the core of Romania’s education system. Because the system did not change dramatically 
from the totalitarian period with the exception of the removal of indoctrination, one could 
presume that either the elite were unwilling to institute significant reform that changed 
the core of the education system or they were incapable. To complicate matters, without 
an alternative elite who would either have new ideas, new abilities or at least a new 
perspective outside of a career within the totalitarian regime, the entrenched elite, the 
education system remained in the management of former leaders within the totalitarian 
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regime. Worth noting, however, is that not every elite was complicit in the previous 
regime, as many desired to simply fulfill a career, but the fact remains that the education 
system in post-coup Romania was expected to change without a change in education 
leadership. Therefore, the education system, as one that is impacted by many of the same 
elite that held positions during the totalitarian regime, has isomorphic properties on its 
own citizenry by replicating similar-minded people. There have been changes, however, 
and there has been growth in the NGO arena—unrelated to private higher education—to 
address this concern. One such nongovernmental insitute, according to Interviewee 
Mona, was looking to the future: 
maybe [this institute] can’t influence now, but maybe in the future. [It could be a] 
breeding ground to train elites and let staff create projects and submit to foreign 
institutes…  
Whether through institutes or slowly modifying the education system, it is clear that the 
Romanian elite represent one of the single most important factors that impacted education 
in terms of the pace of reform, types of reform, depth of reform, policy implementation 
and amount of citizen input.  
 
Teachers and Teacher Education 
 To this point, much of this study has focused on factors influencing education 
during Romania’s transition such as the impact of colonialism, the influence of 
globalization and the limitations of the elite. Teaching and teacher education were 
certainly not immune to these factors. As one of the major areas of potential modification 
for future democratic growth, teacher education is one of the most striking untapped 
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resources for improving reform implementation. Teachers, therefore, have potentially 
changed in the same way the elite have—as individuals, and not systematically. 
Moreover, there is not an incentive to change, whether fiscal or through the collective 
“buy-in” of changing a generation, one student at a time. Interviewee Petre explained one 
of the factors with which teachers must contend: 
For example, you don’t have any data on children going from one grade to the 
other, but you don’t know if they – because what happens even now, if you make 
a student repeat one year because of bad results in a certain subject, it is 
considered the teacher’s fault for not being able to motivate and stimulate that 
child to learn, and so the teacher gets a bad mark for that, which causes the fact 
that most teachers prefer to pass students, just not to look bad in the eyes of their 
colleagues, in the eyes of the inspector for education, in the eyes of the Ministry 
and so on. 
What is missed, in this example, is the potential for the teacher as an individual activist or 
minimally, contributor, to the transition. Because the state is not providing an incentive, 
and the threat of “working in a factory” no longer looms over children’s heads, it is 
critical that the teacher be a major motivator and agent of cultural and political change.  
A limiting factor, besides the “passing” grading mentality discussed by 
Interviewee Petre, is teacher preparation. As Interviewee Petre explained, 
I think that civic education became a part of school curriculum pretty early [in the 
transition]. The only problem is that we didn’t have teachers for that because you 
didn’t have qualified people for civic [education] – what happened was that 
248 
 
mostly, teachers of this so-called social sciences…they became also teachers for 
civic education. 
These teachers were trained under the totalitarian regime, like all teachers in post-coup 
Romania, and none of them were required to take any new coursework or professional 
development. Without proper or any training, teachers were expected to “flip a switch” 
and suddenly teach democratic education. As the reform gained momentum, however, 
there were some changes in professional development, as Interviewee Petre explained: 
I’m sure this has changed. Now the situation, I think it’s completely different 
because you had a lot of training courses, you had a lot of programs supporting 
Romania on this field. So now, I’m sure that this has changed. Going back then, 
yes, I think so, but that’s why at the beginning, I think it was more concentrated 
on the theoretical level because it was easier even for the teacher to learn about 
the state. 
While there were some changes in professional development, teacher training itself must 
be explored because it is very different from teacher training in many western European 
countries or the United States. As Interviewee Dan said,  
it's a bit more complicated because here, in Romania, if you want to become a 
teacher, you go to whatever university you like, and it just take an additional 
course on pedagogics…those who graduate and have also this course taken for 
three years now, but it was four years before, they are allowed to teach in –    
Interviewer: Just one class? 
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Interviewee: Yeah – we are allowed to teach in a particular subject. For instance, 
when I graduated philosophy, I did this just as an insurance – took this course, 
and I was allowed to enter into the system. 
Therefore, in Romania, to become a teacher, the only academic requirement is one course 
on pedagogy in addition to a university degree; there are various other electives that one 
can take; only the pedagogy course is required. Also, a student can take a practicum, but 
it is voluntary and more of a “job shadow” type program than a full semester of being the 
main teacher as is customary in a Western-style “student teaching” period. Interviewee 
Dan delineated other requirements:  
Interviewer 2: Do you have to take a test or anything? 
Interviewee: Yes, at the beginning. When you express your intention to the 
authority at the county level, and then they provide you with a list of available 
places in that particular year, in your subject. Of course, most of them are far 
away from the city center, but okay, they can begin. Then…you pass a test, and if 
you get a minimum [score], you are allowed to teach there for three years and to 
prepare for a bigger test that is called definitive teaching – to be officially 
recognized as a teacher in the system. 
 This requirement of a test after three years in some ways mitigates the lack of robust 
instruction on teacher education during one’s undergraduate degree, but for those three 
years, students are learning from a teacher who may also have had only one course on 
teacher education.  
 After passing the definitive teacher test, there are other avenues for professional 
development. Interviewee Dan identified two major types of professional development: 
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one is the current one that offers you…updates of the needed competencies, and 
this is provided mainly by the government, and another that is more put on your 
shoulders – on your initiative – to go to a sort of professional degrees – first the 
second degree and then the first degree – where after a number of years of 
experience, you can pass on exams with some university teachers, and then you 
get sort of higher recognition of your skills as a teacher, and you get a better 
salary and so on. 
 The professional development that is akin to continuing education credits (CEU) in the 
United States in that it theoretically allows for teachers to remain current and provide 
relevant instruction methodologies. The other type of professional development are two 
additional tests that teachers take based on additional experience and mentoring with 
university professors, but without additional formal coursework or the conferring of an 
advanced degree. These two types of professional development apply to both primary and 
gymnasium [high school] teachers, with one major difference, according to Interviewee 
Dan: 
In the primary schools, you have also the…access or regulation change because 
before, it was possible only to have a pedagogical high school [no university 
study]…more recently, it was said that there is not  such a big difference between 
a primary teacher and a secondary – lower secondary, for instance, teacher. So to 
have such a big difference in initial requirements – so now, they are also supposed 
to have…higher education to become… [a teacher].  
 Therefore, during totalitarianism, primary school teachers were only educated through 
high school in Romania, and were not required to pursue university studies. Currently, all 
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teachers of any grade level are supposed to acquire at least an undergraduate degree in 
any subject. 
 This shift is a significant change in requirements for primary education, but it is 
not system-wide. A gap exists between the urban and rural areas. To attempt to fill this 
teacher preparation gap, there is a distance education program, but one that does not 
involve any technology and bears no resemblance to the type of distance education in 
Western Europe or the U.S. Interviewee Dan provided some context for this distance 
education program: 
People started including in this rural program – started to do some sort of distance 
education courses, only to get a diploma to become a qualified teacher. Because if 
you, for instance, teach – you are graduated philosophy, but you are needed as 
music education or – I don't know – French language teacher, you can, of course, 
teach, but you will be considered unqualified, and of course, the salary is very low 
and you don't have a lot of incentives… 
It is distance more a traditional, when they send you the materials – could be on a 
CD, but you don't have a platform and so on. You just receive – it's a sort of 
blended, let's say, because they are required to come quite often to [monitor]. 
To fill a void in the teacher population in terms of the new and higher standards of 
instruction, this distance education program was established. Being primarily rural, this 
program underlined and may have even exacerbated existing differences in the quality of 
education in urban versus rural areas. Moreover, technology could not be used to keep 
this program up-to-date because, as Interviewee Dan continued, 
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there are two problems. First…unqualified teachers lack the basic competencies 
in using computers, and secondly, there was a huge challenge in terms of 
infrastructure because only recently, they started to receive an Internet connection 
or a more upgraded PC before – when they started the program…the rural 
education program, the infrastructure was really, really poor. They said it will be 
not an equal access because some of them will be [unable to use it]. So this is why 
they printed everything, and they – sometimes they organize some meetings in the 
region, so they – there was not supposed to travel a lot, so they try to find a 
compromise between this. 
Distance learning in Romania carries a stigma similar to that in the U.S., where it is often 
considered subpar to traditional, face-to-face instruction.  Because of this, and because of 
technological constraints, its potential for truly keeping rural teachers up-to-date is, at 
present, limited.   
 One of the reasons that teacher training was not put at the forefront of the reform 
process was the traditionally limited teacher training in Romania: one course on 
pedagogics. Therefore, other areas were deemed more important, such as curriculum and 
law. In fact, as Interviewee Mihai explained, 
teacher training was the last component, which starts. So it was gap between the 
moment when the new curriculum was put in place, and the teachers’ were trained 
to put in place this curriculum.  
This gap between the implementation of a new curriculum and the ability for teachers to 
provide current pedagogical practices may have contributed to the poorly implemented 
reform process and competency acquisition of all students, as well as the lack of 
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motivation to learn subjects such as civic education. There is symbolic value in teacher 
training being a last component of reform, almost disincentivizing teachers from desiring 
to change their methodology, as explained by Interviewee Mihai: 
I would have liked to have…done differently was to, somehow, teach people how 
to teach, to give incentives to people to implement things, and somehow, make 
them understand the use of this debate, discussion, and implementation process in 
order for things – no matter if a law is good or bad or a policy is good or bad, at 
least we need to implement it and wait for the results and have more patience to 
see if it works or not. 
Therefore, without an incentive to change and without the teacher training to execute 
pedagogic change, one may expect many of the same practices and outcomes to occur in 
terms of what students know and expect—a serious challenge in a country with a new 
form of government and new economy.  
The idea of “looking back” at the reform process did not really begin until 2000, 
at which point some studies commenced to determine how student learning was being 
impacted during this reform as it relates to teacher training. These studies placed a focus, 
according to Interviewee Mihai, on “the quality of the education and training provision in 
Romania, and also the outcomes of the education.” One of the main studies, aside from 
the emergence of internal domestic studies, was through the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF). Interviewee Mihai explained that a central UNICEF focus was on 
gender education, an entirely new concept in Romanian education:  
[Gender education] was a subject that was only briefly touched before, and we did 
a big survey on written and taught curriculum, so we elaborated – also, some 
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recommendations. Then, we elaborated some guides – specific guides for 
different types of teachers, explaining how they can follow the gender dimension 
in their classroom, and how they can improve the partnership between boys and 
girls and fight against different stereotypes and so on. 
To implement new practices to support teachers in becoming aware of and learning how 
to avoid gender stereotyping, Interviewee Mihai said that technology was used 
in a very innovative approach, we proposed an online training course for 
inspectors because they coordinate, more or less, the work of a lot of teachers, and 
we have very good success. We used a Moodle platform we adapted a bit to the 
specific of this program, and we had almost 350 school inspectors, which is more 
or less eight – nine per county. With their help, we promoted a lot of our ideas at 
school level.  
It is worth noting, however, that as previously mentioned, due to technological gaps that 
exist in Romania’s school infrastructure, this platform would not have been easily 
accessible from the rural communities—some of the areas that most desperately needed 
gender education training.  
Another study that came out of the UNICEF support was on school violence. 
With the diminished role of the state as a mechanism for social order, violence was either 
on the rise during this study or, at least, more documented due to a freer press. 
Interviewee Mihai provided a background on this study: 
Now, we are planning a big national training program – is on school violence, 
together, again, with UNICEF because they were very interested – especially after 
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the media published a lot of cases about school violence between students, 
between teachers and students, and so on. 
The results of this study on school violence and gender education indicated that, finally, 
teacher education or teacher training needed an overhaul. Interviewee Mihai explained 
that in-service training is not enough: 
From a broader perspective on sort of in-service training for teachers – 
opportunities, challenges, impact of the new system because in 2004-2005, we 
moved to the credit system of teachers, with teachers being forced to have at least 
90 credits in five years, and provoking a lot of discussion and issues. Another was 
to evaluate the policy. It was very important in 2003-2004 on extension of the 
duration of the compulsory education from eight to ten years. That provoked a 
huge debate and a lot of challenges for the system because suddenly, you need to 
ensure two more – curriculum and resources for two more years.  
The addition of two additional years of compulsory education, which had been lowered in 
the beginning years of post-coup Romania to eight, provided an additional reason to truly 
investigate and make recommendations for teacher training. However, this interest 
developed a full fifteen years after the coup, and will take many more years to be 
implemented, presuming it is wholly implemented, and coordinated with the curriculum. 
Even with additional teacher training, such training is still so theoretical that its 
application may be lost on many new teachers, or many older teachers who are 
accustomed to a different way of instructing. 
256 
 
 Finally, not all aspects of teachers or teacher education in post-coup Romania 
were negative. Interviewee Victor explained that teachers had, overall, a different 
disposition than during the totalitarian era: 
Teachers [in post-coup Romania] were – we could feel that they were calmer and 
they were happier in a way. They could better relate to us. We had new subjects. 
We escaped from the subjects we didn't like, like political economy, defending 
the country, military… [in addition] teachers could – also limited, depending on 
their availability to introduce new topics, could take care of pupils' interests and 
introduce a topic that is needed or that the pupils are interested in, even if it's not 
in the analytical syllabus.   
This change in perspective can be harnessed and utilized for positive reform changes and 
for motivating students. To support a teacher toward this end, it may be, ironically, good 
to look back at how teachers were treated during totalitarianism, as outlined by 
Interviewee Victor: 
Teachers were very much models of behavior. They were very respected by the 
community. To be a teacher, it was something for me…This is not the case now. 
 And in general, to have higher education – if you had a higher education 
diploma, you were very much appreciated by the community. Now, when you can 
buy a diploma any time, it is not valuable to study. 
For Romania to harness the way in which teachers were respected could take advantage 
of the newfound disposition of teachers and the potential newly positive relationship with 
students. As private higher education quality increases, the idea of “buy[ing] a diploma 
anytime” can be resolved, further increasing the respect of the teacher. In addition, the 
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belief that the “authority of being a teacher disappeared” must be addressed to further 
instill a sense of teacher respect.  
  Finally, a cultural shift must occur to better prepare teachers for democratic 
education and for the instruction of core competencies. As Interviewee Mona explained, 
“teachers are not ready for key competencies.” In addition, Interviewee Daniela discussed 
the need for a shift in the way teachers approach the teacher-pupil relationship, which 
will in turn support democratic education: 
This teacher/pupil or teacher/student relationship... it was meant to preserve and 
to reproduce a paternalistic order in which the teacher had all the answers. The 
student had none, and had no right to question, right? Pupils weren’t expected to 
challenge professors. It wasn’t the common exploration of knowledge...In my 
opinion, what is interesting to witness is the difficulty of the transition from a 
model based on counting mistakes, right? In evaluating, by diminishing the grade 
according to the number of mistakes. 
To shift the type of relationship teachers have with the student is to reevaluate the idea of 
social reproduction, to address decades of momentum and tradition and to uncover the 
core challenges in teacher education. There are some positive changes that have occurred, 
but they are small in comparison to the many lurking challenges that remain since teacher 
education was the last component of education reform, and due to the fact that those 
orchestrating the reform were, themselves, schooled in the previous system of education. 
With the support of organizations such as UNICEF, it may be possible for Romania to 
address and resolve the challenges that must be faced to further reform its education 




 As with policy, Romania’s curriculum, a backbone of its education system, 
endured many changes. These changes differed based on the stage of the reform, whether 
during the 1990’s or during the 2000’s. The challenge, however, is the exploration into 
the extent to which democratic education, which could be a considered a balanced liberal 
arts education with both democratic courses as well as democratic tactics spread 
throughout many subjects, e.g., team work, lesson selection, etc., was implemented. As 
previously described, between the years 1990 and 2000-2002—the first period of 
reform—the focus was largely on macro-level education reforms in an elite-driven 
manner without an apparatus for implementation or quality control. The second period of 
reform, from 2001 through the end of the case study time period, 2007, was more focused 
on implementation, quality and urban versus rural parity, albeit still top-down. While at 
first glance the second period could be considered better in terms of implementation, this 
period was characterized by the interviewees as reactionary, too. Therefore, both period 
one and period two were reactionary in nature, thereby potentially undermining their 
respective potential.  
 To characterize the first period of time, Interviewee Victor explained that 
curriculum was a victim of the changes in government: 
After the '90s, the changing in the education – not only in education – in 
legislation and different other institutions or fields of society were very rapid. 
You couldn’t get used to a system because it changed. Changing the government 
meant a lot of changing in a lot of things. In education, for example, changing the 
government meant many times changing the curriculum.  
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The lack of momentum and the overall succession of short-term decisions may have 
undermined the potential opportunity for demonstrable curriculum reform. This does not 
mean that the Romanian Ministry should not have been rigid to one ideology or 
philosophy of curriculum design; the learning process that occurs during curriculum 
development is valuable. Nevertheless, this “back and forth” impacted teachers and 
contributed to an overall sense of confusion as further explained by Interviewee Victor: 
I remember…a teacher of physics, [who] said ‘I really don't know if electricity is 
a subject or not for the seventh grade because in one year, we should teach 
electricity.’ And also, they got sick of changes. Let us focus on teaching. Another 
side effect was that many changes asked teachers to prepare better materials, to 
prepare critical evaluation assessment of students. This can happen when you 
have – when you work with a smaller number of pupils, but when you work with 
150, for example, you cannot concentrate and give to each pupil a good or very 
fine, precise, accurate evaluation. 
This idea of uncertainty pervaded many of the interviewee comments. Teachers were 
forced to reckon with a new form of government and supposedly, a new form of 
education—or at least modified—but the constant changes invariably had an impact on 
the consistency of what was taught. Fortunately, teachers were at least partially included 
in the development of the curriculum which, as Interviewee Victor continued: 
to design your own curriculum for subjects, it was a challenge and it was 
something that increased at least the self perception of teachers that they are not 
just implementers of curriculum but they can design and contribute with their 
ideas and they can adapt to the pupil's needs.  
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You are not obliged to create a new subject. You could use that time to get more 
into details in one subject or to – if the class had some learning difficulties, to 
solve them. It was in my opinion really good that this curriculum happened 
because it was a little bit of revival. You could see teachers enthusiastic about 
something really good, I think.  
This “opening” of the curriculum design process marked a significant change from the 
previous system, where teachers were agents of ideology and indoctrination coupled with 
knowledge-disbursement a.k.a. banking style of instruction. While the new approach to 
curriculum design does not guarantee a new style of instruction, it is a more democratic 
approach. One of the main reasons for this change was due to the World Bank, as 
Interviewee Victor recalled: 
The World Bank program was a comprehensive one. It provided curriculum, 
teacher training. In teacher training, nothing significant happened, but at least they 
had a vision about it. They approached textbooks. It was the first time when we 
had alternative textbooks. More textbooks for the same subject, for the same 
school year. You could choose.  
This idea of multiple textbooks was revolutionary for those who had lived under the 
totalitarian regime for the past number of decades. Of course, multiple textbooks opened 
the door for corruption via bribery as teachers were the ones who selected books and 
were subject to bribes from the publishers. However, at a minimum, multiple options 
allowed for testing various approaches in a new system. This change marked a time 
when, as Interviewee Victor continued, 
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the textbooks were not perceived as compulsory to follow. Not all the topics 
should be approached in the classroom. I remember, for example, in the teaching 
of Romanian language, literature and Romanian language, that I had just topics of 
what I am supposed to teach students – for example, poetry. What a poem means. 
I could choose any poem. It was really a high level of liberty because in other 
forms of curriculum, you didn't have poetry. This curriculum tried to focus more 
on competencies and less on content. This was a major change in terms of 
didactics.  
The freedom to choose even within a textbook marked another aspect of a change that 
occurred in post-coup Romania. This freedom was met almost with temporary 
uncertainty, as if the idea of freedom was almost overwhelming. In fact, when given this 
new opportunity to develop curricula, as Interviewee Simona explained, “the system was 
very difficult to digest these things because from curricula, for instance, they just listed 
the topics that should be taught in schools.” In this example, Interviewee Simona is 
referring to the U.S., U.K. and Canada, and how Romania was looking for an almost 
prescriptive approach to education within a new democracy, one that could be adopted 
after “digesting” or “filtering.” Without this approach, the next best step was 
implementing to the best of their ability elements of other countries’ curricula. As 
Interviewee Victor explained, however, when those teachers and elite who participated in 
curriculum development undertook this approach, even the word “curriculum” was new: 
This is curriculum; everybody said that this is why we should take this word from 
English, why we don’t use school programs, as it was used in Romania 
before. And we said, “Look, this is not English. This is Latin.” Curriculum is a 
262 
 
Latin word… [one teacher] had an understanding. Understanding the word 
“curriculum” to a Romanian word that means your backside, and she simply 
didn’t understand. 
This comment provides perspective on the challenge of introducing curricula to teachers, 
especially in rural and isolated regions, where the concept was brand new.  
 The idea of curriculum as a new concept, in comparison to the previous idea of 
programs, was compounded by the idea that the source for curriculum did not have to 
originate from a textbook, only. For example, Interviewee Daniela explained the 
following: 
I couldn’t quite wrap my mind around the fact that we were getting chapters from 
books, passages, paragraphs, little pieces of information in a newspaper article. So 
I couldn’t get it that that was knowledge as well because I was coming from this 
mind-set that in order for it to be knowledge, it has to be bound in a textbook and 
be handed down to me, right? 
Therefore, the challenge of curricular reform was that the textbook would not be the only 
“hand of the state” that passed down mandates for what would be taught, but as 
previously mentioned, teacher training did not actually train teachers to know what to 
select outside of the textbook. Therefore, this first decade of reform can be characterized 
as both exciting and confusing for all actors involved. 
  The second period of time for curriculum design echoed the ideology of teacher 
training and policy creation in that it was retrospective in considering how things had 
faired during the first ten years as largely macro in focus, and focused on the specific 
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aspects. For example, Interviewee Raluca explained that among these curricular changes 
in the second decade,  
there are a lot that are really supporting democracy.  Then now, at least in case of 
technical and vocational education, we’ve switched, based on competencies.  
That’s why I told you that we don’t have any longer subjects but modules.  It’s 
not the case for the whole education, but there is a process because it’s – well, you 
could not simply do it by night.  But the same difficulty on who’s going to teach 
democracy, it is now with us who’s going to teach competencies?   
This comment expresses the idea of ownership and responsibility, and how specific 
pockets of the system were responding to the missed opportunity of curriculum 
development and that too much freedom of development without a common framework 
may not be positive for student learning, let alone longitudinal studies to determine 
efficacy. Moreover, the desire to not experience constant change in curricular reform 
grew out of this idea, as Interviewee Raluca explained: 
Why should I change again the syllabus for civic education?  Why am I not 
keeping the same program of training for ten years?  Why should I change it each 
year or every four years? 
Interviewer: Does it change? 
Interviewee: In some cases, yes.  And right now, for example, we have on the 
discussions which kind of subjects should remain into the education.  Who’s 
going to decide that?  It is also the question who is right in that.  
In this second period, the challenges of decentralizing the development of curriculum and 
determining who are the players and actors in this development is a key theme. Because 
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democratic or civic education was not integrated throughout the curriculum but only 
segregated as a single course, for example, there were missed opportunities to create a 
democratic education curriculum. Moreover, due to the deficit of knowledge in 
developing a democratic education system curricula, coupled with the fact that teacher 
education was not developed to prepare for a new curricula, the second period can be 
categorized not simply retrospective but also uncertain.  
 
Access 
 Following the exploration of curriculum and a new system, it is important to note 
that the proliferation of new ideas and concepts was not spread equally throughout the 
country. Most of the education experts resided in urban areas, and when the local 
administration gained additional authority to decide upon curricular and program 
changes, the effects were not felt uniformly across the whole nation. Previously, access to 
education under totalitarian rule was, according to the state, universal and equal (unless 
one was Roma). While it has been documented in this study that Romania exhibits an 
ongoing urban focus to the detriment of the rural areas, access has changed during the 
transition. Because there was no apparatus to enforce new policies, and “policing” of 
these new policies was limited access became more challenging, particularly among 
minorities or the poor, who often lived in rural areas. In reference to the “J curve,” as 
freedoms increase, so too does instability, and with instability via decentralization came 
inequalities and disparities between those who can access or know how to access those 
aspects of the system that can benefit them.  
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One of the reasons that access and by association, inequality, pervaded Romania 
was due to Ceauşescu’s state-mandated urbanization movement, which depopulated the 
rural areas. With a lower proportion of citizens in the rural areas, resource distribution 
from the Ministry favored the highly populated urban areas—which lasted throughout the 
transition. One of the major factors that allowed this reality to continue was due to the 
misperception of education quality in Romania, based on the myth pervaded by the 
education Olympiad. Interviewee Petre explains that a very small percentage of schools 
participated in the Olympiads, and those schools 
are traditionally training students for this international contest. I mean, they 
started at school level and they study only one subject, for example, math. But the 
truth is that the other 99 percent of the schools are not doing that great.  
  Interviewer: You mean at that point in time or today or both? 
Interviewee: I would say both. I’m not sure about before 1989. We have figures 
that document my words, but they are from the recent times, from 2006, 2007. 
And you can find, also, numbers that can prove some of those facts that date from 
1990, so after the revolution. Before ’89, you didn’t have official statistics, let’s 
say. You didn’t have the certainty that the official statistic was real. 
However, the results of the Olympiad, where the few students who competed 
internationally performed well, were touted by the Ministry as being representative of 
most Romanian students and the entire Romanian education system. The reality, in fact, 
was that a small minority of urban-schooled students participated, which let the 
inequality and inconsistency of education performance nationwide continue to languish 
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under this misapprehension. The results of this misunderstanding, Interviewee Petre 
argues, is that 
statistically speaking, in Romania, if you are born in a village, you have more 
chances to die at birth than to get to university. So people coming from rural 
areas, if they don’t have some kind of – if they cannot get to high school in an 
urban area to a city, then they have no (chance) – there are no high schools in 
rural areas. 
Moreover, teachers are the ones in charge of truancy, and they are not financially or 
otherwise incentivized to track down rural students to keep them in school. Coupled with 
financial challenges for even paying for higher education, rural students have an uphill 
battle to attend and graduate from rural areas in Romania to this day.  
 The implications for an unequal access to quality education for the rural 
Romanian population impact Romania’s transition toward democracy. As Interviewee 
Raluca explains: 
In rural areas, the access to learning and to practicing democracy is far away from 
what it should be or [in comparison to] the average in Romania.  So not 
comparing with the ideal world but is there.  And in this respect, I think, again, 
that from both sides, NGOs and those in charge with education, I’m referring to 
technical and vocational education, but I don’t think that it’s too much difference 
with primary schools in rural areas, also, with what I’m saying.  I think that both 
partners, they should work together, plus the public administration, they have also 
to come there and to do something, in this respect.   
267 
 
By linking the learning and practicing of democracy, this interviewee speaks to the 
linkage that has not wholly been made in Romania between the theoretical and the 
practical in democratic education, which is exacerbated by schools of lower quality. 
Moreover, as Interviewee Raluca continues: 
Unfortunately, demographically, we are very bad because it’s an aging society, 
Romania, and we do not have that many youngsters in the rural areas, so it’s quite 
difficult, then, to say that it will be very easy to rebuild the trustfulness, starting 
from rural areas to urban areas. But it’s quite rare and I could not say that there it 
is the education that did that.  No role of education.  It was just because they are 
old enough to remind their good times and to do that, and they are accepting the 
dialogue and the way they work each other. 
Thus, the rural areas have democratization challenges, and as discussed during the section 
on decentralization, resist assuming responsibility. These broader macro challenges 
impact rural areas on a micro level in terms of limited access to a quality education. 
Therefore, as urban areas continue to transition and refine, rural areas will be left behind 
along with their students, which has implications for the entire system as a whole.  
 
Minority Education 
Following on from a discussion about access to quality education in rural areas, 
one of the major issues facing Romanian education in a democratic society is minority 
education. Romania is almost ethnically homogenous as a whole, but there are significant 
populations of ethnic Hungarians, some Germans and many Roma who face many 
challenges in receiving a high quality education. While the Hungarian and German 
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population have the cultural backing of their respective countries, and have been more 
strongly integrated into the Romanian higher education system and culture, the 
challenges Roma face are comparatively far more significant. To this day, ethnic 
Romanians rarely describe this ethnic minority as “Roma”, instead using the pejorative 
words “ţigani” or “gypsy.” One interviewee described the plight facing the Roma as akin 
to that of African-Americans in the United States of the 1940’s, before the civil rights 
movement had dismantled the racist Jim Crow tradition of second-class citizenship.  
 The Roma population was at one point nomadic, and therefore had no official 
relationship with any particular country. However, populations have settled in respective 
Eastern European countries, adopted local languages and are no longer nomadic. Both the 
citizens of the country they inhabit and the Roma themselves have resisted integration or 
assimilation, the combination of which preserved or increased prejudice and inequality. 
In the case of Romania, Interviewee Ana expressed that over 90% of Roma use the 
Romanian language as their first written and spoken language, with 85% expressing that 
they were Romanian Orthodox. In short, the Roma have culturally adopted two major 
aspects of Romanian culture—language and religion—but have not received adequate 
representation in government, support via integration policy or engagement via 
supporting the education of their children by allowing for non-matriculation of first 
graders and early dropouts. 
 Some organizations such as UNICEF have stepped in to address the inequalities 




We work a lot with students coming from schools that are located in very poor 
areas, associated many times with having gypsy students, and with a lot of social 
and economic problems. This is why we carried out several studies with the help 
of Ministry and with UNICEF Romania, in the area of access to education of 
Roma students in the area of promoting a development model.  
Some positive outcomes may have originated from this study, as Interviewee Victor 
expressed: 
Those gypsy pupils, it was the first year of mandatory school, so those that get 
higher marks in the class really became well appreciated. No integration 
problems. The other pupils didn't even think about that they are gypsy because 
they had the highest marks. When they – in the opposite case [when Roma receive 
poor marks], the integration problems were bigger.  
This observation indicates that when Roma perform well, they are respected in schools at 
least by other students and teachers. However, as Interviewee Ana explains: 
Despite all these nice laws, Romania’s literacy rate is decreasing and the school 
abandonment rate is rising. From 2001 until ’07, it tripled, the dropout rate in 
primary school, which is one through four. And then middle school was worse. 
Let’s assume 10 to 12 percent of the population is Roma. And 44 percent of Roma 
are under 18. We actually find it’s more like 50 percent of the communities. And 
22 percent of the Romanian population is under 18, so 23 percent of the 
population under 18 is Roma. One out of four Romanian children is Roma. Now, 
years spent in school, national average, 11.2, Roma children, 6.8. Those are the 
education curves, so you can see how much less education these Roma kids are 
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getting. It’s scary if one out of four kids is in this group. Where are they going to 
get their workforce in 2020?  
 Unlike the United States’ efforts to increase enrollment in higher education by beginning 
to provide additional support for cultures who historically did not attend higher 
education, Romania has not begun to make this connection. While the statistics are 
challenging to substantiate due to uncertain census numbers and a gross under 
acknowledgement of the Roma population, especially the Roma population in urban 
areas, it is clear that for those statistics of students who enter school, the performance of 
students is low and dropout rates are extremely high. Interviewee Ana dispels other 
myths that permeate the Romanian population about Roma: 
That’s another mentioned as a big problem, identity documents. Well, 95 percent 
of them have it. We wind up with about, maybe, 1 out of 100 kids we deal with 
needs – well, I’ll say, I don’t even think it’s 5 out of 100. Anyway, that’s not a 
huge problem.  
With laws such as the anti-discrimination law supposedly protecting the Roma 
population, there are policies in place that prevent students from receiving an equal 
opportunity for Roma education, as Interviewee Ana explains: 
There’s a program that provides school supplies to poor kids, but the practice is to 
wait a month before you give it to them to make sure they’re going to stay in 
school before you waste the money. And sometimes, they don’t even get there for 
three months. We know cases like that because we provide schoolbooks for – not 
the books. The book is there, but the teacher can require workbooks, and the 
workbooks can cost up to, say, 20 Euros.  
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 What are the results of this type of policy? Interviewee Ana has observed that Roma 
students who do not have materials 
sit in the back of the class and cause trouble. Anything that does go wrong – and 
everything does go wrong all the time – in order to help these people, you really 
have to have integrated services or you have to have your network of services 
because everything goes wrong.  
To be fair, however, not all blame falls on the shoulders of the Romanian Ministry of 
Education at the central or local level—some responsibility falls on the Roma 
themselves, as Interviewee Ana articulates: 
The Roma movement is partly responsible for that because they want a sense of 
their own culture and identity, so they identify with wagons and with Roma 
clothes and just all that kind of stuff, and there are problems within the Roma 
movement because some of the women want to change the marriage customs and 
some of the men – 
So the schools, teachers don’t know how to deal with these kids who come in, 
who are 8 years old and they don’t know all the colors in the rainbow, they don’t 
know how to hold a book, they don’t know how to hold a pencil.  
This case seems strikingly similar to the achievement gap that exists in the U.S., whereby 
students from more affluent backgrounds or at least families who value education come 
to kindergarten with basic literacy and social skills, while other students enter 
kindergarten without these skills—and this gap lingers throughout every grade of 
schooling. The achievement gap in the U.S. is far more complicated, however, because 
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there are a plethora of cultures whereas in the case of Romania, the main issue is with one 
culture—a more manageable challenge to tackle.  
 To remedy the challenges Roma face, new leadership is necessary. Just as Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. broke barriers so that Rev. Jesse James could lead a way for the 
subsequent election of President Barack Obama, so too must the Roma enter the 
leadership of the Romanian government because, after all, Republics are representative 
democracies. Since the U.S. and Romania both have representative democracies 
(although Romania’s is Parliamentary), the Roma will not receive adequate 
representation until they are part of the system. Interviewee Ana continues this idea with 
the following comment: 
The Roma don’t even respect their own leadership. It’s a big problem. And I see, 
in part, the difference being that, in the [U.S.] black community, there were also 
these churches that had black ministers who really pressed for education, really 
pushed the people to send their kids to school. There was an educated class 
because of the segregation. You had to train blacks to be doctors and lawyers and 
stuff because whites wouldn’t serve them. [In Romania] they recently announced 
the first Roma Orthodox priest. It’s 2009 and they got the first Roma Orthodox 
priest and these people are 85 percent Orthodox.  
With some precedent that provides a roadmap in countries like the United States, the 
Romanian Ministry of Education, Romanian people and Roma may wish to consider 
adopting a similar approach, i.e., substantively ensuring that the Roma enter kindergarten 





 Just as primary and secondary education experienced many reforms, so too did 
higher education. More than primary and secondary education, higher education is the 
only area where exogenous directly impact education,35 via organizations like the EU and 
its voluntary Bologna Process or ECTS, or through the desire to compete internationally 
with reforms based on Western-style institutions. Because of this “outlet” to the outside, 
higher education was part of a top-down assimilation process whereby reforms to the 
programs and requirements for admission and graduation impacted K-12 curriculum and 
pedagogy. In short, reforming higher education impacted the entire education system. 
This top-down approach to reform, whether wholly intentional or circumstantial, was 
certain to be flawed by the lack of implementation review apparatuses or assessments of 
ramifications of these top-down policies.  
 Findings for interviewees are divided into two main categories: 1) public higher 
education ; and 2) private higher education. The findings are organized around both real 
and perceived changes that occurred during the transition, with a focus on specific 
examples of what happened, accompanied by interviewee’s perceptions on why certain 
changes occurred. While many of the public higher education reforms were driven 
largely in response to Bologna or ECTS, or perhaps mimetic isomorphism based on 
Western institutions, private higher education was driven largely by domestic forces. 
 
                                                            
35 As argued, the EU impact on Romania is isomorphic. The EU directly impacts higher 
education, but does not have any direct role in K-12 policy. Other forces like colonialism 
and globalization may impact all levels of education, but indirectly and not through 
official policy and law via external mandate. 
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Periods of Higher Education Reform 
 Public higher education reforms were based primarily on domestic interests. 
Following the coup, institutions were free to broaden their curriculum and consider new 
majors that would have been previously forbidden or not relevant for a planned economy. 
There were three distinct periods of reform that were based on three specific laws or 
policies. The first period follows the 1991 Romanian Constitution and the passage of 
Article 32. While my interviewees may not have known that specific article by name, 
they were all aware of the powerful change that occurred when private universities were 
allowed to form, the specifics of which will be discussed in a subsequent section on 
private higher education. The next period is marked by the Law of 1993, whereby 
universities were granted autonomy to operate free from the Ministry’s control. My 
observations in Romania lead me to believe that autonomy was granted for the 
democratic reason of decentralization and empowerment of locally-run institutions. 
Moreover, autonomy may have been granted by the Ministry of Education to shed the 
responsibility of “figuring out” the transition while the Ministry focused on primary and 
secondary education. The third period of higher education reform began in 1999 with 
Bologna, which to this day impacts the reform process, acting as both a change agent and 
exogenous force of assimilation to EU standards.  
 
Period One: Private Higher Education 
 Almost concurrent with periods two and three of the public university reforms, 
private higher education reforms commenced with the creation of the Romanian 
constitution in 1991 and specifically, Article 32, as discussed in Chapter II. Private higher 
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education in Romania is still very controversial as a relatively new phenomenon; 
interviewee feedback, coupled with my literature review, suggested that this controversy 
stems from the way in which these universities operate as NGO’s and their status as 
“diploma mills.”  Interviewee Petre provided an interesting perspective on private 
education pertaining to the lack of historic precedent, using the example of private high 
schools: 
In the case of private universities, the story is different. In the case of private high 
schools, you have only a few of them. They’re not very known. And usually, they 
are considered an alternative for students who, somehow, didn’t make it in the 
public sector or for students who have very rich parents who can afford to pay, 
but usually, people coming from private high schools are not really considered as 
the best students that you can find. I think this is because education has been a 
state affair in Romania since forever. You don’t have a history of private 
education in Romania.  
When asked whether the perception of private education being of low quality will 
change, Interviewee Petre responded by saying: 
We can only hope. The experience of private universities, for example, is very 
interesting from this point of view because in 1993, after 1990, what happened 
was everybody was – a lot of people tried to do things. One of the things they 
tried to do was establish private universities, or at least higher education 
institutions in the form of faculties, let’s say, only one subject. And this was a 
field that was not legislated. You had no legislation for three years. Between 1990 
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and 1993 [Period 1], you had no legislation regarding higher education and 
private higher education.  
The lack of legislation and framework for reform may have even been compounded by 
the significant increase in the amount of freedom for those with the fiscal ability to found 
and manage new institutions. The legal loophole for the management of private higher 
education institutions stems from their status as NGOs—another entirely new concept to 
Romanians, as Interviewee Petre discusses: 
In Romania, private higher education institutions, private universities, are 
considered NGOs. From a judicial point of view, they are considered NGOs. This 
is important to know because first of all, in the ‘90s in Romania, NGOs were, and 
still are, from some point of view, exempt from certain taxes. For example, in the 
‘90s, if you bring a car from outside the country, if you buy yourself a car, you 
had to pay some taxes to the Romanian state. If you were an NGO, you didn’t 
have to pay those taxes because we wanted to encourage the NGO field. 
While there is international precedent for private higher education institutions to operate 
as NGOs, most of the interviewees felt that their status as an NGO undermined the 
benefits of an NGO because they saw tax avoidance as a main reason for their 
establishment—not mission. Furthermore, it was the way in which funds were dealt with 
that proved disconcerting for the interviewees, as Interviewee Petre explains: 
They’re not for-profit, all of them. And so what happens is that now, this has led 
to the following thing. In 2009, the wealthiest, in terms of universities, the 
wealthiest are the private ones because they got money from students as 
admission fees, in general, and they needed to invest all that money in something. 
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And they have built empires, let’s say, of building which are empty because there 
are not enough students to fill then. But they had to build buildings and this is 
what they did. They built buildings. 
The criticism about constructing buildings is that money could have been reinvested in 
the quality of instruction or a myriad other ways in which private higher education 
institutions could have improved, but instead, they chose to put the money into 
unnecessary infrastructure development.  
 The history of the NGO predates its application to private higher education. A law 
from 1923, which is still applicable in post-coup Romania, was applied following the 
creation of Article 32 to legally create private higher education institutions under this 
framework. The fact that a law created during the time when Romania was a monarchy 
was permitted to not only be used today, but applied differently for private higher 
education, is testament to the powerful importance of history. Although unanswered, the 
question of what other laws were allowed to be “carried over” and how they were applied 
within this new democratic government is a topic that must be explored in future studies. 
As it relates to this case study, part of the stigma for the private higher education 
precedent is that the law was not created for the expressed purpose of education, which 
means a unique interpretation of the law appears, to the Romanians, as manipulative. 
Interviewee Auralia discusses the way in which NGOs were created from this historic 
legality that was not previously utilized for private universities, despite predating the 
democratic form of government: 
There was this trick of establishing a university like foundations, using the 
foundation law of 1923. They had established, which was valid, nobody knew, but 
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somebody knew, somebody discovered, and they said, okay, according to this 
law, we establish a foundation, which will deliver education. And so we do have 
almost additional 40, if not more, private, so-called private universities. The 
parliament tried to regulate in a way this situation, and they drew regulations 
related to the quality of the education, but the process is very complicated.  
One of the outcomes for these NGOS was a lack of regulation, which resulting there 
being “a lot of crooks who started to present themselves as directors of the university” as 
Interviewee Auralia expressed. Therefore, it was not that private education itself was the 
crux of the challenge in garnering respect, it was the individuals themselves who may not 
have been respected and represented greed. Moreover, as Interviewee Auralia explained, 
for many years the private higher education institutions  
were not accredited. They were not part of the higher education system, but 
people believe, and the period was not Romanian traditional period. People want 
to have access, an easy access to a university degree, so I think that the mass 
university education is something, which came also due to some pressure from the 
people.  
While private higher education universities may have had a stigma, were not accredited 
and may not have provided as high a quality education as with public universities, they 
represented the massification of higher education and a symbol of breaking down the 
existing elitist model that even impacted professor hiring as discussed in a previous 
section. Because the public higher education had too many barriers to entry, private 
higher education lowered the barrier—but not without the costs previously discussed.  
 By the time Romania entered the EU, new regulatory frameworks inspired by 
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Bologna were introduced to mitigate the challenges of private higher education and help 
integrate these institutions as part of a comprehensive solution to increase the number of 
graduates in Romania. Has private higher education improved over time? Interviewee 
Raul believes it has “higher standards”:  
Interviewer: But not to the standard of public higher education? 
  Interviewee: Probably not. So it’s improving, but still – 
With a positive overall trend in private higher education quality, it went from being part 
of a problem to part of a solution for training the next generation of Romania’s 
workforce. Interviewee Victor was even more optimistic and yet ironic about private 
higher education, in saying that  
probably in two or four years, there will be no difference in the quality of public 
and private universities because the quality decreased also in the public 
universities as well. The private universities didn't offer quality programs from 
the beginning. I think they were seen as a business, not as a higher education 
institution. They really – they were very interested to have a great big number of 
students. No selection for entering the university, which means a lot. 
Therefore, while private higher education will continue to increase in quality, being on 
par with public universities does not carry the same significance as it once did. However, 
if there is a relatively close gap in quality between private and public higher education, 
perhaps they can together compete and possibly increase the quality of education to 
attract talented students, therefore potentially driving up education quality throughout the 




Period Two: University Autonomy  
 
One of the first challenges during period two pertained to making sense of 
autonomy and determining how to proceed. As Interviewee Raul explained, higher 
education 
[has] changed a lot, some things for the better, some things let’s say being part of 
the general trends, generally speaking, so not necessarily positively. So first of all, 
of course from the topics point of view, it’s much more freedom now than it used 
to be, then, it was restrictions for even the teachers, sometimes they were 
supposed to say certain things, and now there is no such constraint. So we go and 
say whatever we consider is related to our topic, of course, we discussed what is 
to be told, so this is one thing that happened and is different from the previous 
period, meaning before 1990, when it was more restrictive, and this is a sign of 
democracy. The fact that we can teach our classes how we consider that it’s 
appropriate for the particular subject, no politicization as it used to be previously.  
What complicated the newfound freedom and potentially undermined its beneficial 
potential was the fact that as with the Ministry of Education, there was not an alternative 
elite in the higher education community. Moreover, the predominant theme for those who 
could usher forth reform echoed the primary and secondary teachers—almost all 
Romanians were educated in the theoretical, not practical.  
Complicating this matter of higher education reform was the fact that an 
urban/rural divide existed, albeit with two main regions of influence: Cluj-Napoca and 
Bucharest. Cluj-Napoca’s university, Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai, is surrounded and 
attended by many Romanian-Hungarians and, regardless of this culturally unique factor, 
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this University tends to cultivate many of the education leaders in Romania. The other 
center is in Bucharest both with the Universitatea din Bucureşti and Academia De Studii 
Economice, coupled with the Ministry of Education and other local elite institutions. 
With these two centers of higher education authority, and due to the Ministry granting 
university autonomy, reform was not geographically consistent in Romania. One 
byproduct of inconsistent reform and prestige of certain select universities was the 
challenge in redistribution of faculty talent, as Interviewee Auralia explains: 
If you are an assistant professor in Timisoara, and you…move to Bucharest, and 
find a position, which is advertised, it’s no use. It’s not going to happen unless 
you go and talk to the people, and say, “I want to come.” At the assistant’s level, 
it’s no problem. At the professor level, it’s a tragedy. It’s very complicated. So 
that’s a mentality. The universities, they start opening towards each other. It’s 
very strange. In the last ten years, it was much more easier to make all the 
paperwork, and to send people abroad than to send them from Bucharest to 
Timisoara. It’s the internal bureaucracy. It’s a lack of culture because education 
means a certain type of culture. Certain type of culture, when I say that I’m 
referring – for example, I’m saying some of the universities did not care about 
publications. It’s a problem of culture. If you know, as a young researcher, as a 
young assistant that you are going to be promoted only if you have articles in 
known journals, in well-known journals or is to go to important conferences, and 
you’ll fight for it. If not, you’re not going to do it. Why do it? 
The idea of university prestige and hiring based on the university at which one teaches is 
not entirely unique; However, the extent to which this is executed in Romania coupled 
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with the idea that after the coup a necessary balance in distribution of university talent 
may have been beneficial, compounds the impact.  
 The challenge regarding the voluntary redistribution of university teachers was 
not the only institutional issue with which universities must contend. Bureaucracy, 
specifically this Ottoman-type democracy that one interviewee previously discussed (one 
designed to devalue the individual), remained in post-coup Romania. One of the impacts 
of this carryover pertained to accounting challenges, as Interviewee Auralia discusses: 
The problems are not in agreements, the problems are in daily activities, and how 
the accountant will treat you, and come with an invoice from the states or from 
France that you will say I don’t understand, and I’ll state it legally in Romania, 
things like that. These are the daily things, which have smothered the relations. So 
definitely, exposure today would be cooperation with the other entities saying 
universities are not only research entities.  
From an outside perspective, the concept of requesting an invoice translation appears to 
be practical, but as Interviewee 4 went on to explain that it was not legally necessary or 
even pragmatically necessary as many Romanians are well-versed in French; Instead, this 
act of requesting a translation is a political game to slow down processes and demonstrate 
authority. This type of bureaucracy and operational environment provides a backdrop for 
the ways in which universities still contend with the byproducts of Ottoman colonialism 
and challenges related to the transition itself.  
 Another new challenge following the granting of university autonomy in a free-
market economy pertains to funding. The percentage and proportion of students attending 
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higher education in Romania, according to Interviewee Petre, is lower than other 
countries in Europe: 
Our purpose is to get more students into universities, first of all, because we don’t 
have a lot of – compared to the population, let’s say, the percentage of people 
having access to higher education is very, very low. I don’t know the numbers by 
heart, but I can tell you that in 2006, I think, in Romania, in all public and private 
higher education institutions, we had around 600,000 people at a population of 20 
million, let’s say, which is very low as a number. If you compare it to any 
European Union – not to say the States, but if you compare it to any European 
Union member country, this is a very low number.  
With a relatively low number of students matriculating at higher education institutions, 
the next generation of leaders will therefore emerge from a smaller pool of talent.  
Compounding this issue is the idea of education finance for universities, as Interviewee 
Mihai explains, which is driven by user fees: 
Many students didn’t go to universities, and universities had to attract students in 
order to have finance because as you know from yesterday, they are financed 
upon the numbers of the students. And that number was in decline. And because 
of the exam, not many got into higher education, and this is why they…were 
forced to put aside the exams, and also, to attract students from the private 
universities into the state ones.  
The exam this interviewee mentions is the University Entrance Examination. The 
University Entrance Examination’s role has diminished in significance because it proved 
to be a barrier to entry for universities who sought to attract larger numbers of students. 
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In short, universities lowered their admission standards to increase the student body for 
the sole purpose of bringing in more revenue. The effects of watering down their degrees 
will be felt in the decades to come, and represent one area that must be addressed to 
ensure that the university system adequately educates students based on both having 
enough fiscal resources and being able to academically support students who may not be 
prepared for university. 
 
Period Three: Bologna  
Fortunately, the Bologna Accords in 1999 marked the beginning of a new era in 
higher education reform for EU member countries and especially for Romania. While 
Bologna is an exogenous force and one that homogenizes and assimilates—the 
manifestation of one-size-fits-all—it provided the framework that Romania needed to 
address its lack of leadership in helping universities reform. While universities have not 
become entirely autonomous, especially with regard to educational quality, this re-
examination of  higher education had  an impact beyond undergraduate students.  In fact, 
undergraduate study is only one challenge for the university, as Interviewee Petre 
explained: 
What’s even worse, I think, is that inside higher education, you have three levels. 
You have the bachelor’s degree, you have the master’s degree, and you have the 
Ph.D…starting from the second level, the master’s and the Ph.D., you have less 
and less people. And the worst situation we have is in master’s degrees because 
the number of people going for a master’s degree is very, very low. I’m not sure 
about the number, but I know it’s very, very low.  
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And one of the targets of the Bologna Process is to increase the number of people 
[to] have access and going to master’s degrees and Ph.D.s, to the second cycle, I 
would say. And this is because you want to train your workforce better. This is 
how it’s supposed to be done, to get more competencies, to get better education, 
as you’re saying, for example, to become more professional in a field you need to 
go to the master’s, and of course, the Ph.D., if you’re pursuing an academic 
career. The bachelor’s degree, even in Romania now, they’re not really 
considered enough for most jobs.  
By focusing on increasing the number of master’s and Ph.D. students, universities may 
need to address the challenge of admitting too many students who would otherwise not be 
qualified.  
To mitigate this challenge, universities may have to either provide a more 
individually-centric form of instruction to maximize individual learning or slightly 
decrease enrollment and focus on educating students to be prepared for graduate studies. 
Additional challenges, as Interviewee Petre continues, pertain to what the Romanian 
workforce demands: 
Depending on universities, of course, but in most fields, it’s not enough, and you 
need to, somehow, get a master’s degree. In terms of quality and of what the 
students learn to do and if they have better abilities or competencies or something 
like that, and if they learn more things, I think this is debatable. It depends on 
what point of view you are taking. And it depends from one higher education 
institution to another. And even inside the same higher education institution, you 
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have the facilities and they are different, in terms of quality of education. The idea 
of checking the quality of education in Romania is, again, new.  
The concept of quality control is new to Romania due to the shifting of values resulting 
from transitioning toward democracy. Instead of graduating a workforce for a planned 
economy, Romania’s higher education must now tackle issues related to broadening its 
mandate to prepare students to be global leaders and participate in a global economy.  
 After the Bologna Accords, and a full 16 years after the coup, Romania created 
new legislation, according to Interviewee Petre, which “passed in 2006, and only starting 
in 2007, we have a national agency who is monitoring, evaluating, assessing quality of 
higher education.” This national agency is supporting both quality control as well as the 
general approach toward implementing the Bologna Accords concept of ECTS, or 
European Credit and Transfer Accumulation System and the respective requirements, as 
explained by Interviewee Petre: 
For the Bologna Process, for example, we needed to implement the European 
Credit Transfer System, the ECTS. This had to be done through a law, which 
stated that in order for you to get your bachelor’s degree, for example, you need 
to get 240 ECTS. But because of university autonomy, they could not – the 
Ministry cannot put forward a law saying how this ECTS is awarded, how many 
credits do you award a course and on what ground. This is the problem of the 
university to establish. And also, the Ministry cannot force universities, for 
example, to accept ECTS from other universities.  
Based on this interviewee’s contribution, the challenges facing public education remain 
as byproducts of the transition, i.e., the two periods of reform whereby autonomy without 
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a roadmap and authority without power caused the higher education system to undergo 
significant changes with serious consequences until Bologna provided a start for a real 
framework. However, the effects of Bologna and the extent to which it is well-
implemented remains to be seen. 
 
Summary of Chapter Findings  
 Based on the findings in this chapter, there are several important factors to the 
question “What role did education play in Romania’s transition from a totalitarian regime 
toward democracy?” In short, the role of education in Romania during its transition was 
minimal because it was not a change agent in the transition toward democracy. 
Education’s role was undermined because it was not placed at the top of the national 
policy agenda as compared to the legal and economic reforms. The interviewees felt that 
there were too many reforms created and implemented without a consistent framework 
and with a short-term perspective because education lacked clear leadership and 
comprehensive strategy. In addition, the number, frequency and poor construction of  
reforms meant these reforms had little effect on the core of Romania’s communist 
education system. Particularly, these policies were often created for political victories and 
often only represented symbolic policy. Because education was not a national priority 
and its reform process lacked a cohesive strategy, the role was far smaller than it could 
have been.  
With some irony, reformation during the transition was not static, and yet in many 
ways, status quo was preserved. The focus on urban areas remains, and the valuing of 
public higher education and lack of attention paid to private higher education caused a 
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delay in advancing education quality countrywide. Thus, the system is reforming in a 
disjointed manner with many conflicts of interest and on an uncertain path—as if it is not 
one large system but instead, many independent parts transitioning at different paces. 
Fortunately, there are agents within the education system with the capacity for 
demonstrable change such as reforming the core of Romanian education, integrating 
democratic education and increasing the robustness of teacher education if coordination, 
vision and prioritization are aligned.   
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CHAPTER VI: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL REFLECTIONS 
 
Introduction 
The source of my interest in exploring the case of Romania and the role of 
education during its transition toward democracy was the desire to identify and examine 
those factors that influence the democratic transition. These factors are often relegated to 
the realm of domestic politics or international relations, as if there is not any overlap with 
the field of education. To explore these factors with Romania as a case study, I reviewed 
policies, laws and literature that pertained to Romania, Romanian education and the 
Romanian political transition, together with a historical perspective. The purpose of this 
research was to determine if there were unanswered questions that would warrant further 
original research. The short answer was yes: a gap in the literature existed, as explained 
in Chapter IV and Chapter V, regarding the minimal research that explored relationships 
between exogenous forces on transitional education reform as well as a distinctly poor 
representation of the Romanian perspective in the literature.  
The literature on education in Romania has largely focused on broad-scope 
education issues and the potential forces that shaped or impacted those education issues. 
While some studies have “drilled down” into specific areas of Romanian education, 
ranging from the education or treatment of the Roma, post-Soviet studies, or a focus on 
the coup d’état, only a handful have explored macro themes as exogenous forces 
impacting education. However, even the few studies that have explored macro themes 
have limited themselves to exploring challenges and successes within specific subject 
areas without focusing on education in Romania. Moreover, no study focused on 
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Because my case study explored the concept of transition rather than 
democratization or simply decentralization, I was able to better understand how a 
country’s population and government change during a specific period of time bounded by 
events (in this case, the coup in 1989 and entry into the EU on January 1, 2007). 
Democratization literature tended to focus on a framework of steps or qualities that a 
country must acquire or possess, respectively, to be democratizing. In the case of 
Romania, and in a tumultuous region such as Eastern Europe, I sought to explore how 
these countries have survivalist mentalities based on a legacy of colonialism, and how 
they transition to varying levels of autonomy or independence. Transition to democracy, 
therefore, became a series of necessary coping mechanisms for countries that wished to 
remain relevant and viable as autonomous nations. Education amidst transition in 
Romania, therefore, was a system less able to provide the stability and focused 
characteristics of nation-building. Moreover, while education in non-transitional 
countries do experience change and exhibit some degree of fluctuation, it is the extreme 
degrees of change that impacts education in a transitional democracy, like a compass 
whose needle cannot settle on a bearing.  
To further explore the linkages between transition and education, I researched 
relevant topics and came across three emerging forces: colonialism, globalization and 
isomorphism. These three forces, whether as independent or as collective actors, were 
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tremendously important in shaping the current path of Romania’s transition. As I will 
discuss in subsequent sections, the concepts I utilized in Chapter II help explain these 
forces and provide various perspectives on how they can, or do, impact a country—
especially a country in a vulnerable position such as transition. What is original as it 
relates to these concepts is that they have never been explored in conjunction with one 
another, and never in association with one another as a group of three, as interrelated 
factors that must be researched together when evaluating the role and context of 
education during a political and cultural transition. This combination of all three concepts 
as a foundation or backdrop to exploring transitional countries is one gap I sought to fill 
with this research. 
Following on from this assumption, a second gap emerged: the perspective of the 
Romanians who held or now hold key positions that affected education during the 
transition (and possibly before, too) is generally missing from the literature. Therefore, I 
focused the foundation of my literature review on the need to better understand: 1) what 
transpired in education during the transition and; 2) what impacted this course of events 
to manifest in the manner in which they did. Moreover, the literature necessitated that I 
understand how past political and educational decisions affect the present, or in this case, 
the period between 1990 and 2007, even though the transition in Romania is ongoing. 
With such a seemingly broad mandate, my first assumption was that I should narrow this 
broad scope it to a finite point such as an age group or subject, e.g., early childhood 
education or, citizenship education.  However, this would perpetuate the study of narrow, 
subject-specific aspects of transitional education, rather than resolving the dearth of high-
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level, macro perspectives for the purpose of understanding education’s role and context 
in a transition. 
The literature provided a strong foundation for my original research interviews, as 
the initial research questions were effective and relevant because they focused on subject 
matter chosen to be familiar enough that interviewees could delve deeply into subjects 
and provide concrete examples. Moreover, interviewees’ perspectives and voices, two 
syntactically different concepts, could be acknowledged alongside those of international 
scholars who have written or discussed Romania’s case. Moreover, a deeper and specific 
discussion could take place, whereby theory and practice could merge into concrete 
understanding and tangible evidence. With a carefully crafted strategy coupled with 
refined and artfully selected interview questions, the interviews transpired in such a way 
that I was able to gather 160 pages of transcribed interview text, from which I developed 
the findings in Chapter IV and Chapter V. From those findings, it is possible to infer and 
comment upon possible conclusions and solutions to transition challenges that could have 
been avoided or mitigated to some degree.  
My investigation not only filled gaps in the literature related to the scope and 
content of previous studies; it was also unique in that this case study did not focus on the 
negative—what went wrong, what could have transpired differently, or who was in the 
wrong role. Instead, the goal was to have a deep understanding of Romania, its education 
system during the transition, and the impact by and on people and culture. By focusing on 
acquiring information and not judging, I was able to ask questions that could elicit 
information that helped to characterize and provide a foundation upon which future 
studies can be constructed to apply a lens for specific subject or thematic analysis. 
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 As a citizen of a strong democracy situated within a relatively young civilization 
and culture that enjoys a rich economy and established infrastructure, I was able to 
provide a unique view of a country like Romania, which was in many ways the inverse: 
Romania is an older civilization and is much further along in its cultural development 
than the United States, but has a weaker democracy, struggling economy and dilapidated 
infrastructure. This viewpoint is essential to my qualitative research because of its unique 
perspective. In addition, my perspective incorporates cognizance of being ethnically part 
Romanian and being married to a Romanian-American. Therefore, I brought to bear both 
experience living in a strong democracy and a cultural understanding of Romania.  
 In addition to my nationality and personal history with Romania, several other 
factors enhanced my credibility as a researcher on this particular topic. One such factor 
was the pool of interviewees, who comprise a group knowledgeable about education in 
their country. I also brought credibility and trust through the institutional association with 
the University of Maryland. This background, coupled with my ethnic background, 
enabled me to quickly establish a level of trust necessary to conduct interesting and 
informative interviews. Coupled with the literature review, my research provides a next 
step in understanding the role of education in transition.  
 After aligning the literature review with my original interviews of Romanian 
bureaucrats, three emerging phenomena—colonialism, globalization and isomorphism—
emerged as forces to be evaluated and considered when exploring the role of education in 
transitional Romania. To help explain these phenomena, I evaluated the theoretical 
underpinnings that provide further context and a deeper sense of how these forces may 
impact decision-making, policy creation, or perspective. While I cannot comment on the 
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extent to which these concepts can explain both the conscious and subconscious mind, I 
found significant evidence that these forces were powerful influences on Romania’s 
transition. The literature review and subsequent findings in Chapter IV and Chapter V 
speak to the need to consider these exogenous forces when evaluating transitional 
countries and, specifically, education reform within a transitional country. While the 
findings in the literature review focused on mostly non-Romanian sources due to what 
exists in the literature being mostly non-Romanian, and the findings in Chapter IV and 
Chapter V focused on the practical impact of these exogenous forces, among other things, 
this portion of Chapter VI will focus on the theoretical aspects of the findings. The 
theoretical perspective achieves both a contextualizing of phenomena as well as a way of 
attempting to explain reasons for their existence, and ways in which their negative 
attributes may be mitigated. In short, the theoretical perspective allows for problem-
solving in a manner less bounded than with the practical perspective. Together, these two 
approaches provide a powerful combination for policy and phenomena review. 
Through my research, and after much reflection, I have come to understand the 
relationship of power and identity between colonizers and the formerly colonized 
countries like Romania not as “the powerless against the powerful,” or “the weak against 
the strong.” Rather, the most accurate way of explaining the identity of Romania and 
relationship toward more powerful countries is through the analogy I cultivated about the 
octopus. While this analogy may seem inelegant, its accuracy justifies the comparison. 
Romania is dependent upon more powerful countries for a “frame of reference,” as one 
Interviewee mentioned, and is therefore like the arm of an octopus. Each arm of an 
octopus has its own central nervous system that controls movements. But, when 
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summoned by the central brain to swim, for instance, that individual nervous system is 
over-ridden so that all eight arms can be coordinate in this effort. Therefore, if Romania 
is an octopus arm, with the other 7 arms representing various other Eastern European 
countries that were colonized, the EU could be said to be the central brain that has overall 
control. So, too, could organizations like the World Bank, United Nations, and even 
countries like the United States, UK, France, China and Japan take turns as the central 
brain, summoning the various arms, or former colonies, toward a particular end such as 
with the U.S. and its missile defense system. Citizens of Romania will never say they 
were once a colony due to indoctrination—not that this recognition is a requisite for this 
reality—even though they were controlled by the Romans, Ottomans, Hapsburgs, 
Russians and now the EU. Though they have always followed the lead and preconceived 
plan of more powerful countries or entities, they have not ceded 100% sovereignty to 
another nation since the Roman Empire. Therefore, vassal or suzerainty does not apply as 
cleanly in the first world—third world comparison. Instead, the analogy of the octopus 
applies—Romania can control its own free will as with the arm of the octopus, but that 
autonomy can be over-ridden by greater powers, almost caught between freedom and 
servitude. Whereas first, second, and third world derive from the misinterpretation of a 
French poem that considered formerly colonized or exploited countries as “tier monde,” a 
new concept must be considered to explain those countries and super-national 
organizations with the power and authority to control the fates of many countries, and to 
reflect what used to be called suzerainties, or vassal states, or even colonies, depending 
on the power relationship. Thus, countries like Romania can be considered brachio [arm] 
patrida [country], or, patridabrachs and the US and other powerful countries are 
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patridaarchs, archigos patrida—head countries rather than arm countries. While every 
country is connected, it is the arm that is forced to do the will of the head, whereas the 
head does not do the will of the arm: brach-countries vs. arch-countries represent the 
relationship of one-way power. 
 
Theoretical Reflections Summary 
 While the focus of my interviews was heavily directed to the practical aspects of 
exogenous forces, there are a few key reflections upon the theoretical that must be 
highlighted. One: there are concepts such as isomorphism, historically applied to 
institutional change within solely a domestic paradigm, that can be borrowed and applied 
to understand international forces that precipitate and dictate domestic change, as with 
the case of the EU and Romania. Also, the concepts discussed in this study, and in 
particular colonialism and globalization, tend to describe global phenomena. While 
important for understanding a country’s role within that larger context, it is equally 
important to understand the forces’ role within the country. In addition, concepts are a 
powerful and necessary component of exploring challenges and successes in the field of 
education, but must always be conducted or applied to examples on the ground, as I have 
done with this study. This last point is critical, because if theory exists to help explain 
phenomena, a deeper, individualized understanding is critical when informing leaders or 
policy-makers on course-corrections or long-term strategic planning for a specific entity. 
For example, even the context of Eastern Europe was too large of a geographic area to 
study, which is why the microcosm of Romania was more suitable for a macro-level 




Insufficient Change: The Unaltered Core of Romanian Education 
 While the theoretical reflections are critical to better understanding or explaining 
the phenomena of colonialism, globalization or isomorphism, the findings from my on-
the-ground original research were more directed toward the examination of practical 
experiences. The main reason for this is that the Romanian bureaucrats were not expected 
to reflect upon their experiences in terms of the theoretical; instead they were asked to 
detail their personal impressions of what was significant, and why, in Romanian 
education before, during and after the transition toward democracy. Fortunately, there 
was enough shared ground among the responses to draw a few conclusions, which I will 
further clarify in Chapter VII. In this section, I will review my personal reflections on my 
research, taking into account the practical nature of my original research, followed by 
possible directions for education in transitional democracies in Chapter VII.  
In reflecting upon the status of Romania’s transition and whether its education 
system has changed and, if so, to what extent, I have discovered that yes, it has changed; 
however, while it has changed, many attributes of the core remain the same. Interviewee 
Petre explained this point regarding change: 
I don’t think that the system in its core has fundamentally changed. I think that 
there are some improvements that have been made. For example, you have 
alternative textbooks, so there is no longer only one textbook. You have some part 
of the curriculum, which can be decided upon by the school. But the school does 
not have the means to implement what it decides [in every case because]...I have 
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to go the Ministry and write a formal request that I need this person to come and 
get some money for the person and so on.  
You can say that parts of it are getting better. If you look at numbers, it all 
depends [upon] what better means. In terms of, for example, performance, you 
have these international tests, the TIMSS and the PISA. These are international 
tests designed to measure the abilities of students in different fields, like exact 
sciences or linguistics and so on. And you could say that the system is going 
down because our results over time are going down, in terms of performance of 
students. But in other terms, you could say that things are looking up because you 
have more computers going into schools, for example, you have [some] students 
in rural areas that now have access to computers and the Internet, somehow, and 
they’re quality of life is better.  
So as a whole, you cannot say. You cannot say if it’s better, if it’s worse, if it’s 
going up or down. 
This interviewee’s comment reflected an overall sense of Romanian education in that the 
complexity is too challenging to encapsulate in a simple status report. Based on the 
literature review and original research, the core of Romanian education retains many core 
attributes: its pedagogical tendencies continue to be banking- and theory-oriented, its 
curriculum continues to be focused on theory, its student learning de-emphasizes 
teamwork and critical thinking, and its administration remains bureaucratic to the point of 
stasis.  Certainly the violent and fearful elements of totalitarianism have been removed in 
post-coup Romania, but Romanian education still remains relatively unchanged.  
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 As previously discussed, too many reforms were passed and too little focus was 
put on the very important task of implementation. As Interviewee Mihai explained, there 
were 
too many changes, not very well-prepared changes. Too fast, also, 
implementation, and also, during these years, in the field of education, we didn’t 
build some mechanism for debating and for discussing very rational – you know a 
lot of people in the Ministry of Education can say, “I decide to change this thing.” 
So – and nobody knows… 
These changes were orchestrated by an administration that maintained a veil of secrecy 
without including the public, which led to disenfranchised parents and confused teachers, 
coupled with an entire generation of students who may have received a very incoherent 
education of questionable quality. One of the byproducts of these reforms and the 
uncertainty of the transition goals (that is, to what end were the policies created) is a 
student body characterized by interviewees as lacking character and motivation. As 
Interviewee Raul explained, motivation existed during totalitarianism: 
This is one positive aspect that we had previously [during totalitarianism] because 
the student population was much more selective in terms of academic 
performance but also in terms of motivation. 
Interviewer: So would you say there used to be more of a meritocracy than there 
is today? 
Interviewee: Previously, yes. The entry exams were much tougher than they are 
now, and because of that, people are much more selective. I will give you an 
example. When I entered, there were 70 [positions] for faculty, today, there are 
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700 [faculty positions]. So ten times more at the same faculty and only in this 
institution, and in one faculty, we have ten faculties. So it multiplied like that 
everywhere. This is a good scene because more people will have higher 
education, but in terms of performance, sometimes you cannot if he doesn’t have 
the brains or enough brains or if he doesn’t have enough motivation, then it’s 
difficult...  
The lack of student motivation is a serious challenge for Romania. In a free-market 
economy and democracy, individual motivation is a critical component of enjoying 
freedom by applying skill and character to find and enjoy a vocation, if possible, after 
excelling in school or mastering a trade. Without the motivation created by the rigorous 
selection methods and limited alternatives of totalitarianism, students may not perform 
well in school. While mentioned sporadically in the interview findings as well as with 
this Interviewee’s comment, character education is equally important in this case, 
because without the moral framework that the state used to provide, there is no 
scaffolding upon which current students can structure their lives, and it seems that 
students and the community at large are waiting for some authority figure to motivate and 
manage each respective challenge.  
 One example of a reason that character, motivation, and democratic education in 
general are not valued in Romania supports this concept of a lack of a framework within 
which students and the citizens at large can operate within. In particular, a framework can 
provide a clearer path within which the student and citizen can operate within, thereby 
allow for the understanding that their efforts may yield positive results as opposed to 
operating within a confused realm, whereby efforts may not gain traction, thereby 
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diminishing one’s motivation.  As it relates to education, Interviewee Raluca discusses 
how a test can provide a framework, and that if a particular attribute or characteristic is 
valued but is not featured within a test, a student will not value it: 
I think that another aspect that should be considered when referring to education 
role is what kind of skills we evaluate as continuing evaluation, continuing 
assessment, and as well as formative assessment because if, for example, when 
speaking about the Baccalaureate – at the end of high school in Romania, you 
have to pass an exam in order to certify that you did it, from the academic 
perspective.  But if you are certifying Romania language, foreign language, math, 
history, or I don’t know what, to which extent, then, what you said you have as a 
goal of education, citizenship, could be really measured?   
Why, then, during the studies, you expect someone to be busy with all these 
aspects if final assessment goes for other kind of skills?  And I think that this final 
assessment is not encouraging at all behaviors, attitudes, supporting democracy, 
not necessarily at this age, at 18, but never before.  
This interviewee’s comments further supported the idea that education in Romania has 
not changed in its core because it is still test-driven, and that test has not been modified to 
support or acknowledge the importance of a democratic education. More to the point, the 
interviewee’s comments indicated that behaviors and attitudes were a critical component 
because, while it may be true that many Romanians could explain how a democracy 
works in theory, their attitude is still similar to a proletariat and not a democratic citizen, 
with resulting behaviors that exhibit a sense of apathy and powerlessness. Because the 
student and the citizen are waiting for a test or other representation of authority to 
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provide a framework for what to value and how to act, the student and the citizen are 
passive—not actively seeking to participate within, and change, their reality. Fault in this 
case is not on that of the student as much as it is on those who create exams and, more 
broadly, the democratic realm within which the citizenry operate—the elite. 
 
Redirecting the Momentum of History: Romania’s Obstacles 
 Prior to this study, most of the scholarly literature focused on those issues that 
were quintessentially domestic in Romania, and none connected all three exogenous 
forces as major factors in Romania’s transition. This research was limited because it did 
not focus on the ongoing external factors, or why the domestic challenges continue.36 For 
example, Romania’s trajectory of democratic growth did not progress as quickly as that 
of the Czech Republic or Latvia. The explanation for this reality is uncomplicated:  
Romania did not have an alternative elite who were both competent in democratic 
leadership and free of the influence of the totalitarian regime, as evidenced by the fact 
that those who attained leadership positions within government after the coup were in 
government before the coup. This finding or realization was not the most profound, 
however, it is a fact that the Romanian citizenry and government continued in an almost 
“business-as-usual” fashion when it unhitched itself from Russian and latched onto the 
EU. This “wagon” metaphor speaks to the fact that Romania has historically been a 
nation that trails behind others, allowing more powerful countries to drive its fate. This 
observation could have been a useful one for the EU, which could have allied itself with 
other partner countries or partner institutions such as the World Bank and supported an 
                                                            
36 Some of the challenges discussed in this study continue today, but are largely discussed 
within the boundaries of the case study, not simply as ongoing phenomena. 
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empowered Romania, with an active and informed citizenry. Instead, efforts were made 
toward short-term goals, such as establishing baselines for engaging in business, banking 
and the refinement of the judiciary and media. These efforts were, of course, essential to 
the stability of Romania to ensure that it did not backslide into an authoritarian regime, 
but not, perhaps, sufficient to create the foundation of an independent democracy.  
Transitional democracies are package deals, with many advantages and challenges 
that cannot be extricated from each other and which all need to be addressed in a timely 
manner. Those supporting the development of these democracies must think in terms 
more broad than “law” and “economics”; Romania initially failed to do this and, 
consequently, did not meet EU requirements in 2005 and barely achieved membership in 
2007. Moreover, citizens in these developing democracies must be educated as to their 
rights and responsibilities.  Again, Romania provides a cautionary case: based on my 
interviews and inferences, the Romanian citizenry do not seem empowered or overly 
participatory and the education system has not been established to train the next 
generation of Romanian citizens and leaders. In short, the EU has become Romania’s 
“frame of reference,” thereby filling the traditional role long occupied by former 
colonizers; meanwhile, the Romanian elite and citizenry have fallen into their typical 
roles: authoritarian and apathetic, respectively.  
 Who is to blame? Perhaps this is not the most relevant question. The largest 
challenge, with so many factors in play, is the coordination of efforts to maximize the 
benefits for a particular transitional country. Because of the one-size-fits-all approach of 
the World Bank and EU, combined with the generic approach the U.S. government has 
taken with regard to democratization, historic precedent and culture are often overlooked 
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in the rush to the democratic end. Instead, focus is placed on the variables or components 
that must be put in place instead of the context into which these components will be 
placed. With a more coordinated approach or more culturally or historically focused 
impact, the factor of coordination would be mitigated. To date, and based on the 
literature, a successful orchestration of this type has not yet occurred. 
 Once the formation of the Romanian constitution and the passage of the 
Education Law of 1995 established  a desire to implement an education fit for 
democracy, there should have been a change in focus from the short-term to the long-
term—or at least a better balance between the two. Instead, the political infighting and 
constantly changing foci left policy change and democratic growth at the mercy of 
sporadic and undirected development. Consequently, Romanians were poorly prepared 
for the critical and analytical tasks required of democratic citizens, who must weigh the 
claims of their representatives and decide their nation’s course. Therefore, at the critical 
juncture five years into Romania’s transition, a long-term approach could have mitigated 
the challenges that Romania faces today and the country could have been on a trajectory 
to free itself from a history spent in some other country’s or institution’s shadow. Instead, 
Romania lost this opportunity, a loss which also proved costly for external institutions 
and countries that supported its transition.  Failed reforms in Romania required human 
and fiscal resources that, had the initial reforms been successful, could have been directed 
toward other countries. Moreover, Romania could have developed a more robust 
economy, which also would have positively impacted the EU. Practically, better 
knowledge of its history could have informed those both inside and outside Romania to 
plan a transition that would use the institution of education as a means to help Romania 
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extract itself from the powerful momentum of history. Had education been a central 
component of Romania’s transition, one may presume that a new batch of leaders would 
be on the rise, entrepreneurship would be a growth opportunity with an influx of new 
thinking and the future of the country would seem much brighter. 
 While seemingly pessimistic, this conclusion indicates that there is still a chance 
for Romania to redeem itself. As the Romanian bureaucrats stated, reform often means 
elder generations make way for younger citizens who have a desire and capability to 
usher in demonstrable change. Romania’s hope lies with this younger generation, so long 
as it does not lose itself as it waits—turning into vinegar instead of a fine wine. Without 
any additional resources, this potential could be harnessed by revamping the teacher 
training, refocusing the curriculum, and emphasizing quality instead of hortatory policies 
that enhance the reputation of the Ministry of Education. Simple applications of true 
distance-education technologies could provide a baseline of knowledge dispersion onto 
which “in person” training could fill in the cracks. Distance education would require new 
technology infrastructure, training on how to implement and utilize and, most 
importantly, a shift in attitude to embrace its usefulness as a supplemental education 
mechanism. However, the aversion to distance education in its Western parlance is a 
limiting factor for a country with insufficient resources and a large geographic area to 
cover—let alone a poor infrastructure to efficiently travel.  
  Romania is like a rock that is being pushed uphill. If a few extra steps could be 
taken, the summit for this country is certainly within reach, followed by the relative joy 
of the rapid momentum of descent. These extra few steps must come from the people, as 
the government in any democracy cannot simply impose its will on the citizens; rather it 
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is up to the government to help create a space within which the citizenry can lead the 
country to a better place. As long Romania continues to harbor an apathetic citizenry that 
waits for the government to “do all” as it always has, it will remain the same. But, if 
education is focused upon as a tool for transitional democratic development, it can 
transform Romania into a strong democracy with the related benefits of increased 
autonomy and economic prosperity. To better explain the way in which this is possible 
for a transitional country like Romania, the following are a few solutions. 
 
Theoretical and Practical Reflections Summary 
 Romania and other countries in Eastern Europe are in a position of self 
empowerment if they can harness the power of education to forge new education leaders 
as well as more engaged and capable citizens. While some Eastern European countries 
have taken advantage of this opportunity, or have at least been able to advance from a 
stronger foundation than Romania’s, there is still ample and necessary opportunity for 
improvement. In particular, reform must be approached with a long-term view both in the 
pace and expectation for policy creation and implementation. Too much change—if 
poorly coordinated and inconsistently implemented—is not good, even if the end goal is 
benevolent (in this case, the establishment of a successful democracy and strong 
education system). The challenge is to find a balance between immediate needs and 
future needs. The solution is to trust those researchers, policy-makers and other talented 
Romanians to build a domestic capacity to best utilize international resources from the 
World Bank, EU or U.S. in a way that is integrated into a broader strategy, and properly 
coordinated. Through better internal dialogue and trust, a stronger democracy may be 
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formed and a new chapter can be written for this country and others in Eastern Europe 
who follow suit. If these steps are not taken, the legacy of colonialism will continue and 
historic power structures will remain in place. Fortunately, there are many opportunities 
for Romania that will be discussed in the concluding chapter.  
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 CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION AND TOPICS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
 
The Study’s Original Contribution 
  The following description of my study reexamines my perspective, approach and 
execution of a bounded case study that focused on post-coup Romania and its education 
system amidst transition from totalitarianism toward democracy between 1989 and 2007. 
Although no single methodology is flawless, accessing the human element behind 
decision-making particularly necessitates an investigation into why decisions were made 
without applying judgment or negative criticism. A purely quantitative analysis would 
explore only the what of the events that unfolded as opposed to a qualitative analysis, 
which discusses the why of events. Of all the qualitative methods available for my study 
of Romanian education, the most effective and appropriate method would allow me to 
explore a bounded period of time without overly constraining the perspectives of the elite 
or the documents they created and employed: a case study. Therefore, I studied 
transitional Romania with key consideration about the elite and their roles. To support 
this analysis, however, I used relevant quantitative studies to supplement my qualitative 
analysis, as they provided necessary assessments of various sub-questions such as 
democratic competency within the IEA study. Although I focused on the time period after 
the Romanian coup d’état of 1989, I did not limit relevant information that may pre-date 




Characteristics of the Study 
Among other qualitative methodologists, I have drawn case study structures from 
Robert Yin (2003), Sharan Merriam (1998) and Robert Stake (1995). By combining 
document (policy) assessment; qualitative and quantitative literature; and original 
research via interviews with Romanian educators, I explored how Romania has made 
strides as a country amidst a challenging transition towards democracy, with special 
attention focused on its context for change amidst many exogenous and domestic forces.  
Although reform continues to occur today, January 1, 2007 is a fitting end to the 
case because Romania completed accession into the EU, a literal and symbolic 
unification of Romania to the whole of democratic Europe. The context for democratic 
transition in Eastern Europe will incorporate exogenous forces that each country faced 
and still faces: neo- and traditional colonialism, globalization and isomorphism. Finally, 
this research provided suggestions for Romanian elite to work within these contexts by 
challenging short-term thinking and incorporating alternatives such as long-term 
ecological perspectives. Furthermore, in this chapter I will discuss the incorporation of 
democratic values that may mitigate negative aspects of globalized consumerism in 
Romania. The potential result of these alternatives could include the empowerment of the 
Romanian elite as partners and contributors in both domestic and global decision-making, 






The data I collected are a combination of a deep and broad literature review and 
document analysis with the support of interviews with bureaucrats who held or now hold 
positions of influence in Romania’s education system. I collected significant quantities of 
many documents, articles and books to provide a context for my interviews, which were 
conducted in person. The combination of both documentary analysis and original 
interviews yielded a study that is comprehensive. The challenge was in allowing for the 
interview data to exist without being overly constrained by the document analysis; this 
was achieved by keeping as many of the interview quotations intact with little 
paraphrasing that might have diminished the role of the interviews and, by extension, the 
voice of the Romanians. The overarching contribution of this study was to fill the gap in 
the literature relating to the context for education reform with a significant focus on the 
voice of the Romanian bureaucrat.  By triangulating this original research with my 
literature review, I was able to explore a very complex transition from totalitarianism 
toward democracy. Through this case study, I have uncovered or created various possible 
directions for transitional countries as well as countries seeking to improve their 
democratic system. Specifically, I have cultivated ways in which education can play a 
stronger role in both democratic transition as well as continued sustainability via the 
incorporation of a new dimension in democratic analysis, long-term thinking, a 
refocusing of indicators of successful transition and ecological principles which support 





Possible Direction 1: Transition as 3-dimensional Reform  
One of the most significant ways in which my study is an original contribution to 
the field of education research is in its exploration of the case of a country in transition 
and of the three-dimensional nature of that transition. While concepts such as the “J 
curve” are helpful in a two-dimensional sense, I have discovered that transition has three 
dimensions, which take into account the axis of historical and cultural context. While I 
do not believe transition or democratization can easily fit into a chart or graph, some level 
of quantification helps in the explanation and understanding of an otherwise complicated 
and convoluted phenomenon. “Reform over time” is the traditional or common approach 
to understanding this concept, and in this case, a country in transition: was the transition 
fast or slow?; did the transition experience peaks and troughs and missed opportunities?; 
were reforms implemented?; and what could have changed in terms of the timing of 
reforms to improve the net result? This two-dimensional and often bimodal approach 
omits the legacy of history and culture, which could be identified by what I consider the 
z-Axis. Moreover, there is no climax in democratic development; therefore, the value of 
Y on Bremmer’s J curve should not be finite. However, it is understood that the 
functional stability of a strong democracy can be reached, where the curve is no longer as 
steep and therefore represents stability while continuing to address the z-Axis issues of 
equality and equity via exploring the implications of history and culture. Therefore, 
because all democratic countries are on an arc of transition that is three-dimensional, 
additional factors must routinely be examined. Otherwise, two-dimensional solutions will 
undermine challenges in a three-dimensional reality, such as with the Romanian case. 
This case acknowledges the fact that Romania  lacked an alternative elite and was devoid 
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of a grass-roots desire for democracy but rather freedom. The z-Axis, however, brings 
about the third dimension, the personalization or humanization of a transition, and one of 
the most challenging aspects of transition to quantify, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Through my qualitative study, I explored the power of history and how the past 
impacts the present. By applying this concept, the case of Romania can be better 
understood, which of course provides information for its continued transition as well as 
the transition of future or other nascent democracies. For illustrative purposes, in the 
figure below, I have re-presented the J curve, per Bremmer’s theory of democratic 
transition. 
 





When factoring in my concept of the z-Axis of history and cultural context, transition is 
acknowledged as being three-dimensional. Therefore, the above two-dimensional J curve 
of Authority (y-Axis) and Openness (x-Axis) may really appear less clean-cut or clear 
when introducing the historical and cultural context (z-Axis). 
As this case study has made clear, transition is not clear-cut or two-dimensional; 
many factors other than politics and economics must be considered through the lens of 
history and context, which allow for the consideration of the humanitarian costs of 
transition, equality and equity. With the force of cultural context, at the center of which is 
a country’s history, the J curve suddenly appears more complicated and disjointed—but 
therefore far more accurate to reality. While I believe the J curve remains a strong tool 
for explaining or exploring trends in a democracy’s transition, it does not allow for the 
factor of history and does not represent the whole reality. This z-Axis, a topic for future 
study, could help provide an additional layer of analysis which would prove to inform 
better all parties involved and better utilize resources, both people and fiscal, to yield 
stronger results during a transition.  
 During a transition, education is the institution best-suited to mitigate the negative 
effects of those elements which skew the x-Axis. As the only institution charged with the 
duty of cultivating the next generation of leaders and citizens, this is the best institution to 
resolve historical legacies—both positive and negative—and prepare both the country 
and the individual for an improved future. Education can also help a country “evolve” out 
of historical precedent and escape the gravitational pull of status quo. By first 
acknowledging this factor and then exploring the original concept of the z-Axis, my 
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study’s original contribution is clear: education must be a central component to the 
creation and maintenance of democracies and free market economies. 
 
Possible Direction 2: Policy-making amidst transition 
An additional solution to consider is the application of what I call “Open Curtain” 
Policy. “Open Curtain” Policy denotes a process by which policy creation and 
implementation is charted in confluence with exogenous efforts, both domestic and 
international, to uncover patterns, both intended and unintended. In effect, the curtain that 
segments various systems is pulled to expose concurrent efforts in other sectors, as 
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Romanian citizens truly wanted democracy, when in reality it is plausible that Romanians 
wanted life free from tyranny, and simply chose democracy as the best or most familiar 
alternative. With a better understanding of intentions, the groundwork for policy must 
then be explored to determine the best approach, speed and duration for policy reform 
because democratization is a long-term process that should have ten-, 20- and 50-year 
timelines. Otherwise, the risk for misapplication or failure of policy and law remains 
high, and quite costly—financially to donor organizations and in terms of quality of life 
for citizens in a country like Romania. In short, solutions may become clearer if looked at 
over the long-term, as suggested in the next section. 
 
Possible Direction 3: Refining Indicators of a Strong Democracy 
One way to create a long-term approach is to consider the many factors that 
influence a citizen’s quality of life in a democracy. Quite often, economic factors can 
undermine an otherwise strong democracy. Moreover, these economic factors can slow or 
freeze a democracy’s progress toward equal representation for all citizens. However, 
there are additional factors to consider. One way of shifting expectations to consider a 
long-term perspective on democratization is to incorporate other indicators of quality, 
such as citizen happiness and quality of life, the latter of which would strongly consider 
ecological principles. One way to quantify these otherwise abstract concepts is through 
the use of political and cultural journalist Judith Levine’s concept of country indicators 
(2006). Instead of measuring the economic success of a country only in dollars, Levine 
raised the notion that other quality of life indices are needed. For example, wealth alone 
does not guarantee happiness (McMahon, 2006). Therefore, to measure the success of a 
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country’s transition, Levine suggested that a change in perspective is needed. Her 
suggested solution exists    
[t]o gauge how an economy is doing on the human-happiness scale. Redefining 
progress…has developed an alternative to the gross domestic product, called the 
Genuine Progress Indicator [GPI]. Instead of adding up all the dollars spent in the 
economy…the GPI looks at what the dollars are spent on, by whom, and how 
much they enhance or worsen people’s lives; it also assigns values to 
nonmonetary benefits and costs (Levine, 2006, p. 258). 
The Genuine Progress Indicator can measure a country’s progress and, as an indicator, 
reflect how a change in perspective can help alter the course of democratization, for 
example. The GPI is also an example of how a country like Romania can gauge its 
progress in changing to incorporate a new form of government, new economic system 
and new values within its education. Educating citizens about changing the indicators 
used to examine their lives, just like evaluating how the tools of a society are used to 
gauge modernity, can make an individual the focal point of action and will thus lessen his 
or her dependency on governments, especially fragile, transitional governments. In turn, 
GPI maybe the impetus to provide motivation and shift citizen expectations from “tell me 
what to do” to “here is what I am going to do” by acknowledging the paradigm and 
relationship between civic responsibilities government responsibilities—a concept new to 
Romania. 
The GPI, in other words, is a chart upon which a person’s actions can be plotted 
in such a way that the individual can gauge whether or not action is positive or negative. 
For example, as Levine explained,  
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in the GPI asset column, one enters the value of unremunerated time spent on 
housework, child care, and volunteering. Deficits include “defensive 
expenditures” such as hospital bills for car accidents, prison costs, and the 
“depreciation” of old-growth forests. As you can imagine, America’s GPI does 
not look as rosy as its ever-expanding GDP (2006, p. 258). 
If a serious dialogue ensued focused on GPI, individual change could be put in the 
forefront of the discussion about national change. However, national action is a 
combination of government and individual civic action. Therefore, individual action must 
become a priority because national policy alone does not suffice in a democracy. Lastly, 
negative effects of globalization must be challenged in the United States as well as in 
Western European countries that, in turn, influence and guide the transition of countries 
in Eastern Europe.  
In conclusion, countries must define the ways in which history and culture 
manifest themselves in a new democracy, and with various global forces at play. As 
Levine wrote “[i]n the end, it’s a matter of how you, or you collectively as a nation, 
define prosperity and poverty, abundance and scarcity—a question of what ‘you,’ the 
nation, the culture, desire” (2006, p. 259). As previously mentioned, education as a 
system is one of the best, if not the only, ways to instill and therefore alter a country’s 
values during a reform process. Perhaps by addressing the way in which Romania must 
empower the citizenry to better understand and therefore shoulder individual 






Possible Direction 4: Revisiting Democracy Exportation 
Complicit with the spread of globalization is the spread of democratization, which 
creates great opportunity for countries in transition if key factors are achieved. For 
example, the model of democracy education must be reexamined. Since education is the 
instrument that can support democracy development, it is crucial for democratic 
education to be expanded. Democracy expert Diamond (1997) observed that “[i]f 
democracy is to be deepened, reformed, and consolidated […] three broad challenges 
confront the mission of civic education,”: generating “demand from below”; developing 
citizens’ abilities to “make democracy work;” and cultivating the “values, norms and 
practices that make democracy governable” (p. 1). By considering the untapped potential 
in employing democracy as a form of government, it may be possible to empower 
individual countries instead of spreading a homogenous template. In addition, Diamond 
proposed that citizenship education must be expanded to incorporate the principles of 
“peace—and thus security; political and social justice; respect for the physical 
environment, and human dignity for all people, no matter their color, culture, or faith” 
(1997 p. 2). These values do not threaten any national constitution or other national 
interests; rather, a revised democratic education may increase the power of education to 
incorporate global principles and linkages as a solution to the negative effects of 





Possible Direction 5: Democratic ecology 
Within the current force of globalization, opportunities for change exist on a large 
scale, especially for countries transitioning toward democracy, by considering long-term 
ramifications of development through consideration of ecological principles. Romania 
does still have time to redress some of the errors it has made during the last 20 years and 
avoid or prepare for certain future challenges. Democratic theory only incorporates 
anthropocentric thinking, derived in part from the meaning of the word democracy: “of 
the people.” Because they are historically human-oriented, current democracies do not 
incorporate ecological thinking. In due course, democratic theory can be advanced to 
accommodate ecological thinking and incorporate broader considerations such as the 
actual physical environment within which a democracy is placed—its ecological 
environment—and how jeopardizing this environment can destabilize a democracy.  
By merging democratic theory with the principles of ecology, it is possible for 
nation-states to empower themselves within the context of globalization by tapping into 
the plethora of solutions that exist worldwide. If a country desires to educate citizens 
about their local environment while preparing students for a global economy, one viable 
solution would be for democratic theory to incorporate ecological perspectives. Thinking 
ecologically, for example, is thinking about the long-term effects of an individual or 
group of individuals.37 Ecological thinking can help shift the perspective of democracy to 
                                                            
37 For example, BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill represents short-term thinking about 
revenue generation over the potential risk of an unstoppable leak. This spill signifies a 
mindset of cost-benefit only terms of money, but not in terms of the physical destruction 
of the Gulf Cost habitat for humans and animals, and moreover, the significant resources 




incorporate this mindset, which considers future generations of individual countries and, 
collectively, the world. Although this solution is not a concrete theory, the following 
suggestions can supplement the concepts I have put forward such as the z-Axis, “Open 
Curtain” Policy, increasing education’s role in a transition, and shifting indicators of 
successful democratization as previously outlined. 
The process of merging democratization and ecological thinking and its resulting 
actions may mitigate the negative effects of globalization and consumerism. Which 
principles of ecology are in consideration? Although an exhaustive list of all ecological 
principles does not exist, the Ecological Society of America (ESA) published a report in 
2000 that lists the following as core ecological principles: 
(1) examine impacts of local decisions in a regional context, (2) plan for long-
term change and unexpected events, (3) preserve rare landscape elements and 
associated species, (4) avoid land uses that deplete natural resources, (5) retain 
large contiguous or connected areas that contain critical habitats, (6) minimize the 
introduction and spread of nonnative species, (7) avoid or compensate for the 
effects of development on ecological processes, and (8) implement land-use and 
management practices that are compatible with the natural potential of the area. 
(p. 632) 
Given these eight core principles, it is evident that caring for land and the surrounding 
environment is congruent with the principles of democratic government. Instead of 
undermining democratic theory or democratic governments, the result of applying these 
principles are governments and citizens that collectively care for both the planet and all 
its inhabitants. Because the basic principles of both democracy and ecology are 
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compatible, merging them is a logical step in sustaining the physical space that a 
democracy and its people inhabit. 
 
The Case of Hong Kong 
Versions of democratic ecology citizenship education are not without precedent, 
and the United States and the EU are not the only examples .In Hong Kong, the notion of 
citizenship education has been recently expanded beyond the nation-state to “include 
world ecology; global, social, and economic relations; and world religions” (Law, 2004, 
p. 254). This expansion allows for students as citizens to understand both national and 
global interests. As a result, students may exhibit more compassion for humans who live 
outside their country’s borders. According to Law, the Hong Kong case is unique in that 
citizenship education incorporates an appreciation for the  
heritage of human civilizations and the world’s diversity. Lessons also relate 
global citizenship to individuals’ duties and responsibilities. Ultimately, their goal 
is to give students the tools to analyze the problems, causes, and solutions 
associated with such issues as global ecology, world peace, and fair distribution of 
resources. (2004, p. 259) 
By teaching both domestic citizenship and global citizenship, students will become more 
prepared to face or possibly avoid catastrophes related to the ecological crisis. 
 
The Case of Romania 
Hong Kong is not alone in reforming its citizenship education and exhibiting 
some of the principles of democratic ecology citizenship education. In the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy, Romanian students had to learn wholly different skills 
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and the school system needed to adapt, but nationwide policies were slow to support 
democratic reform due to the previously addresses poor implementation and weak overall 
strategy. In a case study researching Romania, Tibbitts (2001) suggested that Romania 
was slow to change nationwide citizenship education because in “countries undergoing 
rapid political and economic change, there may be many, even conflicting, emerging 
ideas of political identity among important groups” (p. 27). Tibbitts found one source of 
the problem to be the fact that schools are very important in the development of values in 
a democracy, but the idea of which values to adopt and how a good citizen is defined 
must be carefully considered.  
A few schools in Romania attempted to incorporate ecological principles into 
their citizenship education reform as part of the solution to defining the good citizen. 
With regard to democratic development, “the Romanian study appears to confirm the 
results of others that have shown a clear link between instructional methodology and the 
development of participatory attitudes, or ‘civic behavior’, in students” (Tibbitts, 2001, p. 
38). Students were therefore educated to be a part of the solution via participation in 
policy change. For example, if a student believed in a particular ecological cause, he or 
she could collaborate with other citizens and pressure the government toward a solution 
instead of waiting for government to solve the problem. Thus, citizens who participated 
could spark change and spur government to take action to solve problems that the 
government may otherwise not prioritize. By coupling positive participatory attitudes 
with “social order, politeness, national security, peace, respect for tradition, faith in God 
and harmony with nature,” students in the Romanian schools Tibbitts studied were 
actually learning democratic ecology citizenship lessons(p. 38). Although this study is a 
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positive example in Romania, it only occurred in a few schools and has not been applied 
throughout the country. 
 
Possible Direction 6: Education to mitigate isomorphism 
For citizens to band together and support substantive democratic transition, 
government must help create a space in which to implement this change. The government 
should be the keystone to solving issues that can at first seem unrelated to democratic 
transition such as ecology and democratic development in general. Failure to address 
these issues early on can hinder the success and sustainability of would-be democracies. 
Due to the immensity of the ecological crisis and government’s ability to make macro-
policy shifts, governments can sometimes be the source of the problem if they do not take 
action. Via reformation, citizenship education may help place government on the solving 
end of the crisis. For example, in the article “Ecological Democracy and Sustainable 
Development,” Dietz et al. (2001) pointed to the type of democracy Western countries 
have developed and promoted. Western governments were inherently unfriendly toward 
the environment, some more than others. Dietz et al. (2001) also observed that “while 
democratic societal discourse seems essential for effective engagement with 
environmental problems, such discourse may require structural supports that goes beyond 
those sufficient for traditional liberal democracy” (p. 12). Liberal democracy, in this case, 
is exemplified by Western democracies that have a top-down administration with elected 
representatives. Western democracies, namely the United States, place more value in 
government representatives than in the citizenry itself. Liberal democracies thus differ 
from deliberative democracy, which is defined as “a school of political theory that 
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assumes that genuinely representative public participation in decision-making has the 
potential to produce policy decisions that are more just and more rational than actually 
existing representative mechanisms” (Baber, 2004, p. 332). Therefore, empowering 
citizens is necessary because representatives in liberal democracies do not always act in 
the interests of their constituents and do not always enable democratic action to flourish. 
With the incorporation of ecological principles and the powerful impact of combined 
individual action, democracies will be strengthen as these citizens become empowered, 
better informed and less likely to simply rely blindly on the government for everything.  
 
Topics for Further Study 
 In addition to the macro-level topics mentioned in the previous section regarding 
the use of the theoretical tool of the z-Axis, the general emphasis on education as the tool 
for long-term transition and short-term stability, and the incorporation of ecological 
principles for strengthening and ensuring the sustainability of democracies, other 
practical factors will need further exploration. While the following section does not 
wholly encapsulate all aspects of what must also be considered with regard to Romania’s 
transition, they are issues that require further study. 
 
Special Needs Education 
 The issue of special needs education and special needs treatment is a pressing 
issue that must be addressed and studied further in Romania. During my trip to Romania, 
I witnessed a surprising lack of handicap ramps or elevators to support the physically 
handicapped in accessing stores or public transportation. Comments from those with 
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whom I spoke illustrated the low priority of this matter and the inconvenience it would 
impose for non-handicapped individuals. This same attitude exists toward special needs 
education, possibly as a byproduct of communist educational values. Further 
observational data based on conversations insinuated that, during communism, special 
needs children were separated from others and were not “counted” in testing, nor were 
they provided with equal care or attention. An alarming lack of information on special 
needs education during communist times exists, and the exclusionary attitude against 
these students remains, whether the disability is emotional, intellectual or physical.  
 For example, schools do not all have and are not required to have a special needs 
teachers or departments and often do not even have a school counselor on staff, as 
Interviewee Dan explained: 
we did a sort of screening, in some schools, and at least three children – 
sometimes even more – in a classroom – they don't have [support] because you 
need the professional person to tell this, but they have a behavior that is very 
much alike, and it is very important, too, so they have a potential, let’s say, a 
potential of this. Of course, teachers need help for other – expert for other – but 
unfortunately, Romania only – big, large schools have a counselor or a 
psychologue [psychologist]. The smaller schools, they cannot – they are not 
allowed to hire such a person. 
Without even the basic starting point of a school counselor, special needs children, 
including the physically handicapped, too, have a long, uphill battle to fight. While 
exogenous studies by UNICEF and anti-discrimination law indicate that minor efforts 
were made after the fall of communism, the continued hiding of information and under-
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recognition of this group undermines potential growth of this area, and it remains an area 
for future study as a human rights issue. 
 
Orphans 
 Prior to my research, I spoke with a U.S.-based, American citizen who is an 
expert on the orphans of Romania. While I opted to not include his comments in this 
study because I wanted to focus on the voices of the Romanians, I do wish to paraphrase 
a conversation I had with him in 2008. In short, he said there are as many orphans in 
Romania today as there were during Ceauşescu’s time due to a culture of comfort that 
existed under communism for unknown reasons,38 when many parents had to abandon 
their children for economic or political reasons. Consequently, such abandonment, which 
now occurs primarily for economic reasons, is not viewed as negatively in Romania as it 
is in other countries.  More recently, Romanians abandon their children to work the 
strawberry fields in Spain, a carryover from communism but now for economic reasons. 
While the EU cannot be blamed for this problem because it opened the door for countries 
like Romania to have their citizenry work throughout the region, insufficient attention has 
been paid to the lives of orphans as well as this overall phenomenon. Moreover, the EU 
must increase the sophistication of its assessment mechanisms and not allow for some in 
the Romanian government to play a game of “shells” and spread the orphans throughout 
the country to create the appearance of a declining orphan population when in reality, it is 
about the same.  
                                                            
38 Based on observation, the reason may be that the “state” would take care of the 
children if the individual could not. 
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Role of Development partners 
A real focus must be placed on evaluating the role of development partners for 
Romania, Eastern Europe and any country in transition. In short, development partners, 
including the EU; World Bank USAID; and countries such as the U.K., France, Japan and 
the U.S. must carefully consider how they spend their resources. From my perspective, 
the return on investment of democratic development is poor. While the overall number of 
democratic countries has increased over the last 60 years, the poor quality, strength and 
sustainability of these countries brings about the question of how to best utilize funding 
toward this end. Moreover, countries like Romania and others in (or soon to be in) 
transition must consider the disparate and uncoordinated efforts of these various 
organizations and how they each fit into a broader, domestically-driven strategy. While 
obvious in retrospect, the poorly coordinated efforts of the various entities that provided 
support to Romania were not part of a broad strategy, thereby reducing efficiency and 
effectiveness. Moreover, and outside the scope of merely considering economic factors, 
real damage can be done to the student and citizen in these countries when policies are 
ill-timed, too frequent, or laden with an agenda that is not beneficial. Foreign aid does 
appear to preserve a colonizer-colonized type relationship, since the majority of the 
funding and resources come from the former colonizers and go to countries that are 
traditionally colonized. However, this field has great potential if it could focus on long-





 In essence, this study is an homage to education and a lament about the ways it is 
continually neglected as an institution of nation-building and citizenship development. In 
relation to Romania, through my literature review, document analysis and interviews, I 
was able to provide a clear, in-depth case study about its transition. Even with all of the 
findings, I am still left with many questions. As I came to my final stages of writing this 
study, Tom Friedman of the New York Times wrote an article about Iraq and democratic 
development that had a striking resemblance to the question I would now pose to 
Romania’s elite and citizenry. Friedman wrote: 
from the very beginning of the U.S. intervention in Iraq and the effort to build 
some kind of democracy there, a simple but gnawing question has lurked in the 
background: Was Iraq the way Iraq was (a dictatorship) because Saddam was the 
way Saddam was, or was Saddam the way Saddam was because Iraq was the way 
Iraq was — a collection of warring sects incapable of self-rule and only 
governable with an iron fist? (New York Times, 2010). 
This comment made me question the following: was the Romanian leadership the way it 
was (retaining authority) because the elite were the way they were (also retaining 
authority) or was the inverse true? To answer his question, Friedman continued: 
In many ways, Iraq is a test case for the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 
dictum that ‘the central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics that 
determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can 
change a culture and save it from itself.’ Ironically, though, it was the neo-
conservative Bush team that argued that culture didn’t matter in Iraq, and that the 
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prospect of democracy and self-rule would automatically bring Iraqis together to 
bury the past (New York Times, 2010). 
This central question has been at the epicenter of many studies about democratic 
transition, i.e., does the political system drive societal reform, regardless of culture, to 
achieve the fulfillment of a strong democracy, or does the culture and precedent of 
history leave an indelible mark on the outcome of development despite the political 
system? These bimodal perspectives rarely encapsulate the reality within which decisions 
are made, which is the main impetus for creating the z-Axis: to acknowledge the third-
dimension of democratic theory and democratic education. With the case of Romania, it 
requires and deserves more than an either/or, bimodal solution. Moreover, because 
education is the only institution within a political system whose core potential is to not 
only provide skill-building but also instill an understanding of culture and cultivate a 
comprehension of politics, perhaps Friedman, Moynihan and Bush were all close, but 
wrong—like so many in the development policy world and colonizing world before that.  
Each country, in educating its population, creates the culture it deserves measured 
by the resources and effort put into shaping all of the elements that comprise education 
(Barzun, 1989). Likewise, each country empowers a population through education for a 
political system it deserves, measured by the framework and expectations it places upon 
the actors of the education system. Therefore, if Romania truly wants a strong democracy 
and independence from colonizers and neocolonizers, it must create an education system 
it desires—and one it deserves. When this happens, Romania can represent for Eastern 
Europe and all transitional democracies a new way of democratizing through knowledge, 
practice and application. Because education is a cultural institution, it is only education 
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that can cause a societal shift which can determine the success of a democracy and forge 






The following key terms are defined for the purpose of my case study: 
 
Colonialism: the act of an aggressor country taking control by force or threat of force a  
less powerful country who concedes by defeat or to avoid bloodshed elements of 
ruling the country so as to no longer be wholly sovereign; also, the theory which 
critically explores this phenomenon. 
Colonization: the act of populating or taking control of a country; used as a term  
interchangeably with colonialism.   
Decentralization: the act by a democratic government by which responsibility and  
authority are disseminated from a central institution or entity throughout the 
country into local hubs.  
Democracy: a form of government whereby officials are elected to represent the  
citizenry; a system of checks and balances that mitigates tendencies toward 
increasing the authority of government; a form of government that is often 
considered Western. 
Democratic Education: a type of education that supports a democratic government  
by educating the citizenry to be able to participate in a democratic system; 
democratic education can be integrated into many subject areas and through 
various methods of instruction, but is often taught in civics courses. 
Democratization: the process by which a country progresses toward the establishment of  
a strong, stable and functioning democracy; considered to be a long-term process.   
Elite, Bureaucratic Elite: Elected, appointed or hired officials within the government or  
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organizations with the ability to create, impact, or implement policy, law or the 
course of actions for a country; for those interviewed elite, they held or now hold 
positions of influence within the Ministry of Education or organizations which 
impact education.  
Globalization: a phenomenon by which ideas, goods, values and traditions are spread in  
an ever-increasing rate throughout the world; a theory that critically evaluates the 
various ways in which globalization impacts countries or individuals.  
Isomorphism: a phenomenon by which institutions or entities foster homogenization or  
assimilation through mimicry, coercion or normative means; also a theory that 
critically evaluates the phenomenon of isomorphism. 
Modernization: the act of modernizing or developing to incorporate increasingly  
sophisticated uses of technology or infrastructure; a theory that critically evaluates 
the impact of modernization; also used interchangeably with modernism. 
Neocolonialism: a phenomenon with the same attributes as colonialism but without the  
obvious or overt tactics which require a physical presence; a subtle version of 
colonialism with an equally powerful effect. 
Transition: a country’s movement from one form of government toward a new form of  
government; not always linear or with clear-cut normative markers of assessment;  
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